In Kapable Kids the court followed Eighth Circuit precedent recognizing enforceable Medicaid rights and denied summary judgment on that basis. Kapable Kids Learning Center, In… ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
The case involved a private plaintiff suing on behalf of the United States under the Medicare Secondary Payer statute to recover double damages from Catholic Health Initiatives, alleging the healthcare provider failed to pay for medical care it caused to Medicare recipients and improperly received Medicare reimbursements instead. Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The court analyzed whether the MSP's private cause of action functions as a qui tam provision similar to the False Claims Act, noting that Congress enacted the MSP private right of action in the same legislation period as the FCA's explicit qui tam amendments but without comparable procedural protections or government involvement requirements. It concluded that the MSP statute does not authorize such suits by private individuals on behalf of the government, leading to dismissal of the action.
The case involved the Green Party of Arkansas seeking official recognition as a political party to allow its candidates, including nominee Jim Lendall for governor, to appear on the 2006 ballot with an accurate party label rather than as independents. The plaintiffs challenged Arkansas's requirement under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-7-205 of 24,171 signatures (3% of votes cast) for new party certification as compared to the 10,000-signature threshold for independent candidates under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-7-103, arguing it violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled that the 3% requirement was not narrowly drawn to serve the state's interest in avoiding cluttered ballots, imposed a severe burden on associational rights, and was much higher than necessary given that the 10,000-signature threshold suffices. It therefore declared the party-recognition threshold unconstitutional, enjoined the Secretary of State from failing to recognize the Green Party, directed ballot access for the election, and awarded costs and fees.
The case involved Kapable Kids Learning Center suing the Arkansas Department of Human Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after its application for enrollment as a Medicaid provider in the Developmental Disabilities Treatment Clinic Services program was rejected on grounds that no new providers would be added without first determining need and issuing a Request for Proposal. The plaintiff alleged violations of Medicaid Act provisions (42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(30)(A), (a)(1), and (a)(23)) requiring economy, efficiency, quality of care, and equal access, plus equal protection claims based on differential treatment compared to other Medicaid programs. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the Eighth Circuit recognizes enforceable rights under these provisions, that material factual disputes remain regarding licensing requirements and compliance, and that sovereign immunity and jurisdictional challenges do not bar the suit at this stage. The decision turned on precedent from Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and the existence of triable issues on whether the state's actions complied with federal Medicaid mandates.
In Bryant v. Barnhart, the plaintiff sought judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits, claiming disability since 1999 due to joint pain, high blood pressure, chest and shoulder pain, and related symptoms that prevented him from continuing his work operating a grocery store. The district court rejected the magistrate judge's recommendation to affirm the denial, holding that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The court reasoned that the ALJ improperly relied on opinions from non-examining medical sources without fully developing the record, failed to objectively consider the claimant's testimony and his daughter's corroborating evidence about his physical limitations and the forced closure of his business, and did not adequately address the need for consultative examinations. Accordingly, the court reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings.
The case involved Pamela Allen, a Black employee at Tobacco Superstore, Inc., suing under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging race discrimination in the failure to promote her to assistant manager and manager positions and retaliation for an EEOC charge, along with discriminatory discharge. After vacating an initial jury verdict due to procedural issues and treating the jury as advisory, the court found that the company discriminated against Allen on the basis of race by denying her promotions in January 2002 and November 2002, and retaliated against her in the November 2002 manager promotion decision. The court awarded back pay of $16,116.21 plus interest, $7,500 in compensatory damages, and $75,000 in punitive damages, jointly and severally against the defendants, based on evidence that white employees were promoted over Allen despite comparable or lesser qualifications, inconsistencies in the company's handling of incidents, and a pattern of ignoring discriminatory conduct.
This case concerns a 1965 ground lease for University Mall in Little Rock, Arkansas, under which the defendant lessees developed and subleased the property in exchange for base and percentage rents, with the lease running until 2026 and having been amended six times. The plaintiffs asserted two claims: breach of an express covenant requiring the property to be kept in good repair, for which they sought an injunction, and breach of an implied covenant requiring the lessees to secure and maintain viable retail subtenants to generate percentage rents, for which they sought damages. The defendants moved to dismiss only the second claim. The court granted the motion, holding that Arkansas law does not recognize such an implied covenant in a commercial lease because implied covenants are disfavored, the written agreement is presumed to contain all intended obligations, and the lease terms are unambiguous. The court noted that the parties, as sophisticated commercial actors, allocated risks through express provisions, and discovery would not alter the legal insufficiency of the implied-covenant claim.