George Howard jr

The case involved a private plaintiff suing on behalf of the United States under the Medicare Secondary Payer statute to recover double damages from Catholic Health Initiatives, alleging the healthcare provider failed to pay for medical care it caused to Medicare recipients and improperly received Medicare reimbursements instead. Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The court analyzed whether the MSP's private cause of action functions as a qui tam provision similar to the False Claims Act, noting that Congress enacted the MSP private right of action in the same legislation period as the FCA's explicit qui tam amendments but without comparable procedural protections or government involvement requirements. It concluded that the MSP statute does not authorize such suits by private individuals on behalf of the government, leading to dismissal of the action.

healthcareprocedure

The case involved the Green Party of Arkansas seeking official recognition as a political party to allow its candidates, including nominee Jim Lendall for governor, to appear on the 2006 ballot with an accurate party label rather than as independents. The plaintiffs challenged Arkansas's requirement under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-7-205 of 24,171 signatures (3% of votes cast) for new party certification as compared to the 10,000-signature threshold for independent candidates under Ark. Code Ann. § 7-7-103, arguing it violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court ruled that the 3% requirement was not narrowly drawn to serve the state's interest in avoiding cluttered ballots, imposed a severe burden on associational rights, and was much higher than necessary given that the 10,000-signature threshold suffices. It therefore declared the party-recognition threshold unconstitutional, enjoined the Secretary of State from failing to recognize the Green Party, directed ballot access for the election, and awarded costs and fees.

electionscivil rights

The case involved Kapable Kids Learning Center suing the Arkansas Department of Human Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after its application for enrollment as a Medicaid provider in the Developmental Disabilities Treatment Clinic Services program was rejected on grounds that no new providers would be added without first determining need and issuing a Request for Proposal. The plaintiff alleged violations of Medicaid Act provisions (42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(30)(A), (a)(1), and (a)(23)) requiring economy, efficiency, quality of care, and equal access, plus equal protection claims based on differential treatment compared to other Medicaid programs. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the Eighth Circuit recognizes enforceable rights under these provisions, that material factual disputes remain regarding licensing requirements and compliance, and that sovereign immunity and jurisdictional challenges do not bar the suit at this stage. The decision turned on precedent from Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Department of Human Services and the existence of triable issues on whether the state's actions complied with federal Medicaid mandates.

healthcarecivil rightsfederal power

In Bryant v. Barnhart, the plaintiff sought judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits, claiming disability since 1999 due to joint pain, high blood pressure, chest and shoulder pain, and related symptoms that prevented him from continuing his work operating a grocery store. The district court rejected the magistrate judge's recommendation to affirm the denial, holding that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The court reasoned that the ALJ improperly relied on opinions from non-examining medical sources without fully developing the record, failed to objectively consider the claimant's testimony and his daughter's corroborating evidence about his physical limitations and the forced closure of his business, and did not adequately address the need for consultative examinations. Accordingly, the court reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings.

labor & employmenthealthcare

The case involved Pamela Allen, a Black employee at Tobacco Superstore, Inc., suing under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging race discrimination in the failure to promote her to assistant manager and manager positions and retaliation for an EEOC charge, along with discriminatory discharge. After vacating an initial jury verdict due to procedural issues and treating the jury as advisory, the court found that the company discriminated against Allen on the basis of race by denying her promotions in January 2002 and November 2002, and retaliated against her in the November 2002 manager promotion decision. The court awarded back pay of $16,116.21 plus interest, $7,500 in compensatory damages, and $75,000 in punitive damages, jointly and severally against the defendants, based on evidence that white employees were promoted over Allen despite comparable or lesser qualifications, inconsistencies in the company's handling of incidents, and a pattern of ignoring discriminatory conduct.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case concerns a 1965 ground lease for University Mall in Little Rock, Arkansas, under which the defendant lessees developed and subleased the property in exchange for base and percentage rents, with the lease running until 2026 and having been amended six times. The plaintiffs asserted two claims: breach of an express covenant requiring the property to be kept in good repair, for which they sought an injunction, and breach of an implied covenant requiring the lessees to secure and maintain viable retail subtenants to generate percentage rents, for which they sought damages. The defendants moved to dismiss only the second claim. The court granted the motion, holding that Arkansas law does not recognize such an implied covenant in a commercial lease because implied covenants are disfavored, the written agreement is presumed to contain all intended obligations, and the lease terms are unambiguous. The court noted that the parties, as sophisticated commercial actors, allocated risks through express provisions, and discovery would not alter the legal insufficiency of the implied-covenant claim.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves defendant Mark Files' motion to suppress evidence seized from his home pursuant to a search warrant, claiming the warrant lacked probable cause due to deficiencies and inaccuracies in the supporting affidavit by Officer Roy. The court denied the motion, holding that the search did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The reasoning was based on the totality of circumstances, including a five-year investigation by multiple agencies corroborated by recent monitored activities involving a co-defendant's arrest and communications confirming drug trafficking at or near the home.

criminal law

This case involves a former employee of the Arkansas Beverage Control Division who sued the Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration, the Beverage Control Board, and various officials and employees, alleging race and color discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under Title VII, as well as related claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. Earlier rulings had dismissed many claims, including those against certain defendants and under Title VII for failure to promote and sex discrimination, leaving only specific claims for race discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment, and some individual-capacity claims to proceed. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding events such as an alleged physical assault, the filing of a grievance, and the reasons for the plaintiff's termination. The decision emphasized that credibility determinations and the weighing of conflicting evidence must be resolved by a jury rather than on summary judgment, noting the close temporal proximity between the grievance and termination as relevant to the retaliation claim. The court also scheduled the matter for a jury trial.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Larry Nance's challenge to the Social Security Administration's denial of disability insurance benefits to his late wife, Rosemary Nance, who had applied based on symptoms including joint pain, edema, back problems, seizures, and dizziness that affected her ability to work after leaving her job at K-Mart. The district court reviewed the ALJ's decision, which had relied on a vocational expert's testimony about available jobs and found that Mrs. Nance was not disabled. The court reversed the Commissioner's ruling and remanded the matter under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings. It concluded that the ALJ's decision lacked substantial evidence because the hypothetical question to the vocational expert did not fully account for the claimant's alleged physical limitations, such as swelling and grasping difficulties, and because the ALJ failed to properly develop the record or weigh subjective complaints alongside medical evidence.

federal powerprocedurehealthcare

This case involves plaintiff Apryl Fuller’s appeal of the Social Security Administration’s denial of Disability Insurance benefits based on her asthma, allergies, and related conditions. The district court rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation to affirm the denial, finding that the ALJ’s decision lacked substantial evidence. The court reasoned that the ALJ failed to properly account for the plaintiff’s subjective complaints about breathing difficulties, steroid side effects, and memory issues, as well as supporting testimony from her mother, and that the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert omitted key limitations such as sensitivity to perfumes. The court therefore reversed the Commissioner’s ruling and remanded the case under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration of the evidence.

labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure

This case involved a widow's claim for accidental death benefits under an ERISA-governed policy issued by AIG after her husband was fatally shot during a confrontation he initiated with another man. AIG denied the claim, arguing the death resulted from injuries received in an encounter provoked by the deceased rather than an accident. The court held that the death qualified as accidental under ERISA standards because it was not reasonably foreseeable or intended, awarding the plaintiff $88,000 in benefits plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs. The court also imposed a $3,700 statutory penalty on AIG for failing to timely provide requested plan documents.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In Wheeler v. Prince, a federal inmate sued prison officials alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, including heart conditions, back pain, and migraines, in violation of his constitutional rights. The magistrate judge recommended granting the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court rejected that recommendation, finding that the grievances adequately raised the claims, including possible retaliation, and that further proceedings were needed; it therefore denied the motion and remanded the case, while noting requirements for fair notice to pro se prisoners on summary judgment. The court also addressed service of process issues but declined to dismiss on that basis.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a claim for supplemental security income benefits due to alleged disability from conditions including fibromyalgia, Lyme's disease, chronic fatigue syndrome, and various nonexertional impairments such as pain, weakness, and neurological issues. The district court rejected the magistrate judge's recommendation to affirm the Social Security Commissioner's denial of benefits, finding that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The court reasoned that the ALJ improperly discounted the plaintiff's subjective complaints and the treating physician's opinion in favor of a consulting physician's report, and erroneously applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines without considering the need for a vocational expert given the nonexertional impairments. The matter was remanded for further proceedings to properly evaluate the evidence.

labor & employment

In United States v. Hively, the defendant moved to dismiss remaining criminal charges, claiming that a prior judge had prepared a favorable ruling on motions for judgment of acquittal before recusing and that this unfiled ruling entitled him to double jeopardy protection barring further prosecution; he also sought an evidentiary hearing to substantiate the claim. The court denied both the motion to dismiss and the hearing request. The core reasoning was that no order had been signed or filed by the prior judge, rendering any alleged ruling invalid and without effect under established legal principles requiring entry of orders, and the record provided no colorable double jeopardy issue.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, the successor administrator of a decedent's estate and the decedent's former wife sued Reassure America Life Insurance seeking a declaratory judgment to recover benefits under a $500,000 life insurance policy. During the litigation, the plaintiffs' attorney met with a CPA firm to discuss it potentially serving as successor administrator and allegedly shared confidential information about the estate, the decedent's state of mind, and legal theories. The CPA firm declined the role but later one of its members, Bruce Engstrom, was retained by the defendant's counsel as an expert witness on financial matters. The plaintiffs moved to disqualify both Engstrom and the defendant's counsel, arguing breach of confidentiality and privilege. The court denied the motion, finding no objectively reasonable confidential relationship was established in the single meeting, no confidential information was actually disclosed to the expert or opposing counsel, and policy considerations weighed against disqualification.

procedure

This case concerns federal criminal charges against Thomas T.J. Hively, a former prosecuting attorney in Arkansas's Sixteenth Judicial District, for racketeering under RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962), multiple counts of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956), and extortion (18 U.S.C. § 1951), alleging he used his office from 1993 to 1998 to obtain personal funds through fraudulent schemes involving state and federal grants, drug task force salaries, and coerced property transfers. After a seven-week jury trial ended in a mistrial on the remaining 16 counts, Hively moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient evidence of intent to harm and lack of detail in the charges. The court denied the motions, finding the evidence—including Hively's receipt of $464,117.63 in benefits tied to his official actions and specific misrepresentations in mailings—sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict on the RICO pattern and related offenses. The court scheduled a retrial for September 2003.

criminal law

In Tucker v. United States, petitioner Jim Guy Tucker, then Governor of Arkansas, moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence after a 1996 conviction on conspiracy and mail fraud counts arising from a scheme to misuse funds of Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan and Capital Management Services, a small business investment company. The opinion recites the indictment details, the jury's findings on fraudulent loans including one to Castle Sewer and Water, acquittals on other counts, and background on related investigations by regulators and the independent counsel. It further discusses complaints by Mandanici and others alleging conflicts involving Independent Counsel Starr, as well as the court's own recusal from those matters. The court explained its recusal stemmed from potential overlap with issues Tucker had raised in his still-pending § 2255 proceeding, to avoid any appearance of improper motive.

criminal law

In Taylor v. Comcast Cablevision of Arkansas, Inc., the plaintiff sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act alleging that the defendant refused to reasonably accommodate his disability. While an EEOC charge was pending, the plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy but did not disclose the charge or potential lawsuit as an asset; he later received a discharge and then filed this action. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) and that judicial estoppel barred the claim due to the nondisclosure. The court denied the motion, holding that the bankruptcy estate could be reopened and the trustee substituted as plaintiff under Rule 17(a) to avoid forfeiture, and that judicial estoppel did not apply because the omission was an inadvertent mistake rather than intentional deception, as the plaintiff had relied on counsel and taken corrective action by reopening the bankruptcy case.

civil rightsprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Cozetta A. Ausler sued the Arkansas Department of Education alleging race-based discriminatory employment practices regarding her job duties and compensation, a hostile work environment based on race, retaliation for complaints about working conditions, and a state-law defamation claim. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the claim involving employment decisions about job duties and compensation, finding that it raised genuine issues of material fact implicating motive, credibility, and intent. The court granted summary judgment on the hostile work environment, retaliation, and defamation claims. For the defamation claim, the court reasoned that the statements at issue were internal agency communications and thus not published to third parties as required under Arkansas law, while the other claims failed to establish the necessary elements to survive summary judgment.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case was a Title VII pregnancy discrimination suit in which the plaintiff alleged she was terminated from her welder position after requesting light duty due to pregnancy-related restrictions. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, rendering the motion to dismiss moot. It found that the undisputed facts showed the employer provided modified assignments only for occupational injuries, and the plaintiff offered no admissible evidence of differential treatment compared to similarly situated employees. The plaintiff failed to meet her burden under Rule 56 by resting on conclusory statements rather than specific facts creating a triable issue.

labor & employmentcivil rights