This case involves a habeas corpus petition challenging a magistrate judge's certification for extradition to Thailand on charges of conspiracy to distribute heroin. The petitioner sought discovery regarding Thai drug laws and policies, argued against probable cause, and raised concerns about potential treatment in Thailand, but the magistrate denied the discovery motion and found sufficient probable cause after an extradition hearing. The district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation, denying the petition with prejudice. The core reasoning was that extradition proceedings are limited to assessing whether the offense is extraditable under the treaty and whether probable cause exists, with no authority to inquire into foreign procedures or policies under the rule of non-inquiry, and that the magistrate did not abuse discretion in denying discovery.
The case involved a prisoner who filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in 1997 seeking damages for injuries and lack of medical care suffered in 1993 while incarcerated. A prior similar action filed in 1994 had been dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. The court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the action with prejudice, holding that the one-year statute of limitations applicable to such claims in California barred the suit, as the prior dismissal did not toll the limitations period and no other extension applied.
The case concerned Michael O'Mara's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 1990 conviction for possessing an unregistered machine gun in violation of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The court denied the motion. It rejected arguments based on the Tenth Circuit's Dalton decision that section 922(o)'s 1986 machine-gun ban rendered registration impossible and thus unconstitutional under due process or tax-power limits. Instead, the court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent holding that section 5861(d) remains valid as a regulation of interstate commerce and that the offense does not require the possessor to have been able to register the firearm.
The case involved Hoag Memorial Hospital suing defendants connected to an employee benefit plan after the plan denied payment for treatment of an injured employee, claiming the defendants had misrepresented that the patient was covered. The hospital alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and estoppel based on its own dealings with the defendants, not on any assignment of the patient's rights under the plan. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that ERISA preempted all the state-law claims. The court held that the claims were not preempted because they did not relate to the ERISA plan in a manner affecting the relationship among traditional ERISA entities and instead concerned independent misrepresentations to a third-party provider. The court therefore remanded the case to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction.
This case concerns insurance coverage disputes arising from 28 homeowners' property damage claims against Chemstar for pitting in interior plaster walls, caused by excessive periclase in Type S lime manufactured by Chemstar's predecessor between 1984 and 1986. On cross-motions for summary judgment in the indemnification phase, the court held that the claims stemmed from a single "occurrence" for purposes of policy limits and that coverage was triggered only once, at the first manifestation of visible pitting. The core reasoning was that all tainted lime came from the same quarry and manufacturing defects, pitting was not inevitable in every home but depended on specific pellet size and location, and no further damage occurred once hydration stabilized the material.
This case concerns whether a bankruptcy court can preside over a jury trial in a core proceeding involving a trustee's claims for fraudulent conveyance against defendants who have not filed claims against the estate. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to conduct a jury trial, holding that the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments authorize bankruptcy judges to handle jury trials in core matters. The reasoning relies on reconciling the statutory mandate for bankruptcy courts to issue final orders in core proceedings with the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials established in Granfinanciera, without violating Article III, as supported by the Second Circuit's decision in In re Ben Cooper. The court distinguished this from non-core proceedings where de novo review by district courts would conflict with jury findings.