Harry Lindley Hupp

This case involves a habeas corpus petition challenging a magistrate judge's certification for extradition to Thailand on charges of conspiracy to distribute heroin. The petitioner sought discovery regarding Thai drug laws and policies, argued against probable cause, and raised concerns about potential treatment in Thailand, but the magistrate denied the discovery motion and found sufficient probable cause after an extradition hearing. The district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation, denying the petition with prejudice. The core reasoning was that extradition proceedings are limited to assessing whether the offense is extraditable under the treaty and whether probable cause exists, with no authority to inquire into foreign procedures or policies under the rule of non-inquiry, and that the magistrate did not abuse discretion in denying discovery.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved a prisoner who filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in 1997 seeking damages for injuries and lack of medical care suffered in 1993 while incarcerated. A prior similar action filed in 1994 had been dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. The court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the action with prejudice, holding that the one-year statute of limitations applicable to such claims in California barred the suit, as the prior dismissal did not toll the limitations period and no other extension applied.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Michael O'Mara's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 1990 conviction for possessing an unregistered machine gun in violation of the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The court denied the motion. It rejected arguments based on the Tenth Circuit's Dalton decision that section 922(o)'s 1986 machine-gun ban rendered registration impossible and thus unconstitutional under due process or tax-power limits. Instead, the court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent holding that section 5861(d) remains valid as a regulation of interstate commerce and that the offense does not require the possessor to have been able to register the firearm.

gunscriminal lawfederal powertaxes

The case involved Hoag Memorial Hospital suing defendants connected to an employee benefit plan after the plan denied payment for treatment of an injured employee, claiming the defendants had misrepresented that the patient was covered. The hospital alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and estoppel based on its own dealings with the defendants, not on any assignment of the patient's rights under the plan. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that ERISA preempted all the state-law claims. The court held that the claims were not preempted because they did not relate to the ERISA plan in a manner affecting the relationship among traditional ERISA entities and instead concerned independent misrepresentations to a third-party provider. The court therefore remanded the case to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

This case concerns insurance coverage disputes arising from 28 homeowners' property damage claims against Chemstar for pitting in interior plaster walls, caused by excessive periclase in Type S lime manufactured by Chemstar's predecessor between 1984 and 1986. On cross-motions for summary judgment in the indemnification phase, the court held that the claims stemmed from a single "occurrence" for purposes of policy limits and that coverage was triggered only once, at the first manifestation of visible pitting. The core reasoning was that all tainted lime came from the same quarry and manufacturing defects, pitting was not inevitable in every home but depended on specific pellet size and location, and no further damage occurred once hydration stabilized the material.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case concerns whether a bankruptcy court can preside over a jury trial in a core proceeding involving a trustee's claims for fraudulent conveyance against defendants who have not filed claims against the estate. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to conduct a jury trial, holding that the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments authorize bankruptcy judges to handle jury trials in core matters. The reasoning relies on reconciling the statutory mandate for bankruptcy courts to issue final orders in core proceedings with the Seventh Amendment right to jury trials established in Granfinanciera, without violating Article III, as supported by the Second Circuit's decision in In re Ben Cooper. The court distinguished this from non-core proceedings where de novo review by district courts would conflict with jury findings.

procedurefederal power

This case concerned whether the EPA remained obligated under a 1989 court-approved settlement to promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for the South Coast Air Basin after Congress enacted the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments, which revised standards, submission schedules for State Implementation Plans (SIPs), and the timeline for EPA to develop an FIP upon SIP disapproval. The court granted EPA's motion to vacate the settlement and dismissed the action. It reasoned that the amended statute is ambiguous as to whether the FIP obligation attaches to the previously rejected 1988 SIP or to new SIPs prepared under the revised criteria and timetables; the Act's structure favors state-led planning with EPA's FIP role as a backstop, legislative history indicates the savings clause does not require completion of the prior FIP process, and EPA's interpretation of the amendments warrants deference under Chevron.

environmentfederal power

This case involves a patent infringement lawsuit filed by Stuart Meyers against ASICS Corp., a Japanese manufacturer of sports shoes, alleging that ASICS shoes infringe Meyers' patent for a special sole and insole design. After the action was dismissed in New York for lack of personal jurisdiction, it was refiled in the Central District of California, where ASICS moved to dismiss for insufficient contacts with the forum and to quash service made by registered mail to Japan. The court denied both motions, holding that specific personal jurisdiction exists because ASICS purposefully availed itself of the California market by manufacturing and shipping infringing products through its independent U.S. subsidiary for distribution in the state, with sales generating approximately $15 million annually, and the claims arise directly from those forum-related activities. The court also determined that service complied with applicable rules and that exercising jurisdiction was reasonable under the circumstances, without relying on an alter ego theory.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a 1986 state court lawsuit by Phillips against Allstate Insurance and fictitious Doe defendants, which Allstate sought to remove to federal court on diversity grounds after the November 1988 Judicial Improvement and Access to Justice Act took effect. The Act allowed courts to disregard the citizenship of fictitiously named defendants for removal purposes, prompting Allstate to file its notice of removal in December 1988. The court remanded the case to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, holding that the removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because the new statute did not qualify as an "other paper" triggering the thirty-day removal period and because the Act's one-year limit on diversity removals applied to cases already pending on its effective date.

procedurefederal power

In Carter v. Gibbs, seven IRS Revenue Officers, who were union members covered by a collective bargaining agreement, sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act for overtime pay, with nearly 300 additional federal employees later opting in. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, holding that the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 preempts district court jurisdiction over FLSA claims by unionized federal civil servants. The core reasoning was that CSRA section 7121 makes negotiated grievance procedures the exclusive remedy for such claims, which qualify as grievances under the statute's broad definition and are not excluded by its exceptions, with legislative history confirming Congress's intent to channel these matters through administrative processes rather than federal court.

labor & employmentfederal powerprocedure

The case involved an employee who sued his employer, Trans World Airlines, and others in California state court in 1980 for wrongful termination, bad faith, and fraud arising from his 1979 firing, with disputes over whether state claims were preempted by ERISA. After multiple amendments, appeals, and proceedings in state court, the defendant petitioned for removal to federal court in 1987, citing diversity jurisdiction after the plaintiff filed an at-issue memorandum. The court remanded the action to the Superior Court for Los Angeles County, holding that any removal right based on ERISA preemption and arising-under jurisdiction existed and should have been exercised within 30 days of the 1980 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Later events creating apparent diversity did not revive a waived right to remove, as the removal statute is strictly construed against removal and the abandonment of Doe defendants did not create a new action.

labor & employmentprocedurefederal power

BV Engineering sued the Regents of the University of California for copyright infringement, alleging that the university illegally copied seven of its copyrighted software programs and documentation. The court granted the Regents' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. It held that the Board of Regents is an instrumentality of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from damage suits in federal court. The court reasoned that states are presumptively immune from such suits even under federal-question jurisdiction, and that Congress had not clearly expressed an intent in the Copyright Act (enacted under Article I) to abrogate that immunity. Although the complaint also sought injunctive relief, the court found no live issue remained on that claim.

federal powerproperty

In this criminal case, defendant Kevin James Sherbondy was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), with an enhancement under § 924(e)(1) based on three prior violent felony convictions, including one under California Penal Code § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness that could involve threats to persons or property. The defendant moved to strike the allegation of the California conviction, arguing it did not necessarily qualify as a violent felony and that the court could not examine the underlying facts. The court denied the motion, holding that the statute's definition of violent felony requires examining whether the conduct involved threatened force against a person or presented a serious risk of physical injury, and that congressional intent permits looking beyond the statute to the facts of the prior conviction when needed. The government was allowed to introduce extrinsic evidence, such as a plea statement, to show the conviction involved a threat against a person.

gunscriminal law