This case involves advertisers suing Newsday, Hoy, their distributor, and various employees, alleging a scheme to inflate reported circulation numbers by up to 50% through false submissions to the Audit Bureau of Circulation, which allowed defendants to charge higher advertising rates. Plaintiffs asserted RICO claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d), RICO conspiracy, and state-law claims for unjust enrichment, fraud, and violations of New York General Business Law § 349. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss the fourth amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), applying the plausibility standard from Twombly and evaluating whether the pleadings sufficiently alleged predicate acts, enterprise conduct, and conspiracy agreements. Some individual defendants, such as Brennan, faced surviving RICO claims based on specific allegations of directing fraudulent activity, while others, such as Halfmann, had all claims dismissed for lack of particularized allegations.
The case concerns plaintiffs Field Day LLC and AEG Live LLC, who sought to stage a large music festival in Riverhead but had their mass gathering permit application denied by Suffolk County and faced additional requirements from the Town of Riverhead and its police chief, leading to claims of First Amendment free speech violations along with tortious interference, prima facie tort, and negligence. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment by Riverhead, Police Chief Hegermiller, and the plaintiffs. It denied the motions in most respects, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether arbitrary prerequisites like an estimated need for 200 officers and intermunicipal agreements improperly blocked the event, but granted dismissal of the prima facie tort claim against those two defendants as a matter of law. The reasoning centered on the summary judgment standard requiring denial where rational jurors could differ on the facts, while concluding that the specific tort claim failed legally regardless of disputed facts.
The case arose from Field Day LLC's efforts to secure a mass gathering permit and other approvals from Suffolk County and the Town of Riverhead to stage a two-day music festival in June 2003, after entering a licensing agreement with a local development agency; the application was denied based on the local police chief's statement that traffic control could not be adequately managed. Plaintiffs sued the County, various individual officials, the Town, and others, alleging unlawful interference with their ability to hold the event, including possible influence from a competitor. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court denied plaintiffs' motion in full and denied the County defendants' motion except for dismissing claims against two individual defendants and the prima facie tort claim. The core reasoning focused on the existence of disputed factual issues regarding the permitting process, the validity of the traffic-related denial, and whether certain requirements like intermunicipal agreements were properly imposed or applied.
This case involves a discovery dispute in an employment lawsuit where defendants sought production of two April 2003 draft memos authored by plaintiff Lara Curto on a company laptop. A magistrate judge ruled that the memos were protected by attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine, and defendants objected to that ruling. The court found that plaintiff's act of attaching the memos as unsealed exhibits to her opposition papers on the public docket waived any applicable privilege or protection. As a result, the court deemed defendants' objections moot and directed further proceedings on remaining discovery and summary judgment issues.
In Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free School District, plaintiff Stephanie Bucalo sued the defendant school district under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the New York State Human Rights Law, alleging she was denied a Library Media Specialist position in 2003 due to her age and in retaliation for a prior EEOC charge. The case proceeded to a four-day jury trial, after which the jury returned a verdict for the defendant, finding that Bucalo had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that age or retaliation motivated the decision not to interview or hire her. Bucalo then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59. The court denied the motion, holding that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence presented and that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework did not require the result urged by the plaintiff in a jury-tried case.
This case involves Hispanic former residents of a multi-family apartment building in the Incorporated Village of Farmingdale who sued the Village under the federal Fair Housing Act, alleging discriminatory housing practices that displaced them through targeted redevelopment efforts and enforcement actions. The plaintiffs claimed these steps, including revival of the Secatogue Avenue Redevelopment Project after a 2004 election, stricter parking rules, and approval of building permits for renovations, were motivated by anti-Hispanic sentiment toward day laborers in their neighborhood. The Village moved for summary judgment, asserting no discriminatory plan existed and its actions were legitimate. The court denied the motion, finding genuine disputes of material fact on whether the Village's conduct violated the FHA, including evidence of disparate impact and intent tied to the area's demographic changes and tenant displacement.