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Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
PurposivismTextualism
In Armstrong, the decision rests on the statute's plain language prohibiting re-imposition of special parole after revocation. Armstrong v. United States Parol… ↗
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
In McCoy, the court applies longstanding Supreme Court precedents establishing baseball's antitrust exemption without questioning them. McCoy v. Major League Baseball ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
In Groom v. Safeway, Inc., plaintiff Patricia Groom sued Safeway and an off-duty Seattle police officer for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims after the officer, hired by Safeway, detained and searched her based on a mistaken shoplifting suspicion, resulting in an unreasonable detention. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $7,500 total and punitive damages of $752,500, primarily against Safeway. The court denied Safeway's motion to dismiss the claims, reaffirming that Safeway acted under color of state law due to its employment relationship with the officer and that its lack of training proximately caused the deprivation. However, the court granted in part the motion on damages, finding the punitive award against Safeway excessive under due process standards and reducing it substantially while upholding the liability findings.
The case involved two appellants charged with DUI under Washington state law (RCW 46.61.502) as assimilated into federal law on Bremerton Naval Base, who moved to dismiss on grounds that the statute's two-hour BAC rule was unconstitutional. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's denial of the motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that the rule is a valid exercise of state police power because it substantially relates to public highway safety, does not create a mandatory presumption of guilt, and is not unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The case involved JJR, Inc., which operated a Tacoma nightclub featuring nude and semi-nude dancers and sought a refund of employment taxes, penalties, and interest assessed by the IRS for late 1991 through 1992; the United States counterclaimed for the unpaid balance. JJR had treated the performers as independent contractors under written lease-style contracts rather than employees, and the parties disputed whether wages were paid or an employment relationship existed. Building on its prior decision in Marlar, Inc. v. United States, the court granted JJR’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the company qualified for safe-harbor relief under § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. That provision protects taxpayers who have consistently treated workers as non-employees, filed required returns, and followed a long-standing practice in the relevant industry. The court therefore relieved JJR of liability for the assessed employment taxes without resolving the underlying employee-versus-contractor classification.
The case concerned Charles Allen Armstrong's petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the United States Parole Commission (USPC), challenging its authority to re-release him under conditions of special parole after revoking his special parole term. The court granted the petition in part, ordering release from the special parole conditions, but denied it insofar as Armstrong sought complete release from USPC jurisdiction. The facts involved multiple revocations of Armstrong's parole and special parole stemming from his 1979 sentence for heroin distribution. The court's reasoning centered on the statute's plain language, which provides that revocation converts the special parole term into a new term of imprisonment without authorizing re-imposition of special parole upon partial re-release, consistent with interpretations of similar supervised release provisions by multiple other circuits.
This case concerns a dispute over whether plaintiff BSB Diversified Company is entitled to proceeds under insurance policies issued in the 1970s and 1980s to predecessor companies for environmental cleanup liabilities at the contaminated Hytek site in Kent, Washington. BSB assumed those liabilities through a 1987 redemption agreement and asset transfer from Criton Technologies, after an EPA report in 1981 had already identified groundwater contamination requiring state and federal remediation. Applying Washington law in this diversity action, the court granted BSB's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the 1987 transfer assigned the rights to pre-loss insurance proceeds as a chose in action and that no-assignment clauses did not bar post-occurrence transfers. Alternatively, the court held that coverage follows liability by operation of law under Ninth Circuit precedent. The decision turned on undisputed facts of the corporate transfers and the timing of the contamination events.
The case involved Marlar, Inc., owner of an adult entertainment club featuring nude and semi-nude dancing, which the IRS assessed for unpaid FICA, withholding, and FUTA employment taxes on the dancers for 1990 and 1991. Marlar paid a portion of the assessed taxes and sued for a refund, arguing either that the dancers were lessees rather than employees or that it qualified for safe-harbor relief under Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. The government counterclaimed for the full amount plus penalties and interest. The court granted Marlar summary judgment under Section 530, finding that the company's treatment of the dancers as non-employees rested on a longstanding recognized practice of a significant segment of the industry and that Marlar had filed all required returns consistent with that treatment.
