The case challenged the constitutionality of the criminal provisions in Texas Government Code § 551.144 of the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), which impose fines or jail time on government body members who knowingly participate in closed meetings discussing public business. Plaintiffs, current and former city council members, argued that these provisions violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment free speech rights by restricting private discussions among officials. After a bench trial following related prior litigation in Rangra v. Brown, the court applied intermediate scrutiny, finding TOMA to be a content-neutral disclosure requirement rather than a speech restriction. The court concluded that TOMA serves a substantial governmental interest in public access to decision-making and does not unduly burden protected speech, and therefore upheld the statute. The court denied the plaintiffs' claims, dismissed pending motions as moot, and awarded costs to the defendants.
The case involved several Texas cities challenging the constitutionality of the Texas Open Meetings Act, which imposes criminal penalties for closed meetings, claiming it violates the First Amendment on its face and as applied under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the cities as plaintiffs for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that political subdivisions like cities have no protected rights under the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause against their creating state and therefore lack standing to assert such claims.
Basic Energy Services sued its insurer Liberty Mutual after the company denied coverage and refused to pay defense costs in a Texas state court lawsuit brought by D-S-B Properties and intervenors, which alleged that Basic Energy damaged an oil well's bore and casing while replacing a pump and conducting pressure tests. The federal district court granted Basic Energy's motion for partial summary judgment, granted in part and denied in part Liberty Mutual's cross-motion, and resolved related evidentiary issues. The court held that the underlying incident qualified as an "occurrence" causing "property damage" under the excess commercial general liability policy, that no policy exclusions applied to bar the duty to defend, and that Liberty Mutual had violated the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act by failing to timely acknowledge and decide the claim. The ruling turned on the policy language, the allegations in the state-court petitions, and undisputed facts about the timing of the insurer's denial.
The case involved defendant Alejandro Pena, who was indicted for failing to register as a sex offender after moving from Colorado to Texas, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Pena moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the relevant provisions. The court denied the motion, adopting the magistrate's recommendation. It reasoned that SORNA regulates persons traveling in interstate commerce, falling within Congress's Commerce Clause powers as interpreted in United States v. Lopez, and that the registration and penalty provisions are interrelated and constitutional.
The case involved a defendant previously convicted of indecency with a child who was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for allegedly traveling interstate from Florida to Texas in August 2007 while knowingly failing to register or update his registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming improper venue in Texas, an insufficient indictment, and a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause due to retroactive application of SORNA's requirements. The court denied the motion to dismiss, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation after granting a bill of particulars. It held that venue was proper in Texas as a continuing offense, the indictment was sufficient, and there was no ex post facto violation because the charged travel occurred after the Attorney General's February 2007 interim rule making SORNA applicable to pre-enactment offenders.
The case involved a defendant previously convicted of sexual assault in Texas who was deported to Mexico in 2004 and later found in Florida; he was indicted in Texas under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for traveling interstate and failing to update his sex offender registration as required by SORNA when moving from Texas to Florida in 2006. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing improper venue in Texas and an ex post facto violation. After referral, the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion to dismiss because the defendant had not traveled through Texas as part of the offense, which instead occurred after deportation and reentry elsewhere. Following de novo review of objections and clear-error review of the rest, the district court adopted the report and recommendation in full, dismissing the indictment on venue grounds.