Asgeirsson v. Abbott
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2011-03-25 · cited 13×
The case challenged the constitutionality of the criminal provisions in Texas Government Code § 551.144 of the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA), which impose fines or jail time on government body members who knowingly participate in closed meetings discussing public business. Plaintiffs, current and former city council members, argued that these provisions violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment free speech rights by restricting private discussions among officials. After a bench trial following related prior litigation in Rangra v. Brown, the court applied intermediate scrutiny, finding TOMA to be a content-neutral disclosure requirement rather than a speech restriction. The court concluded that TOMA serves a substantial governmental interest in public access to decision-making and does not unduly burden protected speech, and therefore upheld the statute. The court denied the plaintiffs' claims, dismissed pending motions as moot, and awarded costs to the defendants.
free speechcriminal lawcivil rights
City of Alpine v. Abbot
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2010-07-28 · cited 5×
The case involved several Texas cities challenging the constitutionality of the Texas Open Meetings Act, which imposes criminal penalties for closed meetings, claiming it violates the First Amendment on its face and as applied under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the cities as plaintiffs for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that political subdivisions like cities have no protected rights under the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause against their creating state and therefore lack standing to assert such claims.
free speechcivil rightsprocedure
Basic Energy Services, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2009-09-18 · cited 7×
Basic Energy Services sued its insurer Liberty Mutual after the company denied coverage and refused to pay defense costs in a Texas state court lawsuit brought by D-S-B Properties and intervenors, which alleged that Basic Energy damaged an oil well's bore and casing while replacing a pump and conducting pressure tests. The federal district court granted Basic Energy's motion for partial summary judgment, granted in part and denied in part Liberty Mutual's cross-motion, and resolved related evidentiary issues. The court held that the underlying incident qualified as an "occurrence" causing "property damage" under the excess commercial general liability policy, that no policy exclusions applied to bar the duty to defend, and that Liberty Mutual had violated the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act by failing to timely acknowledge and decide the claim. The ruling turned on the policy language, the allegations in the state-court petitions, and undisputed facts about the timing of the insurer's denial.
business & regulatoryprocedure
United States v. Pena
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2008-10-20 · cited 3×
The case involved defendant Alejandro Pena, who was indicted for failing to register as a sex offender after moving from Colorado to Texas, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) and the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Pena moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the relevant provisions. The court denied the motion, adopting the magistrate's recommendation. It reasoned that SORNA regulates persons traveling in interstate commerce, falling within Congress's Commerce Clause powers as interpreted in United States v. Lopez, and that the registration and penalty provisions are interrelated and constitutional.
criminal lawfederal power
United States v. Young
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2008-07-07 · cited 1×
The case involved a defendant previously convicted of indecency with a child who was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for allegedly traveling interstate from Florida to Texas in August 2007 while knowingly failing to register or update his registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming improper venue in Texas, an insufficient indictment, and a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause due to retroactive application of SORNA's requirements. The court denied the motion to dismiss, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation after granting a bill of particulars. It held that venue was proper in Texas as a continuing offense, the indictment was sufficient, and there was no ex post facto violation because the charged travel occurred after the Attorney General's February 2007 interim rule making SORNA applicable to pre-enactment offenders.
criminal lawprocedurefederal power
United States v. Natividad-Garcia
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2008-06-04 · cited 5×
The case involved a defendant previously convicted of sexual assault in Texas who was deported to Mexico in 2004 and later found in Florida; he was indicted in Texas under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for traveling interstate and failing to update his sex offender registration as required by SORNA when moving from Texas to Florida in 2006. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing improper venue in Texas and an ex post facto violation. After referral, the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion to dismiss because the defendant had not traveled through Texas as part of the offense, which instead occurred after deportation and reentry elsewhere. Following de novo review of objections and clear-error review of the rest, the district court adopted the report and recommendation in full, dismissing the indictment on venue grounds.
criminal lawprocedure
H & M Oil & Gas L.L.C. v. Brazos 440 Partners, L.P.
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2008-04-15
This case involved an appeal by H & M Oil & Gas, LLC from bankruptcy court orders in the Lothian Oil, Inc. bankruptcy proceeding concerning the compromise and liquidation of claims, including H & M's purchased claim. The district court dismissed the consolidated appeal, holding that H & M lacked standing under the "person aggrieved" standard because the bankruptcy court had authorized full payment of its claim, leaving it no longer directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by the orders. The court further ruled the appeal equitably moot and denied a motion to intervene by an ad hoc committee of shareholders, as the committee's members had not timely appealed the underlying bankruptcy rulings.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Mainland Drilling Ltd. Partnership v. Colony Insurance
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2008-03-31
Mainland Drilling and Dallas Drilling sued Colony Insurance for breaching its duty to defend them under an insurance policy in an underlying state-court lawsuit brought by Chaparral Energy over mechanical failures, delays, and damage during drilling of an oil well under a contract that began in early 2006. The court granted Colony's motion for summary judgment, finding no duty to defend. The core reasoning was that the policy's Oil and Gas Working Interests exclusion barred coverage, as Chaparral had contractually agreed to pay for equipment and services at its own expense and retained rights to participate in control, development, and operation of the well, making it a co-owner of the working interest.
business & regulatoryproperty
Medical Center Pharmacy v. Gonzales
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2006-08-30 · cited 5×
The case involved ten state-licensed pharmacies challenging the FDA's authority under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to classify compounded drugs as new drugs or new animal drugs, enforce related requirements, and conduct inspections beyond those permitted by statute for pharmacies in compliance with state law. The district court granted in part and denied in part both parties' motions for summary judgment, issuing declaratory relief that compounded drugs are not new drugs per se and that the FDA's inspection powers are limited for qualifying pharmacies, while denying injunctive relief without prejudice to later requests. The core reasoning relied on plain-language statutory interpretation, concluding that the FDA's positions conflicted with the Act's text and exemptions for pharmacy compounding, and that legislative history supported severability of invalid provisions.
healthcarebusiness & regulatoryfederal power
Kaltman v. Key Energy Services, Inc.
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2006-08-11 · cited 9×
This case is a consolidated securities-fraud class action brought by shareholders against Key Energy Services, Inc. and several of its current and former executives, alleging violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act for overstating financial results through improper accounting practices such as capitalizing operating expenses and shifting costs to acquisition transactions, as well as Section 20(a) control-person claims. The court denied the motions to dismiss filed by the company and defendants John and Mitchell, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged the falsity, materiality, and scienter elements under the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA. The court granted the motions to dismiss as to defendants Byerlotzer and Alario without prejudice, ordering the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint that pleads those claims with greater particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b). The decision rests on the court's review of the complaint's allegations concerning access to information, public disclosures, and the company's announced need for restatements and internal-control issues.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Odessa Regional Hospital v. Leavitt
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2005-09-12 · cited 1×
This case involved Odessa Regional Hospital's challenge to the calculation of its eligibility for Medicare Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments for fiscal years 1996 and 1997. The hospital maintained 100 licensed beds, some of which were used for observation services on patients who might later be admitted, but the fiscal intermediary subtracted fractional observation beds from the total, reducing the count below 100 and lowering the hospital's DSH adjustment rate. The court granted the hospital's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's, holding that the hospital qualified for the higher DSH payments based on 100 beds. The core reasoning was that the plain language of 42 C.F.R. § 412.105(b) requires counting all beds not specifically excluded from the available bed count, observation beds are not located in any excluded areas such as labor rooms or emergency departments, and the Provider Reimbursement Manual guidelines confirm that day-to-day use of beds for observation does not remove them from the count.
healthcarebusiness & regulatory
United States Ex Rel. Phillips v. Permian Residential Care Center
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2005-09-12 · cited 2×
The case involved relators, daughters of a deceased nursing home resident, bringing a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against Permian Residential Care Center, alleging that the facility submitted false or fraudulent claims to Medicare or Medicaid for inadequate care provided to their mother between 2000 and 2003. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in part on the federal claim, holding that the relators failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact because they provided no specific evidence identifying any false claims submitted to the government. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state common law fraud claim and dismissed it without prejudice.
healthcareprocedure
United States Ex Rel. Bailey v. Ector County Hospital
District Court, W.D. Texas · 2004-08-31 · cited 1×
This case involves a relator's claims under the False Claims Act against a hospital and several physicians, alleging that unnecessary medical tests, procedures, and surgeries were performed on him solely to obtain Medicare payments. The court converted the defendants' motions to dismiss into summary judgment motions after considering evidence outside the pleadings. It granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claim, finding no evidence that the treatments were medically unnecessary or performed to defraud the government, and noting that the relator's and a nurse's affidavits lacked the qualifications to opine on medical necessity. The court then dismissed the remaining state law claims without prejudice after declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
criminal lawhealthcare