In United States v. Salyer, defendant Salyer moved to suppress evidence obtained from warrantless searches and seizures conducted by a government confidential informant at the premises of SK Foods. The court had previously denied the motion for lack of standing and, upon reconsideration, denied it again. The defendant bears the burden of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the places or items searched to have Fourth Amendment standing, which requires a threshold showing of disputed facts that could support suppression if an evidentiary hearing is requested. Here, Salyer made no showing that the informant searched his personal office, seized his personal items, or that the circumstances matched those granting standing in cases like Gonzalez, so the motion was denied without a hearing.
The case concerned whether interim protective measures were needed for threatened fish species (Chinook salmon, steelhead, green sturgeon) while the National Marine Fisheries Service prepared a new Biological Opinion on the effects of dam operations on the Yuba River, after the court previously found the 2007 BiOp arbitrary and capricious under the Endangered Species Act. The court decided to grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs' request for an injunction, ordering specific interim actions such as improving fish ladders, managing debris, and developing plans to prevent interbreeding with hatchery fish, while denying others. The reasoning focused on the need to minimize harm to the species during the remand period given the identified flaws in the original BiOp's analysis of population stability, stressors, and critical habitat, without vacating the existing BiOp.
The case involved an indigent state prisoner who sued prison medical officers and U.C. Davis physicians under the Eighth Amendment, alleging that delays and inadequate treatment of his kidney disorders caused him pain and permanent harm. After the magistrate judge denied the plaintiff's request for appointment of a neutral medical expert witness and recommended summary judgment for the U.C. Davis defendants largely because of the absence of expert testimony, the district court reviewed that denial. The court concluded that the magistrate's ruling was clearly erroneous under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 because an impartial expert would assist the trier of fact in evaluating the complex medical issues, but it declined to appoint such an expert itself. Instead, the court held that the plaintiff's volunteer counsel could seek reimbursement of expert witness costs from the court's non-appropriated fund.
Roslyn McCoy, a former clerical employee of the Army Corps of Engineers with dyslexia, sued the Department of the Army under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, alleging that her termination during her probationary period constituted both retaliation and disparate treatment based on her disability. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion solely as to the claim for compensatory damages on the retaliation claim, reasoning that Ninth Circuit precedent equates remedies under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and holds that compensatory damages are unavailable for retaliation claims. The motion was denied on all other grounds, permitting the disparate treatment claim and other aspects of the case to proceed to trial.
The case involved plaintiff Gertrude Kennedy, a 71-year-old widow, who alleged that defendant World Alliance Financial Corp. fraudulently misrepresented the terms of a reverse mortgage on her home, including the loan amount, available draws, and interest rate, leading her to enter an agreement that differed from what was promised. Kennedy sought rescission and brought claims for fraud, unfair business practices, and breach of fiduciary duty. The court granted the defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, dismissing some claims for failure to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) for fraud or due to the absence of a fiduciary duty in standard lender-borrower transactions, while permitting amendment of others. The core reasoning centered on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 9(b) standards requiring non-conclusory factual allegations that plausibly support relief, alongside the impact of the defendant's compliance with HUD regulations for reverse mortgages under 24 C.F.R. Part 206.
This case is a wage and hour class and collective action brought by former loan officers against Prospect Mortgage, LLC, alleging violations of federal and California laws including failure to pay overtime and minimum wage, waiting time penalties, and failure to provide meal and rest periods, stemming from a commission-only pay structure that sometimes resulted in no pay for periods without sales and uncompensated overtime work. The defendant moved to dismiss the first amended complaint or strike class allegations. The court denied the motion, determining that the plaintiffs' factual allegations were sufficient to state plausible claims under the applicable pleading standards and that the class action nature supported a claim for attorneys' fees under California law due to the significant public benefit.
