This case involved a township employee who sued her union and employer, alleging that a suspension without pay was politically motivated and that the grievance hearing process violated her procedural due process rights under the collective bargaining agreement, along with related civil rights claims. After the court dismissed the federal claims, finding some moot due to an agreement to arbitrate and others without merit, the plaintiff settled her grievance directly with the township for back wages but sought attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and costs as a prevailing party. The court denied both requests, ruling that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party because she received no relief of the type specifically sought in the complaint regarding changes to the third-step hearing process. The core reasoning was that the settlement occurred through the existing arbitration step rather than through any litigation-driven benefits matching the requested injunctive or declaratory relief, and the same prevailing-party standard applied to costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
The case involved a student group, the Student Coalition for Peace, seeking to hold a public anti-nuclear exposition on various parcels of school property at Lower Merion High School after the school district denied permission. The court addressed claims under the Equal Access Act following a remand from the Third Circuit, which required evidence on whether the district had created a limited open forum allowing nonstudent participation by other noncurricular student groups. After a hearing, the court found no such forum at Arnold Field, the flagpole courtyard, or Pennypacker Field due to lack of evidence or the nature of prior uses like an Activities Fair during instructional time without public invitation. However, the court concluded that the Boys’ Gym constituted a limited open forum because other noncurricular groups had been permitted access there, entitling the plaintiff to use it for its event without substantial interference with school activities. The court therefore granted a permanent injunction allowing use of the Boys’ Gym while restricting review to the originally requested sites.
The case involves a bankruptcy trustee for Rug Rack, Inc. suing Main Line Federal Savings and Loan Association to recover proceeds from checks that the company's officers allegedly cashed at the bank and used improperly. The bank moved for summary judgment, contending that statutes of limitations under the Bankruptcy Code and various Pennsylvania laws barred the trustee's claims. The court granted partial summary judgment dismissing several counts where the trustee admitted having no claims or evidence against the bank, but denied summary judgment on the remaining counts under Pennsylvania’s Uniform Fiduciary Act. It reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code time limits were inapplicable or did not bar the action, certain commercial and banking code provisions did not fit the facts, and the six-year limitations period under the Pennsylvania Judicial Code made the 1984 filing timely.
In Braun v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., a former safety engineer sued his employer after termination, alleging breach of an oral employment contract promising continued employment for satisfactory performance, breach of a severance pay and benefits agreement, and wrongful discharge for whistleblowing on workplace safety violations. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the employment contract and wrongful discharge claims but denied it on the severance claim. Under Pennsylvania law, the employment contract claim failed because oral assurances of job security were too ambiguous to overcome the presumption of at-will employment, and no evidence showed a seniority-based termination. The wrongful discharge claim was preempted because federal OSHA regulations provide an exclusive statutory remedy for retaliation against employees reporting safety issues.
This diversity action arose from contracts under which defendants Julius Gordon and his auctioneering corporation agreed to auction plaintiffs' property, with plaintiffs asserting eight counts and defendants filing a counterclaim. Gordon, who had earlier filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, moved to transfer the entire case or his portion to bankruptcy court. The court denied the motion, concluding that removal was procedurally possible but substantively improper because the bankruptcy court would lack clear jurisdiction over the non-debtor corporation, the availability of jury trials in bankruptcy court remains unsettled, and the intertwined claims against both defendants made severance inefficient.
The case involved plaintiff Michael Petock, a medical student also practicing law, suing Thomas Jefferson University and an administrator for alleged age discrimination under the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, along with related retaliation claims, breach of express or implied contract, and coercion, fraud, and duress, all arising from his grades, evaluations, rotation assignments, withdrawal, and denied readmission. After the plaintiff rested, the court granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict on all counts. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff had not met his burden of showing age was a determinative factor, as the academic decisions were rationally based on work quality with younger students treated similarly; the signed release agreement was valid and not procured by fraud or duress; and no contractual breach was demonstrated.