The case involved a federal prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons' denial of a one-year sentence reduction after he completed a residential substance abuse treatment program. Petitioner had been convicted of felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was deemed ineligible because BOP guidelines classified his offense as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), consistent with Program Statement 5162.02. The court denied the petition, holding that the BOP's interpretation of "nonviolent offense" in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) was a permissible construction of the statute entitled to deference, that the firearm possession offense inherently involved a substantial risk of physical force, and that the guidelines were interpretive rules not subject to APA review or creating a liberty interest. The decision also rejected related claims regarding public notification rules and due process.
In Pelissero v. Thompson, a federal prisoner serving a sentence for drug trafficking convictions petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after the Bureau of Prisons denied him a one-year sentence reduction despite completing a residential substance abuse treatment program. The BOP found him ineligible under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) because his offense was classified as a crime of violence due to a two-level sentencing enhancement for firearm possession, per agency Program Statement 5162.02(9). The court ruled that the BOP's guidelines were interpretive rules constituting a permissible construction of the statute, which grants the agency discretion to reduce sentences only for nonviolent offenses, and upheld the denial as lawful. The petition was denied and dismissed with prejudice.
The case involved a federal prisoner whose term of imprisonment had expired but who remained detained by the Bureau of Prisons after refusing to sign a form agreeing to an installment schedule for unpaid fines and special assessments, a requirement for release onto supervised release. He filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming illegal detention. The court denied the petition, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) expressly conditions release on supervision upon such an agreement and that the BOP's policy and actions were authorized by the statute without improperly setting payment terms.
The case involved a Georgia-based attorney who was a member in good standing of the West Virginia State Bar but maintained his primary office outside the state; he challenged Rule 8.0(c) of the West Virginia Rules for Admission to the Practice of Law, which requires a responsible local attorney sponsoring pro hac vice admissions to maintain an actual physical office in West Virginia that is the primary location of daily practice. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the rule's office requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution by discriminating against nonresidents. The court consolidated the claims and, after briefing and argument, held that the rule did not offend the Clause. It reasoned that the requirement was based on the location of practice rather than state citizenship, served the substantial state interest in ensuring the availability, accessibility, and accountability of counsel in West Virginia courts, and bore a close relationship to that objective without less restrictive alternatives being required.
This case involves a dispute over whether several insurance companies must defend and indemnify Triangle Industries for costs associated with cleaning up a hazardous waste landfill in Ohio under CERCLA, where Triangle had disposed of toxic sludge from its West Virginia plant between 1977 and 1980. The U.S. District Court, applying New Jersey law, granted summary judgment to the insurers Liberty Mutual, NJPLIGA, and Zurich while denying Triangle's cross-motion. The court reasoned that the policies' pollution exclusions barred coverage because the waste was not disposed at a properly authorized site, the damage was expected from the standpoint of the insured, and there was no qualifying "occurrence" under the CGL policies. Additionally, the insurers were not estopped from denying coverage as they had reserved their rights and Triangle suffered no prejudice from their initial participation in the defense.
This case was a declaratory judgment action by insurer Aetna against its policyholder and his ex-wife regarding underinsured motorist coverage for their son Garry following a car accident in which he was injured. The sole issue was whether Garry qualified as a "family member" who was a "resident" of the father's household under the policy, given the parents' 1985 divorce, custody arrangement granting primary custody to the mother, and the father's visitation and support rights. The court denied Aetna's motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' motion, and declared that Garry was a covered person entitled to coverage. The core reasoning was that the undefined policy term permits dual residency, especially for children of divorced parents, and the undisputed facts showed Garry spent substantial time with his father, kept personal property at his home, and that the father expected coverage.