William Matthew Kidd

The case involved a federal prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons' denial of a one-year sentence reduction after he completed a residential substance abuse treatment program. Petitioner had been convicted of felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was deemed ineligible because BOP guidelines classified his offense as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), consistent with Program Statement 5162.02. The court denied the petition, holding that the BOP's interpretation of "nonviolent offense" in 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) was a permissible construction of the statute entitled to deference, that the firearm possession offense inherently involved a substantial risk of physical force, and that the guidelines were interpretive rules not subject to APA review or creating a liberty interest. The decision also rejected related claims regarding public notification rules and due process.

criminal lawgunsfederal power

In Pelissero v. Thompson, a federal prisoner serving a sentence for drug trafficking convictions petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after the Bureau of Prisons denied him a one-year sentence reduction despite completing a residential substance abuse treatment program. The BOP found him ineligible under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) because his offense was classified as a crime of violence due to a two-level sentencing enhancement for firearm possession, per agency Program Statement 5162.02(9). The court ruled that the BOP's guidelines were interpretive rules constituting a permissible construction of the statute, which grants the agency discretion to reduce sentences only for nonviolent offenses, and upheld the denial as lawful. The petition was denied and dismissed with prejudice.

criminal law

The case involved a federal prisoner whose term of imprisonment had expired but who remained detained by the Bureau of Prisons after refusing to sign a form agreeing to an installment schedule for unpaid fines and special assessments, a requirement for release onto supervised release. He filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming illegal detention. The court denied the petition, holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) expressly conditions release on supervision upon such an agreement and that the BOP's policy and actions were authorized by the statute without improperly setting payment terms.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a Georgia-based attorney who was a member in good standing of the West Virginia State Bar but maintained his primary office outside the state; he challenged Rule 8.0(c) of the West Virginia Rules for Admission to the Practice of Law, which requires a responsible local attorney sponsoring pro hac vice admissions to maintain an actual physical office in West Virginia that is the primary location of daily practice. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the rule's office requirement violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution by discriminating against nonresidents. The court consolidated the claims and, after briefing and argument, held that the rule did not offend the Clause. It reasoned that the requirement was based on the location of practice rather than state citizenship, served the substantial state interest in ensuring the availability, accessibility, and accountability of counsel in West Virginia courts, and bore a close relationship to that objective without less restrictive alternatives being required.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involves a dispute over whether several insurance companies must defend and indemnify Triangle Industries for costs associated with cleaning up a hazardous waste landfill in Ohio under CERCLA, where Triangle had disposed of toxic sludge from its West Virginia plant between 1977 and 1980. The U.S. District Court, applying New Jersey law, granted summary judgment to the insurers Liberty Mutual, NJPLIGA, and Zurich while denying Triangle's cross-motion. The court reasoned that the policies' pollution exclusions barred coverage because the waste was not disposed at a properly authorized site, the damage was expected from the standpoint of the insured, and there was no qualifying "occurrence" under the CGL policies. Additionally, the insurers were not estopped from denying coverage as they had reserved their rights and Triangle suffered no prejudice from their initial participation in the defense.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case was a declaratory judgment action by insurer Aetna against its policyholder and his ex-wife regarding underinsured motorist coverage for their son Garry following a car accident in which he was injured. The sole issue was whether Garry qualified as a "family member" who was a "resident" of the father's household under the policy, given the parents' 1985 divorce, custody arrangement granting primary custody to the mother, and the father's visitation and support rights. The court denied Aetna's motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants' motion, and declared that Garry was a covered person entitled to coverage. The core reasoning was that the undefined policy term permits dual residency, especially for children of divorced parents, and the undisputed facts showed Garry spent substantial time with his father, kept personal property at his home, and that the father expected coverage.

family law

The case involved a union suing a self-employed plumber who had joined as an individual member and later signed a collective bargaining agreement as an employer, seeking delinquent contributions to employee benefit plans under ERISA for July through September 1987. The defendant counterclaimed for a refund of his prior contributions, arguing he could not legally participate in the plans as both employer and employee. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's, ordering restitution of the $42,936.87 in mistaken contributions but denying interest and attorney fees. It reasoned that ERISA prohibits dual-status individuals like sole proprietors from inclusion in employee benefit plans, as established by circuit precedents, and permitted recovery of the payments through federal common law equitable restitution while barring interest to preserve plan assets for participants.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved Consolidation Coal Company seeking a preliminary injunction to halt work stoppages by several United Mine Workers locals at its mines, following a temporary restraining order. The company and unions were parties to the 1988 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, which included a mandatory grievance and arbitration process for disputes. The court found that local grievances at the mines were not the cause of the stoppages, which instead appeared to be a protest over the treatment of UMWA members in other regions, and that no clause in the agreement addressed this underlying issue. Applying Supreme Court precedent from Buffalo Forge, the court held that the Boys Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction rule did not apply because the dispute precipitating the stoppage was not arbitrable, and therefore denied the injunction.

labor & employment

This case involved the Secretary of Labor suing Morgantown Yellow Cab Company and its president for alleged violations of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), seeking to enjoin violations and recover back wages and liquidated damages for the company's taxicab drivers. The central issue was whether the drivers, who operated under lease agreements classifying them as independent contractors, were actually employees under the FLSA. The court found the drivers to be employees based on the economic realities of the relationship, particularly the company's significant control over work schedules, location reporting requirements, dispatch systems, and other operational aspects, despite the lease terms and state-mandated forms. The court also ruled that the business did not qualify as a retail or service establishment exempt from certain FLSA requirements, leaving issues of sales volume jurisdiction and Portal-to-Portal Act defenses for further proceedings.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a motion to remand a civil action filed by the State of West Virginia and its Governor against Anchor Hocking Corporation and Newell Company in state court, after the defendants removed it to federal district court. The defendants claimed federal question jurisdiction based on references in the complaint to a 'discrete pool' of job training funds under the federal Job Training Partnership Act, and diversity jurisdiction based on the parties' citizenship. The court granted the motion to remand, holding that the complaint alleged only state-law claims and did not present a federal question on its face under the well-pleaded complaint rule, as the federal statute created no private right of action supporting the plaintiffs' claims. The court further held that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because the State was the real party in interest and thus not a 'citizen' for diversity purposes.

procedurefederal power

The case involved a dispute over whether an automobile insurance policy issued by Transamerica to Don Arbogast provided underinsured motorist coverage for injuries from a fatal motorcycle accident, where the motorcycle was insured under a separate policy that waived such coverage. The estate of the deceased claimed benefits under the Transamerica policy after settling with the at-fault driver's insurer, but Transamerica denied the claim based on an "owned but not insured for this coverage" exclusion. The court granted summary judgment to Transamerica, ruling that the exclusion was valid and enforceable. The core reasoning was that the policy language was clear and unambiguous, the insured had specifically waived underinsured coverage on the motorcycle policy, underinsured motorist coverage is optional under West Virginia law rather than mandatory, and the statute permits exclusions commensurate with the risk and premium charged.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Christopher Hinzman sued West Virginia car dealer Superior Toyota and Kentucky salesman Bobby Porter under the federal Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, alleging that Porter had rolled back the odometer on a vehicle by about 40,000 miles before selling it to Superior Toyota, which then sold it to the plaintiff. Porter moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper service of process, and because he was sued individually rather than as an officer of his corporation. The court held an evidentiary hearing and found that West Virginia's long-arm statute authorized jurisdiction because Porter caused tortious injury in the state through out-of-state acts while regularly selling cars to West Virginia dealers and deriving substantial revenue from them. It further concluded that exercising jurisdiction satisfied constitutional due process, as Porter had purposefully availed himself of the forum by his contacts and the claim arose directly from those contacts. The court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and granted the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to perfect service on the corporation.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved individual and corporate plaintiffs who had long-standing loan relationships with the defendant bank, during which a bank vice president embezzled funds by misusing blank promissory notes, after which the bank restructured the plaintiffs' loans with additional collateral and new terms. The plaintiffs brought federal claims alleging improper banking practices, including a violation of the anti-tying provision in 12 U.S.C. § 1972, along with other causes of action. The court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment on both federal causes of action, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiffs failed to establish any violation of federal law. The court then declined to retain jurisdiction over the bank's remaining state-law counterclaims and remanded them to state court.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case was a wrongful death action brought by the estate of a coal miner against his employer Consolidation Coal Co. and a superintendent, alleging that deliberate intent by the defendants exposed the decedent to unsafe conditions leading to his death on the job. The defendants removed the suit from West Virginia state court to federal court on diversity grounds, asserting that the in-state superintendent had been fraudulently joined to defeat jurisdiction. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that the complaint sufficiently alleged a possible cause of action against the superintendent under West Virginia's deliberate-intention exception to workers' compensation immunity. The court found no proof of outright fraud in the pleadings and concluded that the defendants had not met their burden to show fraudulent joinder.

proceduretorts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case involved former West Virginia employees of a CSX subsidiary railroad who sued in state court for unpaid wages and statutory liquidated damages under West Virginia Code § 21-5-4(e), claiming they were class members entitled to $7,000 each. The defendants removed the action to federal court, arguing that the claims were governed by collective bargaining agreements and thus preempted by the Railway Labor Act. The court held that the dispute constituted a minor dispute under the RLA because it arose from the application and interpretation of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, requiring exclusive mandatory arbitration procedures. The court found that the RLA's broad preemptive scope, unlike the NLRA, occupied the field for such employment-related grievances, regardless of the plaintiffs' attempt to plead only state-law claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed the action as preempted by federal law.

labor & employmentfederal powerprocedure

In United States v. Truglio, the court addressed a motion for reconsideration concerning the disposition of approximately $27,000 in currency seized from the defendant in 1981, which he had assigned to his attorney as payment for legal services prior to indictment. The defendant was later convicted under RICO in 1983, leading to a forfeiture order under the pre-1984 version of 18 U.S.C. § 1963. The court held that the currency was not subject to forfeiture because, under the pre-amendment RICO statute, title did not vest in the government until conviction and legitimate pre-conviction transfers could not be voided absent a restraining order. It further reasoned that including such attorney fees in forfeiture would raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns regarding the right to counsel, supporting an interpretation that excepted bona fide legal fees from the forfeiture order, which was accordingly amended to exclude the funds.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved hospital associations and individual nonprofit and governmental hospitals challenging the constitutionality of West Virginia Code § 16-5B-6a, a state law regulating hospital board composition and selection. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the Act was preempted by federal labor law on collective bargaining, violated the Equal Protection Clause, and impaired contractual rights under the Contracts Clause. After consolidating proceedings, the district court upheld the statute, concluding that the health care industry is heavily regulated, the law did not seriously impair contracts, and it fell within the state's police power without violating federal preemption or constitutional protections.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentfederal power

This case involved nonprofit and governmental hospitals in West Virginia challenging W.Va. Code § 16-5B-6a, which mandated that at least 40% of their boards consist of consumer representatives from groups including small businesses, organized labor, elderly persons, and lower-income individuals, with special consideration for women, minorities, and the handicapped. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the law was unconstitutional and preempted by federal labor law, along with a preliminary injunction to block enforcement by the state health director. The court denied the injunction, finding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm given their contingency plans for compliance and the absence of any enforcement actions, while the state had a strong interest in orderly implementation of its statute. The court also concluded that plaintiffs had not raised serious questions about the law's constitutionality or vagueness.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentfederal powerhealthcare

This diversity case involved a coal miner who sued his employer after sustaining a back injury while attempting to flee a flimsy underground hut during a runaway coal car incident in 1979; the plaintiff alleged that the company's construction and placement of the hut, along with the lack of safety switches, amounted to willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct that should allow him to pursue damages outside West Virginia's workers' compensation system under the Mandolidis exception for deliberate employer intent to injure. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing no genuine issues of material fact existed to support such a claim. The court granted the motion, holding that the undisputed facts showed at most ordinary negligence rather than any deliberate intention to cause harm, as the plaintiff had never been directly injured by prior derailments, had not complained about the stuck door, and the employer had not violated any statutes or regulations.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In this diversity jurisdiction case, plaintiff David Estep, a probationary laborer at Chemetals Corp.'s West Virginia plant, sued his employer for damages after suffering burns and eye injuries from an explosion caused by spraying water on a hot flux pot during a cooling process. The court, sitting as factfinder after a bench trial, entered judgment for the defendant. It held that Estep failed to satisfy the Mandolidis standard under West Virginia law for an intentional tort claim against an employer, because there was no evidence that Chemetals knew of or intentionally exposed workers to a recognized risk of explosion; the water-cooling method had been used without incident for years, management believed it was safe, and any shortcomings in training or warnings amounted at most to negligence rather than deliberate misconduct.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment