The case concerns the government's motion for a final order of forfeiture after Jerry Jarrett was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of money laundering proceeds from drug transactions and illegal structuring. The court granted the motion and entered a personal money judgment against Jarrett in the amount of $92,000. The core reasoning is that 18 U.S.C. § 982 requires forfeiture of any property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained from the violations, that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 authorizes such orders in the form of money judgments, and that relevant case law from the Seventh and other circuits establishes that the amount is calculated based on gross proceeds without deductions for expenses, taxes, or other costs.
The case involved a dispute over distribution of benefits from an ERISA-governed employee retirement plan after participant Cynthia Boldt's death in 2003. Plaintiff Biglands, as executor of Boldt's estate, sued under ERISA sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) seeking the account balance, alleging she qualified as a beneficiary under the plan's default succession rules when no designated beneficiary survived. The court granted the defendants' motion to partially dismiss, dismissing Count II under section 502(a)(3). It reasoned that section 502(a)(3) is a catch-all provision unavailable where an adequate remedy exists under section 502(a)(1)(B), and that the claim was independently barred by the three-year statute of limitations based on the plaintiff's own allegations of knowledge from 2004 or 2007. The court also dismissed Raytheon Company as a defendant since it was only named in the dismissed count.
In Young-Smith v. Bayer Health Care, LLC, a Black female employee terminated in 2006 sued her union, United Steelworkers Local 12273, alleging racial discrimination in the handling of her grievances over termination and workplace issues under the collective bargaining agreement, including claims of breach of the duty of fair representation and disparate impact. The court granted the union's motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, denied the supplemental motion, and denied the motion to strike as moot. It reasoned that the union was not liable for the employer's actions, that no evidence showed the union's own practices or decisions discriminated against Black workers, and that the plaintiff failed to raise genuine issues of material fact on certain claims while others required further proceedings.
This case was a declaratory judgment action by American Family Mutual Insurance Company against its insureds, the Bowers and their son Jonathan, to determine whether homeowners policies provided coverage or a duty to defend against state court claims by Gabrielle Butler for bodily injury and emotional distress from alleged sexual molestation by Jonathan on the insured premises while she was a minor. Butler's claims included allegations of negligence by the Bowers in failing to prevent the assaults and claims against Michael Bower related to his role at a church. The court addressed American Family's second motion for summary judgment, which argued there was no covered 'occurrence' and that multiple exclusions applied, including for sexual molestation, criminal law violations, intentional acts, and others. After analyzing the policies under Indiana law and the factual basis of the claims, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.
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This case involves judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to a claimant alleging disability since 1997 due to morbid obesity and degenerative joint disease of the left knee. The ALJ found the claimant not disabled before April 21, 2008, based on a residual functional capacity for limited sedentary work, but disabled thereafter due to age category changes. The court reversed and remanded the decision, holding that the ALJ erred by failing to adequately analyze or explain rejection of examining physicians' opinions that the claimant could never stoop in favor of a non-examining expert, contrary to requirements for weighing medical evidence and SSR 96-9p on stooping limitations in sedentary work.
The case involved plaintiff Cody Treat suing his former employer, Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. and related entities, alleging violations of Indiana wage payment statutes (IC 22-2-5-1 and IC 22-2-9-2) along with possible claims of workplace discrimination or retaliation concerning the assignment of sales leads. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to strike certain evidentiary submissions by the plaintiff. The court granted both motions, holding that after adequate discovery the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on any essential element of his claims and that the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for him. The decision rested on the summary judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which requires the non-moving party to come forward with specific admissible facts rather than speculation or unsupported assertions.