William Charles Lee

The case concerns the government's motion for a final order of forfeiture after Jerry Jarrett was convicted by a jury of multiple counts of money laundering proceeds from drug transactions and illegal structuring. The court granted the motion and entered a personal money judgment against Jarrett in the amount of $92,000. The core reasoning is that 18 U.S.C. § 982 requires forfeiture of any property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained from the violations, that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2 authorizes such orders in the form of money judgments, and that relevant case law from the Seventh and other circuits establishes that the amount is calculated based on gross proceeds without deductions for expenses, taxes, or other costs.

criminal law

The case involved a dispute over distribution of benefits from an ERISA-governed employee retirement plan after participant Cynthia Boldt's death in 2003. Plaintiff Biglands, as executor of Boldt's estate, sued under ERISA sections 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3) seeking the account balance, alleging she qualified as a beneficiary under the plan's default succession rules when no designated beneficiary survived. The court granted the defendants' motion to partially dismiss, dismissing Count II under section 502(a)(3). It reasoned that section 502(a)(3) is a catch-all provision unavailable where an adequate remedy exists under section 502(a)(1)(B), and that the claim was independently barred by the three-year statute of limitations based on the plaintiff's own allegations of knowledge from 2004 or 2007. The court also dismissed Raytheon Company as a defendant since it was only named in the dismissed count.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Young-Smith v. Bayer Health Care, LLC, a Black female employee terminated in 2006 sued her union, United Steelworkers Local 12273, alleging racial discrimination in the handling of her grievances over termination and workplace issues under the collective bargaining agreement, including claims of breach of the duty of fair representation and disparate impact. The court granted the union's motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, denied the supplemental motion, and denied the motion to strike as moot. It reasoned that the union was not liable for the employer's actions, that no evidence showed the union's own practices or decisions discriminated against Black workers, and that the plaintiff failed to raise genuine issues of material fact on certain claims while others required further proceedings.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case was a declaratory judgment action by American Family Mutual Insurance Company against its insureds, the Bowers and their son Jonathan, to determine whether homeowners policies provided coverage or a duty to defend against state court claims by Gabrielle Butler for bodily injury and emotional distress from alleged sexual molestation by Jonathan on the insured premises while she was a minor. Butler's claims included allegations of negligence by the Bowers in failing to prevent the assaults and claims against Michael Bower related to his role at a church. The court addressed American Family's second motion for summary judgment, which argued there was no covered 'occurrence' and that multiple exclusions applied, including for sexual molestation, criminal law violations, intentional acts, and others. After analyzing the policies under Indiana law and the factual basis of the claims, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilitycriminal lawfamily law

This case involves judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to a claimant alleging disability since 1997 due to morbid obesity and degenerative joint disease of the left knee. The ALJ found the claimant not disabled before April 21, 2008, based on a residual functional capacity for limited sedentary work, but disabled thereafter due to age category changes. The court reversed and remanded the decision, holding that the ALJ erred by failing to adequately analyze or explain rejection of examining physicians' opinions that the claimant could never stoop in favor of a non-examining expert, contrary to requirements for weighing medical evidence and SSR 96-9p on stooping limitations in sedentary work.

federal powerhealthcareprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Cody Treat suing his former employer, Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. and related entities, alleging violations of Indiana wage payment statutes (IC 22-2-5-1 and IC 22-2-9-2) along with possible claims of workplace discrimination or retaliation concerning the assignment of sales leads. The defendants moved for summary judgment and to strike certain evidentiary submissions by the plaintiff. The court granted both motions, holding that after adequate discovery the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on any essential element of his claims and that the record as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for him. The decision rested on the summary judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which requires the non-moving party to come forward with specific admissible facts rather than speculation or unsupported assertions.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Treat v. Civil Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., plaintiff Jill Treat sued her former employers, the Kelley Defendants, asserting claims related to unpaid wages under Indiana statutes (IC 22-2-5-1 and IC 22-2-9-2) and possible wrongful termination as an at-will employee. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending there were no genuine issues of material fact, along with a motion to strike certain evidentiary submissions. The court granted both motions, holding that the plaintiff failed to make a sufficient showing on essential elements of her claims after adequate discovery. The reasoning centered on the summary judgment standard requiring evidence that would allow a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, with the record showing the claims did not meet exceptions such as the public policy exception to at-will employment for whistleblower reports.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involves pro se plaintiff Edward Perrey's lawsuit against defendant Connie Morrow and state defendants including J. David Donahue, Dr. Elton Amos, and others, with the court addressing multiple motions for summary judgment, motions to strike, and a motion for extension of time. The court granted summary judgment to both Morrow and the State Defendants, denied Perrey's cross-motions for summary judgment, granted the defendants' motions to strike portions of Perrey's responses and filings as inadmissible, and denied Perrey's motion for extension of time due to its lateness and lack of justification. The core reasoning applied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) standard, finding no genuine issues of material fact supported by admissible evidence after drawing inferences in the non-moving party's favor and noting that Perrey failed to meet his burden to establish essential elements of his claims. The court also struck Perrey's evidence on grounds that it consisted of inadmissible materials that could not defeat the motions.

civil rightsprocedure

In Grogg v. CSX Transportation, Inc., a former railroad conductor sued his employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for permanent injuries to his back and knee allegedly caused by riding defective locomotives on rough track and working on oversized ballast during his employment from 1968 to 2007. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of evidence, preclusion by other federal laws like the Locomotive Inspection Act and Federal Railroad Safety Act, and no causation. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding insufficient evidence for some claims like defective track but allowing others to proceed after considering expert reports and rejecting certain preclusion arguments.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision in an adversary proceeding where the Chapter 13 trustee sought to avoid a mortgage lien on the debtors' residence under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). The mortgage, recorded in 2001, contained a defective notary acknowledgment that failed to identify the signers, and the bankruptcy court held it ineffective to provide constructive notice under Indiana law, allowing avoidance. The district court reversed, ruling that a 2007 amendment to Ind. Code § 32-21-4-1(c) validates recorded mortgages despite such technical defects and supplies constructive notice to subsequent purchasers. The court found the amendment applies retroactively to pre-2007 recordings based on the statute's text, the 2008 clarifying amendment, and legislative intent, so the mortgage could not be avoided.

propertyprocedure

This case involved plaintiffs suing defendants for violating the Clean Water Act by conducting dredging at the Fawn River State Hatchery without a required permit, resulting in excess sediment, along with related constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. After the Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment on one CWA claim, the district court granted summary judgment on liability under the CWA, and the parties agreed to permanent injunctive relief including expert assessment and remediation. The court granted the plaintiffs' renewed motion for interim attorney fees and costs totaling over $1.3 million through October 2006, determining that they qualified as prevailing parties under the CWA's citizen-suit provision (33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)) by succeeding on a significant issue and obtaining judicial relief.

environmentcivil rights

This case involved a trust, as beneficiary of multiple life insurance policies on Gordon Beeler, suing AXA and Reliastar after the companies denied death benefit claims following Beeler's 1998 disappearance and a 2003 probate court declaration of death. The trust alleged breach of contract, but after a jury trial the court had previously dismissed bad faith and punitive damages claims, leaving only the question of whether the trust could invoke Indiana's rebuttable seven-year presumption of death. The jury found for the insurers, and the district court denied the trust's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, reasoning that evidence of Beeler's intentional departure and changed personal circumstances was sufficient for the jury to conclude the presumption did not apply or had been rebutted. The court noted that differing evidence and credibility findings distinguished this federal case from a related state-court proceeding that reached a contrary result on the same facts.

business & regulatory

This case involved riparian landowners suing state officials after the officials drained a supply pond and released large amounts of sediment into the Fawn River in 1998, allegedly harming aquatic life and water quality. The plaintiffs asserted civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 along with a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act claiming an unpermitted discharge of dredged material in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The Seventh Circuit had affirmed dismissal of the civil rights claims but remanded the CWA claim for determination of whether the defendants qualified for the statutory maintenance exemption for dams. On remand, this court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on CWA liability after the defendants conceded that the sediment release was not reasonably necessary to perform maintenance, thereby failing to meet the exemption requirements.

environmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Moreno v. Buss, a state prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a prison disciplinary board's finding that he committed battery during an attack on a correctional officer, which resulted in one year of segregation and demotion in credit time earning classification. The petitioner had requested that a blood-stained sweatshirt found in his possession be presented and tested at the hearing to show the stains were paint from his work assignment, but the board relied instead on photographs, his presence in the cellhouse, and other reports without examining the item. The court granted the petition and vacated the disciplinary conviction, holding that the denial of the requested physical evidence violated the due process requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell to allow presentation of exculpatory evidence when consistent with institutional safety, and that without it there was insufficient "some evidence" under Superintendent v. Hill to support the finding of guilt. The court ordered that the respondent either retry the matter within sixty days if the sweatshirt still exists or restore the petitioner's credit class and good time credits.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves a dispute between Medical Informatics Engineering (MIE), a software provider, and Orthopaedics Northeast (ONE), a medical practice, stemming from the termination of their software licensing and support agreements. After ONE switched to competing software, MIE's president sent a letter to ONE's physicians accusing ONE's CEO of deception, and MIE's attorney later made statements suggesting ONE and related parties had falsely instigated an FBI investigation; ONE and its CEO then filed counterclaims for defamation. MIE and its president moved to dismiss the defamation claims, arguing the statements were not actionable or were protected by privilege. The court denied the motion, holding that factual issues remained regarding whether the statements were defamatory, whether the attorney acted as an agent, and whether any litigation privilege applied, as the pleadings did not establish good-faith contemplation of litigation at the time of the letter.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned ABN Amro Mortgage Group's claims against Rex Wells and affiliated entities arising from 149 mortgage loans made to third-party buyers of properties sold by the defendants, with ABN alleging that Wells engaged in a scheme of misrepresentations about property ownership and fictitious mortgages that induced ABN to fund the loans. After prior dismissal of some claims, the defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint's fraud count and statutory claims under Indiana Code § 34-24-3-1 for bank fraud, deception, and criminal mischief, arguing that no direct misrepresentations were made to ABN and that ABN suffered no pecuniary loss. The court denied the partial motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint sufficiently pleaded fraud through misrepresentations relayed indirectly via intermediaries like Maximum Mortgage and that ABN adequately alleged it was the direct victim of the scheme by advancing loan proceeds that paid off the fraudulent mortgages.

torts & liabilitycriminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiff Dewayne Higdon suing the Wells County Sheriff's Office, Bluffton Police Department, and several individual officers after his arrest on a felony warrant at his residence. Officers entered the home, claimed to smell marijuana, observed drug paraphernalia in plain view, and according to Higdon and a co-resident conducted a full warrantless search of rooms and drawers while he was handcuffed. The court granted summary judgment to the municipal defendants and on Fourteenth Amendment claims but denied it on Fourth Amendment claims against the individual officers. The core reasoning was that material factual disputes existed over whether officers exceeded plain-view seizures by conducting a broader search, precluding summary judgment on the individual liability claims under the Fourth Amendment.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involved a union employee, Krieg, who sued city officials and others after a comment implying his involvement with illegal drugs was made during a grievance discussion, along with challenges to the city's drug and alcohol testing policy under the collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on liability for alleged due process violations, while defendants sought full summary judgment. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted the defendants' motion on all federal claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that the employee had been offered but declined certain procedural protections related to the policy. The state-law defamation claim was dismissed without prejudice after the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction once the federal claims were resolved.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who sued her employer, Parkview Health System, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for retaliation after she complained about religious discrimination. The plaintiff prevailed at trial, receiving compensatory and punitive damages plus backpay, and then sought over $170,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. The court applied the lodestar method to determine reasonable fees, accepting proposed hourly rates but reducing hours for excessive, redundant, clerical, or unnecessary work, and awarded $152,165.63 in attorneys' fees along with $3,297.27 in costs.

civil rightslabor & employment

Terri Reich, a former sales partner at Homier Distributing, sued the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act alleging failure to pay overtime wages. She sought to expand the case into a collective action on behalf of other similarly situated sales partners who worked at traveling merchandise shows. The court denied the motion to approve collective action notice. The decision rested on the finding that sales partners were not similarly situated, as their duties varied significantly—particularly in loading and securing merchandise, which could trigger exemptions like the motor carrier exception—requiring individualized inquiries that would undermine the efficiency of a collective proceeding.

labor & employmentprocedure