This case involves a dispute over insurance coverage under a directors and officers liability policy issued by Genesis Insurance to First New England Dental Centers, Inc. Donald Strange, an officer of the company, sought reimbursement for defense costs in a lawsuit brought by Imprimis Investors against him and others. Genesis denied coverage citing the policy's Insured versus Insured exclusion, which applies to claims by security holders with assistance from directors or officers. The court, applying Massachusetts law on contract interpretation, determined that the term "security holder" unambiguously includes holders of stock and that the exclusion was triggered by the participation of company officers in the underlying suit, granting summary judgment to Genesis on Strange's breach of contract claim.
This case is a federal tax refund suit brought by Liberty Mutual, a property and casualty insurer, against the United States concerning the company's 1990 taxable year. The dispute centers on Liberty Mutual's pre-1990 hybrid method of accounting for salvage recoverable, its eligibility for transition relief (including a "Fresh Start" and "Special Deduction") under the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, and its right to a "gross-up" adjustment under Treasury Regulation 1.832-4(d). The court found that the hybrid method was permissible, that Liberty Mutual qualified for the Fresh Start on its net lines of business and for the gross-up, but that it was not entitled to the Special Deduction. It therefore recommended granting in part and denying in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, with the motion to compel held in abeyance.
The case involved an insurance company suing several individuals and chiropractic businesses for allegedly submitting fraudulent or excessive claims for insurance benefits, including claims under RICO and state law. The defendants filed counterclaims alleging defamation, intentional interference with business relations, violations of Chapter 93A, and false advertising under the Lanham Act, based on the filing of the lawsuit and a related press release. On the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaims, the court recommended granting the motion in part and denying it in part. The court found that the absolute litigation privilege barred counterclaims arising from the lawsuit filing and certain statements in the complaint, and that the defendants lacked standing or failed to state claims under the Lanham Act, but allowed counterclaims based on the press release to proceed to the extent it could be read as characterizing the defendants as criminals. The district judge adopted the recommendation.
The case involved a former Boston Globe employee whose long-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed plan administered by Prudential were terminated in 2004 after payments since 1999 for eye-related disabilities; the plaintiff challenged the denial through the plan's appeals process and then sued, seeking de novo judicial review of the benefits decision. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for de novo review rather than the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. It reasoned that the plan's definition of total disability and claim rules language, which required Prudential to determine eligibility based on specific objective conditions and proof of loss, did not clearly grant the administrator discretionary authority to interpret or modify the plan terms under Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.
The case involved The Society of Lloyd's seeking to enforce an English court judgment against defendant John Munroe Hamilton for unpaid reinsurance premiums arising from Lloyd's insurance underwriting operations. Lloyd's filed suit in federal court in Massachusetts under the Massachusetts Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act to collect the amount of the foreign judgment. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and recommended granting summary judgment in favor of Lloyd's, which was adopted by the district judge, allowing enforcement of the English judgment.
The case involves a federal inmate suing the Bureau of Prisons under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the loss of personal property during his transfer between correctional facilities. The BOP moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, asserting that sovereign immunity was not waived because 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) excepts claims arising from the detention of property by law enforcement officers. The court reviews the FTCA's limited waiver of immunity and the scope of the exception, noting a circuit split on whether Bureau of Prisons officers qualify as 'any other law enforcement officer' under the provision. It analyzes Supreme Court precedent and policy considerations regarding the application of the exception to prison officials acting outside tax or customs functions.
