Reginald C. Lindsay

This case involves a dispute over insurance coverage under a directors and officers liability policy issued by Genesis Insurance to First New England Dental Centers, Inc. Donald Strange, an officer of the company, sought reimbursement for defense costs in a lawsuit brought by Imprimis Investors against him and others. Genesis denied coverage citing the policy's Insured versus Insured exclusion, which applies to claims by security holders with assistance from directors or officers. The court, applying Massachusetts law on contract interpretation, determined that the term "security holder" unambiguously includes holders of stock and that the exclusion was triggered by the participation of company officers in the underlying suit, granting summary judgment to Genesis on Strange's breach of contract claim.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a federal tax refund suit brought by Liberty Mutual, a property and casualty insurer, against the United States concerning the company's 1990 taxable year. The dispute centers on Liberty Mutual's pre-1990 hybrid method of accounting for salvage recoverable, its eligibility for transition relief (including a "Fresh Start" and "Special Deduction") under the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990, and its right to a "gross-up" adjustment under Treasury Regulation 1.832-4(d). The court found that the hybrid method was permissible, that Liberty Mutual qualified for the Fresh Start on its net lines of business and for the gross-up, but that it was not entitled to the Special Deduction. It therefore recommended granting in part and denying in part the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, with the motion to compel held in abeyance.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved an insurance company suing several individuals and chiropractic businesses for allegedly submitting fraudulent or excessive claims for insurance benefits, including claims under RICO and state law. The defendants filed counterclaims alleging defamation, intentional interference with business relations, violations of Chapter 93A, and false advertising under the Lanham Act, based on the filing of the lawsuit and a related press release. On the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaims, the court recommended granting the motion in part and denying it in part. The court found that the absolute litigation privilege barred counterclaims arising from the lawsuit filing and certain statements in the complaint, and that the defendants lacked standing or failed to state claims under the Lanham Act, but allowed counterclaims based on the press release to proceed to the extent it could be read as characterizing the defendants as criminals. The district judge adopted the recommendation.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a former Boston Globe employee whose long-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed plan administered by Prudential were terminated in 2004 after payments since 1999 for eye-related disabilities; the plaintiff challenged the denial through the plan's appeals process and then sued, seeking de novo judicial review of the benefits decision. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for de novo review rather than the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. It reasoned that the plan's definition of total disability and claim rules language, which required Prudential to determine eligibility based on specific objective conditions and proof of loss, did not clearly grant the administrator discretionary authority to interpret or modify the plan terms under Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.

labor & employmenthealthcare

The case involved The Society of Lloyd's seeking to enforce an English court judgment against defendant John Munroe Hamilton for unpaid reinsurance premiums arising from Lloyd's insurance underwriting operations. Lloyd's filed suit in federal court in Massachusetts under the Massachusetts Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act to collect the amount of the foreign judgment. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and recommended granting summary judgment in favor of Lloyd's, which was adopted by the district judge, allowing enforcement of the English judgment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves a federal inmate suing the Bureau of Prisons under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the loss of personal property during his transfer between correctional facilities. The BOP moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, asserting that sovereign immunity was not waived because 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) excepts claims arising from the detention of property by law enforcement officers. The court reviews the FTCA's limited waiver of immunity and the scope of the exception, noting a circuit split on whether Bureau of Prisons officers qualify as 'any other law enforcement officer' under the provision. It analyzes Supreme Court precedent and policy considerations regarding the application of the exception to prison officials acting outside tax or customs functions.

criminal lawfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

In Rodriguez v. Russo, a federal district court considered a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Rolando Rodriguez, who had been convicted in Massachusetts state court of first-degree murder on a felony-murder theory arising from a convenience store robbery. The petitioner asserted five grounds for relief, primarily challenging jury instructions on the presumption of innocence and expert testimony as improperly shifting the burden of proof, the handling of expert witness testimony, alleged prosecutorial misconduct in cross-examination and closing arguments, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court denied the petition in full, determining that some claims were unexhausted or procedurally defaulted while others failed because the state court's adjudication was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved Joseph Curran, a corrections officer in the Essex County Sheriff's Department, who was terminated after posting a message on a union website that compared the sheriff to Hitler and accused department leaders of unfairly targeting political opponents from a prior election. Curran sued the sheriff, special sheriff, and department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his termination violated his First Amendment free speech rights because the post addressed matters of public concern. The defendants acknowledged the post motivated the firing but argued it was disruptive to department operations. The court denied Curran's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the defendants' cross-motion, ruling that even though portions of the speech involved public concern, the employer's interest in maintaining discipline and efficiency in a paramilitary organization outweighed the employee's speech interests under the applicable balancing test. The court dismissed the federal claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

free speechlabor & employmentelections

The case involved a dispute under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) over whether the North Reading School Committee provided a student with a language-based learning disability and ADHD a free appropriate public education (FAPE) through its proposed IEP for the 2004-2005 period. After the parents unilaterally placed the student at the private Landmark School, a Bureau of Special Education Appeals hearing officer determined that the public school's placement was inadequate and ordered reimbursement for the Landmark placement. On the school committee's motion for summary judgment seeking reversal of that decision, the district court reviewed the administrative record and found that the hearing officer correctly concluded the IEP did not offer sufficient specialized services and that Landmark was an appropriate placement meeting the student's needs. The court therefore denied the motion and affirmed the BSEA decision in full.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case is a patent infringement lawsuit in which NewRiver, Inc. accused Mobular Technologies, Inc. of infringing U.S. Patent No. 6,122,635, titled 'Mapping Compliance Information Into Useable Format,' which covers systems for acquiring, extracting, and providing electronic access to securities compliance information from databases like the SEC EDGAR system. The court conducted claim construction to define disputed terms in the patent claims, as required by Markman v. Westview Instruments. The court largely adopted NewRiver's positions, holding that terms like 'computer-assisted method' do not require human involvement unless explicitly stated, that preambles are limiting only when they define the invention, and that most other terms should be given their ordinary meaning to a person skilled in the art or their stipulated definitions, such as 'acquiring' meaning obtaining data from a source and 'prospectus' referring to a document describing stock or fund offerings. The reasoning emphasized starting with the claim language itself, using the specification and prosecution history for context without importing unstated limitations, and applying the ordinary and customary meaning as of the patent's effective filing date.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who sued the Belmont Police Department after being arrested for driving with a suspended license following a routine traffic stop, despite claiming to have presented a valid driver's license. The complaint alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, all stemming from the arrest. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss all counts under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It reasoned that official Registry of Motor Vehicles records showed one of the plaintiff's licenses had been suspended at the time, establishing probable cause for the arrest under Massachusetts law, and that all claims required the plaintiff to prove a lack of probable cause, which he could not do even considering judicially noticed public records.

criminal lawcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

In Richards v. City of Lowell, the plaintiff, a former fiscal manager for the Greater Lowell Workforce Investment Board, alleged that he faced adverse employment actions in retaliation for raising concerns about the handling of public funds, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as related state-law claims. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal constitutional claim, holding that the plaintiff's statements were made pursuant to his official duties rather than as a private citizen addressing matters of public concern and therefore were not protected speech under the First Amendment, citing Garcetti v. Ceballos. Because no federal claim remained, the court dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) so they could be pursued in Massachusetts state court.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

In United States v. Novak, attorney Lawrence Novak was charged with obstructing justice and money laundering and moved to suppress evidence obtained from a recorded telephone call he had with his client, inmate Scott Holyoke, while Holyoke was in pretrial detention at the Barnstable County Jail. The court granted the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The jail's automated system recorded inmate calls, including this one, even though regulations required exemption of properly designated attorney-client communications and the attorney's number was listed in official directories. Although inmates were generally warned that calls were monitored, the jail had no effective policy or notice for arranging confidential attorney calls, and neither party was informed of the proper procedure. The court held that under the totality of circumstances, Novak and Holyoke had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the call, implicating Fourth Amendment protections against the warrantless interception.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves Richard J. George's petition for a writ of error coram nobis seeking to vacate his 1995 guilty plea to conspiracy to commit wire fraud (honest services fraud) under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1343, based on allegations that he improperly provided blank search warrant forms while employed as a state court clerk-magistrate. George argued that subsequent First Circuit decisions rendered his conviction invalid and that he continued to suffer collateral consequences, including suspension of his state pension benefits. The court denied the petition, holding that George failed to demonstrate a fundamental error in his plea under the law in effect at the time of his conviction and that later circuit court rulings do not provide grounds for coram nobis relief, as only Supreme Court decisions announcing retroactively applicable changes in law are relevant in such proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Espinoza, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to transport and transportation of illegal aliens and moved to suppress statements and evidence obtained after an ICE agent stopped the van in which he was a passenger. The court granted the motion, holding that the agent's approach—flashing his badge and ordering the engine shut off—constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. At the time of the seizure, the agent had observed a Texas-registered van similar to ones previously used in smuggling, knew of a tenuous prior link between the registered owner and a suspected smuggler, and saw passenger silhouettes, but had seen no traffic violations, unusual behavior, or other particularized facts suggesting criminal activity. The court concluded that these circumstances provided only an unparticularized hunch rather than the reasonable suspicion required for a Terry stop, rendering the seizure and resulting evidence unlawful.

criminal lawimmigrationcivil rights

The case is a securities fraud class action brought by shareholders against Ibis Technology Corporation and executive Martin Reid, alleging violations of federal securities laws through misleading statements and omissions in disclosures. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants improperly overstated prospects for booking orders of Ibis 2000 implanter machines and failed to timely reduce by $11 million the reported value of the company's small wafer production line assets on its books, in violation of GAAP, during the class period. The court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendations after de novo review, granting the motion to dismiss the implanter-order claims because the cited statements were not actionable, were made outside the class period, or did not relate to the pleaded misrepresentations, while denying dismissal of the wafer-line claims. The core reasoning for sustaining the latter claims was that the complaint sufficiently alleged the assets were impaired by the start of the class period, creating a strong inference of scienter from the defendants' knowledge, the company's cash needs, and the suspicious timing of the eventual write-down after a stock offering.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Thomas McLain sued the City of Somerville under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) after the city declined to hire him as a police officer in 2001 because his active duty in the U.S. Army prevented him from attending the required police academy training on October 1, 2001. The court granted McLain's motion for summary judgment and denied the city's, finding that the city's decision was based solely on McLain's military service obligations. The reasoning centered on USERRA's prohibition against denying employment opportunities due to uniformed service, noting that the city would have hired McLain otherwise and that later training sessions were available.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved named plaintiffs who obtained non-purchase money loans secured by their Massachusetts homes and alleged that the defendant lender violated the Truth in Lending Act, the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act, and Massachusetts General Laws ch. 93A by providing an inadequate notice of the right to cancel. The plaintiffs moved to certify a class of similarly situated borrowers seeking rescission and statutory damages. The court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation and certified a narrowed class consisting of borrowers who received the specific defective notice form on or after April 1, 2003, where the loans refinanced prior non-First Horizon loans secured by the residence, explicitly including those whose loans had later been refinanced or paid in full but excluding persons whose rescission rights had been extinguished by other means. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the Massachusetts statute permits class actions only for damages and not for rescission claims, finding that the statutory text and history did not support limiting class relief in that manner.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves the Estate of Walter Bennett suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence, civil conspiracy, and wrongful death arising from Bennett's 1967 murder by Stephen Flemmi, an FBI informant whom the FBI allegedly protected while allowing his criminal activities. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Estate's administrative claim, filed in March 2003, was untimely under the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations because the claims had accrued by September 1999 at the latest. The court granted the motion, holding that a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered the basis for the claims through public court proceedings in United States v. Salemme and related media coverage by late 1999, making the 2003 filing outside the limitations period.

criminal lawfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involves a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Raul Gonsalves, who was convicted in Massachusetts state court of receiving a stolen all-terrain vehicle. Gonsalves raised three claims: failure to preserve exculpatory evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and unconstitutional vagueness of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 28. The court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the first and third claims because they had not been exhausted through fair presentation to the state's highest court as required by federal law, while noting that the second claim could proceed. The petitioner was given thirty days to decide whether to return to state court to exhaust remedies or to continue only on the exhausted claim. The court also denied the petitioner's motion to reconsider the naming of the respondent.

criminal lawprocedure