The case was a wrongful levy action under Internal Revenue Code § 7426 in which the Towe Antique Ford Foundation challenged the IRS's seizure of 91 antique automobiles, titled in the foundation's name, to satisfy the tax liabilities of Edward and Florence Towe. The court found that Edward Towe had never validly transferred ownership to the foundation, that the foundation functioned as his alter ego and nominee, and that any conveyance was fraudulent as to the United States. On these grounds, the court held that the levy was proper and entered judgment for the United States.
The case involved federal coal leases issued in 1982-1983 near the Northern Cheyenne Reservation following the Powder River sale; the leases were challenged by the Tribe for the Secretary of the Interior's failure to comply with NEPA, the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act, and trust responsibilities to the Tribe. The court had earlier voided the leases, and after a Ninth Circuit remand and preparation of a supplemental environmental impact statement documenting significant adverse effects on the Tribe, the Secretary took no further action to modify or cancel them. Intervenors Thermal Energy and Wesco moved to void their specific lease interests and recover bonus and rental payments made to the government. The court granted the motions, holding that the leases remained defective due to the original procedural violations and that the lessees should not be left indefinitely in limbo while the government retained the payments.
This case involves plaintiffs who purchased life insurance and annuity policies from New York Life Insurance Company through its agent Harold Schwan and later sued the company for claims including negligent misrepresentation, fraud and conversion, violations of the Montana Insurance Code, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on allegations of misrepresentations about policy returns, unauthorized purchases, commingling of funds, forgery, and failure to deliver policies. The defendant moved for summary judgment primarily on statute of limitations grounds under Montana law, with federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that certain claims such as negligent misrepresentation were time-barred due to the two-year limitations period and plaintiffs' inquiry notice from policy documents and communications as early as 1983-1986, while other claims involving conversion or direct liability might proceed depending on the facts. The reasoning centered on Montana statutes of limitations, the concept of when plaintiffs should have discovered the alleged wrongs, and distinctions between vicarious and direct liability theories.
This case involved the United States suing a ranch owner under the Clean Water Act to enforce Section 404 permit requirements after the owner performed channel maintenance on the Little Bighorn River, including using a bulldozer to remove obstructions and redeposit indigenous river cobble to maintain the existing channel. The parties agreed on the facts, and the court considered cross-motions for partial summary judgment on liability. The court granted the government's motion and denied the defendant's, holding that the activities constituted a discharge of fill material into navigable waters. The reasoning focused on the statutory and regulatory definitions, which treat the addition of such material—even if indigenous—as requiring a Corps permit, while distinguishing the case from unrelated regulatory schemes under the Act.
The case was a copyright infringement action in which music copyright owners sued the operators of a small sit-down restaurant for broadcasting six copyrighted musical compositions over an in-house sound system without an ASCAP license. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' cross-motion, holding that the restaurant's use of the system did not qualify for the statutory 'home-system defense' exemption. The court reasoned that the equipment—an amplifier, tuner, cassette deck, and five ceiling speakers wired throughout the dining area—was not of the type commonly used in private homes and was employed to provide background music to customers in a commercial setting. The defendants were therefore found liable under the Copyright Act, though the court declined to award attorney fees given the defendants' good-faith belief that they qualified for the exemption.
This case involves a foreclosure action brought by the Farm Credit Bank of Spokane against the Debuf defendants for default on two promissory notes secured by mortgages on Montana real property. The defendants raised an affirmative defense and counterclaims alleging that the bank failed to comply with the loan restructuring procedures required by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 and its regulations. The court granted the bank's motion to dismiss the counterclaims, holding that the Act does not create a private right of action, following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane. It denied the motion to strike the affirmative defense, ruling that noncompliance with the restructuring regulations may be asserted as a limited equitable defense to foreclosure. Finally, the court struck the demand for a jury trial because the foreclosure proceeding is equitable in nature.
