James Franklin Battin

The case was a wrongful levy action under Internal Revenue Code § 7426 in which the Towe Antique Ford Foundation challenged the IRS's seizure of 91 antique automobiles, titled in the foundation's name, to satisfy the tax liabilities of Edward and Florence Towe. The court found that Edward Towe had never validly transferred ownership to the foundation, that the foundation functioned as his alter ego and nominee, and that any conveyance was fraudulent as to the United States. On these grounds, the court held that the levy was proper and entered judgment for the United States.

taxespropertyfederal power

The case involved federal coal leases issued in 1982-1983 near the Northern Cheyenne Reservation following the Powder River sale; the leases were challenged by the Tribe for the Secretary of the Interior's failure to comply with NEPA, the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act, and trust responsibilities to the Tribe. The court had earlier voided the leases, and after a Ninth Circuit remand and preparation of a supplemental environmental impact statement documenting significant adverse effects on the Tribe, the Secretary took no further action to modify or cancel them. Intervenors Thermal Energy and Wesco moved to void their specific lease interests and recover bonus and rental payments made to the government. The court granted the motions, holding that the leases remained defective due to the original procedural violations and that the lessees should not be left indefinitely in limbo while the government retained the payments.

environmentfederal powerproperty

This case involves plaintiffs who purchased life insurance and annuity policies from New York Life Insurance Company through its agent Harold Schwan and later sued the company for claims including negligent misrepresentation, fraud and conversion, violations of the Montana Insurance Code, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, based on allegations of misrepresentations about policy returns, unauthorized purchases, commingling of funds, forgery, and failure to deliver policies. The defendant moved for summary judgment primarily on statute of limitations grounds under Montana law, with federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that certain claims such as negligent misrepresentation were time-barred due to the two-year limitations period and plaintiffs' inquiry notice from policy documents and communications as early as 1983-1986, while other claims involving conversion or direct liability might proceed depending on the facts. The reasoning centered on Montana statutes of limitations, the concept of when plaintiffs should have discovered the alleged wrongs, and distinctions between vicarious and direct liability theories.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved the United States suing a ranch owner under the Clean Water Act to enforce Section 404 permit requirements after the owner performed channel maintenance on the Little Bighorn River, including using a bulldozer to remove obstructions and redeposit indigenous river cobble to maintain the existing channel. The parties agreed on the facts, and the court considered cross-motions for partial summary judgment on liability. The court granted the government's motion and denied the defendant's, holding that the activities constituted a discharge of fill material into navigable waters. The reasoning focused on the statutory and regulatory definitions, which treat the addition of such material—even if indigenous—as requiring a Corps permit, while distinguishing the case from unrelated regulatory schemes under the Act.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case was a copyright infringement action in which music copyright owners sued the operators of a small sit-down restaurant for broadcasting six copyrighted musical compositions over an in-house sound system without an ASCAP license. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' cross-motion, holding that the restaurant's use of the system did not qualify for the statutory 'home-system defense' exemption. The court reasoned that the equipment—an amplifier, tuner, cassette deck, and five ceiling speakers wired throughout the dining area—was not of the type commonly used in private homes and was employed to provide background music to customers in a commercial setting. The defendants were therefore found liable under the Copyright Act, though the court declined to award attorney fees given the defendants' good-faith belief that they qualified for the exemption.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a foreclosure action brought by the Farm Credit Bank of Spokane against the Debuf defendants for default on two promissory notes secured by mortgages on Montana real property. The defendants raised an affirmative defense and counterclaims alleging that the bank failed to comply with the loan restructuring procedures required by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 and its regulations. The court granted the bank's motion to dismiss the counterclaims, holding that the Act does not create a private right of action, following the Ninth Circuit's decision in Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane. It denied the motion to strike the affirmative defense, ruling that noncompliance with the restructuring regulations may be asserted as a limited equitable defense to foreclosure. Finally, the court struck the demand for a jury trial because the foreclosure proceeding is equitable in nature.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case concerned plaintiffs who agreed to care for 615 wild mustang horses owned by the United States under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, in reliance on government representations that they could adopt the animals after one year, but were later denied title because their intent involved commercial exploitation. Plaintiffs sued in federal district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging negligence in the government's failure to assess their adopter qualifications beforehand or warn them of ineligibility. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the claims, though framed as negligence, were in essence contractual claims arising from an alleged agreement to transfer title and thus fell exclusively under the Tucker Act in the Court of Claims rather than the FTCA. The decision rested on the determination that the alleged duties were not sufficiently independent of the contractual relationship to support FTCA jurisdiction in district court.

procedurefederal powertorts & liability

The case involved a challenge by Decker Coal Co. to a Montana statute that permitted striking workers to receive unemployment benefits if a state agency determined the employer had violated federal or state labor laws. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the provision was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. The reasoning centered on the NLRA's grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the NLRB to adjudicate unfair labor practices, which would be undermined by allowing state agencies to make such determinations, potentially leading to conflicting rulings.

labor & employmentfederal power

The case Little Horn State Bank v. Crow Tribal Court involved a dispute between a state-chartered bank and the Crow Tribal Court along with an individual defendant. The United States District Court for the District of Montana had previously entered a judgment and memorandum in the matter on July 21, 1988. Pursuant to a stipulation agreed to by the parties, the court vacated its earlier judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice, thereby concluding the litigation on a permanent basis.

federal powerprocedure

The case involved Little Horn State Bank, which obtained a default judgment in Montana state court against Daniel Old Elk and Old Elk Building Supply for defaulting on a promissory note secured by a forklift, and then sought to enforce that judgment in Crow Tribal Court. After the tribal court delayed for over two years without issuing a decision despite a hearing, it issued an ex parte order requiring the bank to return the forklift without providing notice or an opportunity to be heard. The bank filed suit in federal district court alleging a violation of its due process rights under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8), and sought injunctive relief. The court granted a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the June 30, 1988 tribal court order, finding that the bank's due process rights had been violated, that it would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that there was a cognizable danger of recurrent violations based on the tribal court's actions.

civil rightsprocedure

In this case, United Pacific Insurance sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify First Interstate Bancsystems in a wrongful termination lawsuit brought by a former employee. The court had previously ruled that coverage existed under the bank's liability insurance policies. On reconsideration, the court clarified that there was no coverage under the Comprehensive General Liability Policy or the Unipackage Endorsement because the employee's claims for wrongful termination and bad faith did not qualify as bodily injury, property damage, or enumerated personal injuries like defamation. However, the court declined to allocate the settlement amount under the Excess Umbrella Policy, which provided coverage, because the underlying case had settled without any determination of liability or specific damages.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved challenges by coal industry associations and environmental groups to the Secretary of the Interior's approval of a land exchange under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), where federal coal lands were swapped for private coal lands held by an affiliate of a railroad company. The plaintiffs argued that the exchange violated provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act prohibiting coal leases to railroads and the Commodities Clause, and that the public interest determination was inadequate. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, upholding the exchange as authorized by FLPMA Section 206(a) and finding no incorporation of the MLA restrictions or abuse of discretion in the approval process. The decision reasoned that FLPMA provides independent authority for such exchanges when in the public interest, without being limited by the cited statutes.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal powerproperty

This case involved a newspaper's challenge to a Montana justice court's decision to close a preliminary examination in a criminal case under a state statute that mandates exclusion of the public and press upon the defendant's request. The court held that Section 46-10-201 of the Montana Code Annotated is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The ruling followed the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, which established a qualified right of access to such hearings and requires specific on-the-record findings showing a substantial probability that publicity would prejudice the defendant's fair trial rights and that no reasonable alternatives to closure exist. Because the statute compels closure without these findings, it was found to violate constitutional standards, and the newspaper's motion for a preliminary injunction was granted.

criminal lawfree speechprocedure

The case involved an insurance company's request for a declaration that it had no duty to indemnify or defend its insured bank and bank president in a state court wrongful termination lawsuit brought by a former employee. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the insurance policies provided coverage. The policies covered personal injuries resulting from occurrences, including mental injury from the termination, and the exclusion for obligations under workers' compensation or similar laws did not apply because the claim was a common law tort rather than a statutory claim.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtors whose third revised repayment plan was rejected by the bankruptcy court for failing to treat secured creditor First Interstate Bank equally with others in its class under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3) and for not adequately providing for unsecured creditor Norwest Bank under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). The district court affirmed the plan rejection after granting leave to appeal the interlocutory order, holding that Norwest Bank remained an unsecured creditor because it did not foreclose on its second trust indenture on Rental Property No. 3 and thus could pursue other remedies under Montana law as interpreted in Avco Financial Services v. Christiaens. The court separately vacated the bankruptcy court's order granting First Interstate relief from the automatic stay on a sports car and speed boat, concluding that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over that matter while the plan appeal was pending.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, Montana Millwork sued Caradco for breach of a 1980 agreement to purchase 75-100 mbf of pine cutstock monthly, seeking damages for lost profits and business failure after orders stopped in 1981. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations under the UCC for contracts involving the sale of goods. The agreement was classified as a contract for the sale of goods rather than services or a mere commitment to future orders, with the breach occurring no later than August 1981 when no further orders were placed. The court rejected arguments for an eight-year limitations period or a continuing breach, finding the contract of indefinite duration had terminated after a reasonable time tied to the last shipment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned Planned Parenthood of Billings, which provides family planning services funded in part by federal Title X grants administered through the state, and its lease of space to a separate clinic offering abortions. Montana's 1985 General Appropriations Act included a proviso making such funds unavailable to any recipient sharing a physical facility with an abortion provider. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring the proviso unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. It reasoned that the state condition conflicted with federal law, which bars only the use of Title X funds for abortion services and permits co-located programs when funds are properly segregated, and that the proviso obstructed the full purposes of Congress in disbursing the funds through state agencies.

abortionhealthcarefederal power

The case involved a female teamster employee terminated from her job at a power plant project who alleged she was the only one discharged despite having seniority over a male colleague, claiming sex discrimination under Title VII as well as state tort claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court denied the employer's motion to dismiss the Title VII claim because federal discrimination claims are independent of collective bargaining agreement grievance procedures. The court dismissed the tort claims, however, on the ground that they were preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA, as the claims were inextricably intertwined with interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement's terms on just cause, good faith, and non-discrimination, which provided the exclusive remedies and grievance process the plaintiff had not pursued.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfederal powertorts & liability

In Clinch v. Montana AFL-CIO, the plaintiff sued her former employer in state court for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing after resigning from her administrative role in a Job Training Partnership Act program, alleging coercion; the defendant removed the case to federal court, asserting preemption under the Labor-Management Relations Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, and JTPA, and moved to dismiss. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand and granted dismissal, holding that the facts—including the plaintiff's vote for union representation, signing of a recognition letter, and participation in an NLRB settlement agreement—created a relationship governed by Section 301 of the LMRA. Relying on Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck and Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., the court reasoned that resolution of the state tort claim would substantially depend on analysis of labor contracts and collective bargaining matters, placing it within the exclusive province of federal labor law and grievance procedures rather than state law. The plaintiff had agreed to limited grievance steps in the settlement but did not pursue them fully.

labor & employmentfederal power

The Crow Tribe of Indians sued to challenge the application of Montana's Coal Severance Tax and Gross Proceeds from Coal Tax to coal mined on the Tribe's reservation and on an adjacent ceded strip of land, seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. After trial, the court determined there was no justiciable case or controversy regarding coal mined on the reservation itself. As to the ceded strip, the court upheld the taxes, concluding that their legal incidence falls on the non-Indian mine operators rather than on tribal trust property, that the taxes are passed forward to consumers, and that they are not preempted by federal law or the Indian Commerce Clause. The court further held that the Tribe had no approved tax on the ceded strip that would require a credit against the state taxes.

taxesfederal powerproperty