This case involved a dispute in an asbestos-related wrongful death lawsuit over the proper offset against a non-settling defendant's liability for a $100,000 settlement agreement with a codefendant (Johns Manville) that later entered bankruptcy. The total jury verdict was $239,800 (adjusted to $279,400 with pre-verdict interest), and after other settlements the remaining offset question centered on whether to credit the full stipulated $100,000 or only the 3% jury-allocated share. The court directed entry of judgment against Owens-Illinois in the amount of $0.00 because the combined offsets exceeded the verdict. The core reasoning was that New York General Obligations Law § 15-108(a) requires reduction of the claim by the greatest of the amount stipulated in the release, the consideration paid, or the released tortfeasor's equitable share, and the statute does not permit adjustment for subsequent nonpayment or bankruptcy.
The case involved a New York plaintiff suing Washington-based defendants, including attorney Gilbert Levy and his former law firm, for legal malpractice in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff alleged that Levy negligently failed to object to inaccuracies in a presentence report during a 1987 sentencing hearing in Washington federal court. Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, holding that New York law provided no basis for jurisdiction because the defendants had no continuous business presence in New York, did not transact business there, committed no tortious acts in the state, and caused no injury within New York under CPLR §§ 301 and 302. The analysis focused solely on the defendants' contacts, finding that phone calls, letters, and the plaintiff's own actions in New York were insufficient.
The case concerned a bankruptcy trustee's action to set aside the debtor's transfer of residential property to defendants as a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. § 548. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to the trustee, declaring the transfer null and void. The court found that the debtor received only $120,000 in effective value rather than the $150,000 face amount, because a personal check tendered at closing was offset the next day by a credit in an occupancy agreement allowing the debtor to remain in the home. The bankruptcy court and district court concluded this was less than reasonably equivalent value, especially given appraisals showing the property was worth over $167,000 and evidence that the transfer left the debtor insolvent. The court also ruled that the trustee could sell the property despite the non-debtor wife's co-ownership interest as tenants by the entirety.
The case involved Robert Carter's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1978 guilty plea in New York Supreme Court to second-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty years to life. Carter raised four claims: ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue issues of mental incapacity and an intoxication defense; the trial court's failure to inform him of an intoxication defense; the prosecutor's breach of the plea bargain by requesting the maximum sentence; and that the plea was involuntary due to mental incapacity from a gunshot wound and prosecutorial coercion. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the petition in full. The court applied the Strickland standard to find counsel's performance reasonable, concluded the record showed no mental incapacity or basis for an intoxication defense, determined any prosecutorial request was harmless, and found the plea voluntary based on Carter's statements and the record.
This case involved a wrongful death and product liability suit by the widow of a worker exposed to asbestos products, where five of six defendants settled before trial and only Owens-Illinois remained. The jury awarded $239,800 in total damages ($55,000 for wrongful death) and apportioned percentages of liability to the settling codefendants under New York General Obligations Law § 15-108. The plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), arguing that the jury's liability allocations to settling defendants (including 32% to Eagle-Picher and 15% to Keene) lacked evidentiary support and should not reduce the judgment against the non-settling defendant. The court denied the motion, holding that the evidence—including coworker testimony about exposure to Eagle-Picher cement and a stipulation regarding Keene products—was sufficient to support the jury's findings under the strict standard for overturning verdicts, which requires either a complete absence of evidence or overwhelming contrary proof.
The case involved a defendant indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for allegedly making false statements to FBI agents about whether he had met a fugitive named Gus Farace or knew of his business partner's involvement in harboring the fugitive. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the judicially created 'exculpatory no' exception shielded his general denials from prosecution. The court denied the motion, holding that the Second Circuit has never adopted the exception and would construe it narrowly if it did, and that the charged statements were affirmative assertions beyond a simple denial.
