Joseph Michael McLaughlin

This case involved a dispute in an asbestos-related wrongful death lawsuit over the proper offset against a non-settling defendant's liability for a $100,000 settlement agreement with a codefendant (Johns Manville) that later entered bankruptcy. The total jury verdict was $239,800 (adjusted to $279,400 with pre-verdict interest), and after other settlements the remaining offset question centered on whether to credit the full stipulated $100,000 or only the 3% jury-allocated share. The court directed entry of judgment against Owens-Illinois in the amount of $0.00 because the combined offsets exceeded the verdict. The core reasoning was that New York General Obligations Law § 15-108(a) requires reduction of the claim by the greatest of the amount stipulated in the release, the consideration paid, or the released tortfeasor's equitable share, and the statute does not permit adjustment for subsequent nonpayment or bankruptcy.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a New York plaintiff suing Washington-based defendants, including attorney Gilbert Levy and his former law firm, for legal malpractice in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff alleged that Levy negligently failed to object to inaccuracies in a presentence report during a 1987 sentencing hearing in Washington federal court. Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, holding that New York law provided no basis for jurisdiction because the defendants had no continuous business presence in New York, did not transact business there, committed no tortious acts in the state, and caused no injury within New York under CPLR §§ 301 and 302. The analysis focused solely on the defendants' contacts, finding that phone calls, letters, and the plaintiff's own actions in New York were insufficient.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a bankruptcy trustee's action to set aside the debtor's transfer of residential property to defendants as a fraudulent conveyance under 11 U.S.C. § 548. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to the trustee, declaring the transfer null and void. The court found that the debtor received only $120,000 in effective value rather than the $150,000 face amount, because a personal check tendered at closing was offset the next day by a credit in an occupancy agreement allowing the debtor to remain in the home. The bankruptcy court and district court concluded this was less than reasonably equivalent value, especially given appraisals showing the property was worth over $167,000 and evidence that the transfer left the debtor insolvent. The court also ruled that the trustee could sell the property despite the non-debtor wife's co-ownership interest as tenants by the entirety.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved Robert Carter's pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1978 guilty plea in New York Supreme Court to second-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty years to life. Carter raised four claims: ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to pursue issues of mental incapacity and an intoxication defense; the trial court's failure to inform him of an intoxication defense; the prosecutor's breach of the plea bargain by requesting the maximum sentence; and that the plea was involuntary due to mental incapacity from a gunshot wound and prosecutorial coercion. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York denied the petition in full. The court applied the Strickland standard to find counsel's performance reasonable, concluded the record showed no mental incapacity or basis for an intoxication defense, determined any prosecutorial request was harmless, and found the plea voluntary based on Carter's statements and the record.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a wrongful death and product liability suit by the widow of a worker exposed to asbestos products, where five of six defendants settled before trial and only Owens-Illinois remained. The jury awarded $239,800 in total damages ($55,000 for wrongful death) and apportioned percentages of liability to the settling codefendants under New York General Obligations Law § 15-108. The plaintiff moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), arguing that the jury's liability allocations to settling defendants (including 32% to Eagle-Picher and 15% to Keene) lacked evidentiary support and should not reduce the judgment against the non-settling defendant. The court denied the motion, holding that the evidence—including coworker testimony about exposure to Eagle-Picher cement and a stipulation regarding Keene products—was sufficient to support the jury's findings under the strict standard for overturning verdicts, which requires either a complete absence of evidence or overwhelming contrary proof.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a defendant indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for allegedly making false statements to FBI agents about whether he had met a fugitive named Gus Farace or knew of his business partner's involvement in harboring the fugitive. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the judicially created 'exculpatory no' exception shielded his general denials from prosecution. The court denied the motion, holding that the Second Circuit has never adopted the exception and would construe it narrowly if it did, and that the charged statements were affirmative assertions beyond a simple denial.

criminal law

In this case, plaintiff Ronald Kramer, a dock worker employed by third-party defendant Amerada Hess Corporation, was injured while handling a hose on a dock in Connecticut and received benefits under the state workers' compensation statute. He then filed a negligence action against defendant Bouchard Transportation Co., the owner of the barge, which in turn impleaded Hess seeking indemnity. The court granted Hess's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, holding that the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act preempts any state-law indemnity claim against the employer in this context. The opinion reasoned that even in the "twilight zone" of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction over dock injuries, section 905(b) of the federal Act expressly bars vessel-related liability from being shifted back to the employer through third-party actions.

labor & employmentfederal powertorts & liability

The case involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a defendant convicted of first-degree burglary in New York state court, who claimed that delays in his direct appeal violated due process. The court denied the petition, finding that the roughly two-and-a-half-year period from notice of appeal to decision, caused in part by counsel changes and the petitioner's pro se filings, did not rise to a constitutional violation. Applying the factors from Simmons v. Reynolds and Barker v. Wingo—including length of delay, reasons for delay, petitioner's diligence, prejudice to the petitioner, and federal-state comity—the court determined there was no appreciable prejudice because the appeal had already been affirmed and no harm to defenses or outcome was shown.

criminal lawprocedure

Petitioner Aponte, convicted in New York state court on two counts of second-degree murder, had one conviction reversed on appeal for insufficient evidence as an accessory and then sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on the remaining count, claiming improper joinder of the murder charges, a change in the state's theory of guilt on appeal, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and improper admission of hearsay and other evidence. The district court denied the petition in full. It reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance because evidence of one crime was material to motive for the other and the joint trial did not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair, and that the remaining claims failed to show any constitutional violation or prejudice that would entitle petitioner to relief, including no Confrontation Clause issue where the declarant testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by New York City and other plaintiffs to the Census Bureau's planned methodology for the 1990 decennial census, alleging that the traditional headcount would undercount minorities in urban areas and lead to inaccurate representation and funding allocations. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that statistical adjustment to correct the differential undercount would not violate the Constitution or 13 U.S.C. § 195, along with an order requiring adjustment unless defendants proved the unadjusted count more accurate. The court examined whether the claims were ripe, whether the prior stipulation between the parties was ambiguous, the validity of promulgated guidelines, and the role of a Special Advisory Panel, while interpreting the relevant statutes in pari materia to give effect to both the requirement of an actual enumeration and the authorization for sampling.

electionscivil rightsfederal power

In Sousa v. Hunter, a former probationary NLRB law clerk trainee sued under Title VII alleging his termination was due to race and national origin discrimination as a Hispanic male (who also claimed to be black). The court found for the defendant after a bench trial, concluding that the plaintiff's discharge stemmed from documented poor performance in investigations, writing, and case handling, not from any discriminatory motive. Despite receiving a Performance Improvement Plan and offers of guidance, the plaintiff failed to improve according to multiple supervisors, and he also never passed a bar exam within the required 14 months of employment, limiting any potential damages. The court rejected claims of harassment by his supervisor and disparate impact, finding no evidence of a discriminatory policy or practice and noting that the supervisor treated all subordinates similarly regardless of race.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a 1986 New York state conviction for first- and second-degree robbery, with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct during summation, wrongful denial of a request for substitute counsel, and an excessive sentence. The court denied the petition in full, finding that the prosecutorial misconduct did not render the trial fundamentally unfair under due process standards, that the petitioner failed to show good cause or a breakdown in representation to justify substituting counsel on the eve of trial, that the sentence was within permissible limits, and that state remedies had been sufficiently exhausted for the claims presented. The court reasoned that habeas relief requires a showing of constitutional violations, which were not established here, and that trial court decisions on counsel substitution and sentencing fell within proper discretion absent abuse.

criminal lawprocedure

In Mercado v. Senkowski, a pro se petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after his 1983 convictions in Nassau County Court on burglary charges, for which he received sentences as a second felony offender, and after pleading guilty to an additional attempted burglary count. On direct appeal and through a later coram nobis petition, he raised claims including ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call a fingerprint expert to counter prosecution evidence. The court denied the petition without prejudice, holding that the petitioner had not exhausted available state remedies because his ineffective assistance claim depended on facts outside the trial record and required an evidentiary hearing via a CPL 440.10 motion, which he had not pursued. Although the court found no deliberate bypass of state procedures under Fay v. Noia, it concluded that the state appellate courts had not had a fair opportunity to address the claim in full.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Jeffrey Reif's motion to vacate or modify a 10% income execution on his weekly wages to satisfy a $28,264.44 default judgment entered against him for personally guaranteeing a business equipment lease. The court addressed the interplay between New York Civil Practice Law and Rules provisions (including CPLR 5231 and 5240) limiting wage garnishments to the lesser of 10% of gross income or 25% of disposable earnings, federal restrictions under 15 U.S.C. § 1673, and the statutory priority given to preexisting family support obligations. It granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the execution was properly issued but subject to modification to ensure support payments take precedence without exceeding the 25% disposable earnings cap. The reasoning relied on the plain language of the statutes, case law interpreting equitable relief from enforcement procedures, and the absence of exceptions for commercial debts.

procedurefamily lawbusiness & regulatory

In this case, a petitioner convicted in 1987 of conspiracy, theft of interstate freight, and kidnapping moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for a new trial, arguing that a federal magistrate had improperly presided over jury selection despite his objection, in light of the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Gomez v. United States. The court denied the motion. It reasoned that Gomez announced a new rule not dictated by prior precedent, and under Teague v. Lane, such new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to convictions that became final before the rule was announced unless they meet narrow exceptions for decriminalizing primary conduct or addressing bedrock procedures essential to accurate convictions, neither of which applied here.

criminal lawprocedure

In this diversity case, Baker's Aid sued Hussmann and its subsidiary HFC over a 1985 Manufacturing Agreement under which Toastmaster (later acquired by HFC) was to produce commercial rack and deck ovens using specifications that would become Baker's Aid's property after it purchased $1 million worth of ovens, along with a covenant not to compete. Baker's Aid alleged breach of contract, breach of the covenant, and conversion after defendants raised prices, continued using the specifications, and competed in the market. The court granted Baker's Aid summary judgment against HFC on the contract, conversion, and covenant claims, holding that the agreement's plain terms transferred ownership of the specifications and that HFC's competition was based on them. It denied summary judgment on whether Hussmann could be held liable for its subsidiary's acts, reserved that issue for trial, and dismissed the defendants' antitrust counterclaims along with certain defenses such as lack of privity and real-party-in-interest objections.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a bank (FCNB) suing another bank (First Inter-County), its officers, directors, clients, accountants, and the FDIC as receiver, alleging RICO violations and common law fraud in connection with a scheme of excessive and misrepresented loans to corporations controlled by a convicted felon, which led to defaults after the lending bank became insolvent. Defendants filed multiple motions to dismiss the RICO and fraud claims, strike portions of the complaint, and for other relief including sanctions. The court applied the D'Oench doctrine and 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e), which bar claims or defenses against the FDIC based on secret or unwritten side agreements not documented in the bank's official records, to evaluate the sufficiency of the allegations against the receiver and other parties.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a claim by B.R.I. Coverage Corp., as subrogee for insured furrier Victor Goodman, against Air Canada for damage to four cartons of fur skins that disappeared during a 1985 international shipment from New York to Toronto and were later returned in damaged condition. The court held that the Warsaw Convention governed the parties' contract because its liability rules were expressly incorporated by reference in the air waybill, even though the initial leg of transport occurred by truck. It granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on damages and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the goods were delivered to the carrier in good condition. The court also denied the defendant's motions to dismiss for lack of a real party in interest or failure to plead jurisdiction.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a state prisoner convicted of felony murder, multiple counts of first-degree robbery, and weapons possession stemming from a 1980 armed robbery at a Queens social club that resulted in the fatal shooting of a New York City police officer. The petitioner raised claims that the trial court's jury instructions (including refusal to charge lesser included offenses and comments on witnesses and the defendant's silence) and the prosecutor's summation violated due process and deprived him of a fair trial. The district court denied the petition, finding that the jury charge as a whole did not violate federal constitutional rights and that any errors in the summation were not severe enough to undermine the fairness of the trial.

criminal lawprocedure

In Lopez v. Scully, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress evidence seized during his arrest following a 1974 burglary and murder in Brooklyn. The court denied the petition, finding that the arrest was supported by probable cause and that the subsequent search of the petitioner and the area within his immediate control was lawful as a search incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Because a suppression motion would have been unsuccessful, the petitioner could not establish the prejudice required under the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The decision followed multiple prior collateral attacks on the conviction, all of which had been rejected.

criminal lawprocedure