This case is an employment discrimination action in which plaintiff Ms. Bishop alleged that her employer, Albertson's, a multi-state grocery chain, failed to make reasonable efforts to accommodate her handicap. The court had previously denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant then raised an oral motion arguing that the court's law clerk, who had previously served as grievance director for the plaintiff's union and represented her in a 1984 grievance proceeding, may have been biased in her favor. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the clerk's prior representation of one union member among thousands over several years did not create a presumption of bias or require disqualification, as no actual conflict was shown.
The case involved a claim by Mr. Klein, a 51-year-old Navy veteran with extensive experience and top qualifications in electronics and radar systems, that the FAA violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by repeatedly failing to hire him for GS-9 electronics technician positions in 1988-1990 despite his veteran preference and high ratings. The district court, after a bench trial, found that the FAA had engaged in age discrimination, citing numerous procedural irregularities in hiring, destruction of records, inconsistencies in interviews and selections, and the hiring of significantly younger candidates with lower scores. The court's core reasoning was that the pattern of passing over a highly rated older applicant in favor of less qualified younger ones, combined with evidence of non-compliance with hiring rules, established a violation of the ADEA. The court awarded reasonable attorney's fees for the judicial proceedings and directed further proceedings on the remedy.
In this tax refund case, plaintiffs filed 1983 and 1984 Form 1040 returns showing mostly zero entries or Fifth Amendment assertions while claiming refunds based on withholdings, but the IRS determined unreported gross income of $56,645 and $64,086 respectively and issued deficiency notices after three years. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment, first finding the notices timely under the six-year statute of limitations because more than 25% of gross income was omitted. It then held that neither filing qualified as a valid return under Ninth Circuit precedent because they lacked sufficient financial data to compute tax liability, justifying failure-to-file penalties, and that claimed deductions for contributions to the Universal Life Church were properly disallowed as lacking legitimacy. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.
The case concerns the Spokane Tribe of Indians' request for declaratory relief that electronic 'Pick 6 Lotto' gaming devices on its reservation are exempt from state regulation and thus do not violate federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 1166. The court first confirms jurisdiction sua sponte, finding a sufficient actual controversy based on the U.S. Attorney's letter contemplating possible seizure. The central dispute is whether the devices qualify as Class II gaming (subject only to federal and tribal oversight under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act) or Class III gaming (prohibited by state law and therefore a federal crime), turning on whether their electronic operation makes them facsimiles excluded from Class II by 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(B)(ii) or preserves their character as lotto under § 2703(7)(A). The court notes that abstract statutory arguments favor each side but the outcome depends on the specific functioning of the tangible machines, while acknowledging that action by the National Indian Gaming Commission or a tribal-state compact could later moot the question.
This case is a tax refund suit in which plaintiff Anderson claimed she was entitled to a $3,655 refund and carryover from her 1984 return, which she asserted had been timely mailed to the IRS in September 1986 even though the agency had no record of receiving it. After a bench trial, the court held that Anderson was entitled to the refund. The core reasoning was that her credible testimony about personally witnessing a postal employee postmark and process the return created a rebuttable presumption of delivery under the principles of Estate of Wood v. Commissioner (affirmed by the Eighth Circuit), which the IRS had not overcome; the court also noted that the three-year limitations period under 26 U.S.C. § 6511 would be satisfied by a filing on that date.
In United States v. Sanchez-Guzman, the defendant was charged with using a counterfeit alien registration card under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), pled guilty, and was sentenced on May 29, 1990. After sentencing but before judgment, he filed a motion for a judicial recommendation against deportation (JRAD) under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2), serving it only on the INS field office in Spokane rather than the District Director in Seattle as required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.1(a). The court noted that the notice requirements are jurisdictional, that INS commentary emphasizes service on the district director, and that failure to provide proper notice could waive the JRAD or render any order ineffective due to strict 30-day timing rules. To address these concerns, the court granted the motion provisionally on June 26, 1990, as a protective measure and scheduled a rehearing for July 17, 1990, after directing service on the District Director.