Robert James McNichols

This case is an employment discrimination action in which plaintiff Ms. Bishop alleged that her employer, Albertson's, a multi-state grocery chain, failed to make reasonable efforts to accommodate her handicap. The court had previously denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant then raised an oral motion arguing that the court's law clerk, who had previously served as grievance director for the plaintiff's union and represented her in a 1984 grievance proceeding, may have been biased in her favor. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the clerk's prior representation of one union member among thousands over several years did not create a presumption of bias or require disqualification, as no actual conflict was shown.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a claim by Mr. Klein, a 51-year-old Navy veteran with extensive experience and top qualifications in electronics and radar systems, that the FAA violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by repeatedly failing to hire him for GS-9 electronics technician positions in 1988-1990 despite his veteran preference and high ratings. The district court, after a bench trial, found that the FAA had engaged in age discrimination, citing numerous procedural irregularities in hiring, destruction of records, inconsistencies in interviews and selections, and the hiring of significantly younger candidates with lower scores. The court's core reasoning was that the pattern of passing over a highly rated older applicant in favor of less qualified younger ones, combined with evidence of non-compliance with hiring rules, established a violation of the ADEA. The court awarded reasonable attorney's fees for the judicial proceedings and directed further proceedings on the remedy.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this tax refund case, plaintiffs filed 1983 and 1984 Form 1040 returns showing mostly zero entries or Fifth Amendment assertions while claiming refunds based on withholdings, but the IRS determined unreported gross income of $56,645 and $64,086 respectively and issued deficiency notices after three years. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment, first finding the notices timely under the six-year statute of limitations because more than 25% of gross income was omitted. It then held that neither filing qualified as a valid return under Ninth Circuit precedent because they lacked sufficient financial data to compute tax liability, justifying failure-to-file penalties, and that claimed deductions for contributions to the Universal Life Church were properly disallowed as lacking legitimacy. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.

taxesprocedure

The case concerns the Spokane Tribe of Indians' request for declaratory relief that electronic 'Pick 6 Lotto' gaming devices on its reservation are exempt from state regulation and thus do not violate federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 1166. The court first confirms jurisdiction sua sponte, finding a sufficient actual controversy based on the U.S. Attorney's letter contemplating possible seizure. The central dispute is whether the devices qualify as Class II gaming (subject only to federal and tribal oversight under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act) or Class III gaming (prohibited by state law and therefore a federal crime), turning on whether their electronic operation makes them facsimiles excluded from Class II by 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(B)(ii) or preserves their character as lotto under § 2703(7)(A). The court notes that abstract statutory arguments favor each side but the outcome depends on the specific functioning of the tangible machines, while acknowledging that action by the National Indian Gaming Commission or a tribal-state compact could later moot the question.

criminal lawfederal power

This case is a tax refund suit in which plaintiff Anderson claimed she was entitled to a $3,655 refund and carryover from her 1984 return, which she asserted had been timely mailed to the IRS in September 1986 even though the agency had no record of receiving it. After a bench trial, the court held that Anderson was entitled to the refund. The core reasoning was that her credible testimony about personally witnessing a postal employee postmark and process the return created a rebuttable presumption of delivery under the principles of Estate of Wood v. Commissioner (affirmed by the Eighth Circuit), which the IRS had not overcome; the court also noted that the three-year limitations period under 26 U.S.C. § 6511 would be satisfied by a filing on that date.

taxesprocedure

In United States v. Sanchez-Guzman, the defendant was charged with using a counterfeit alien registration card under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), pled guilty, and was sentenced on May 29, 1990. After sentencing but before judgment, he filed a motion for a judicial recommendation against deportation (JRAD) under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2), serving it only on the INS field office in Spokane rather than the District Director in Seattle as required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.1(a). The court noted that the notice requirements are jurisdictional, that INS commentary emphasizes service on the district director, and that failure to provide proper notice could waive the JRAD or render any order ineffective due to strict 30-day timing rules. To address these concerns, the court granted the motion provisionally on June 26, 1990, as a protective measure and scheduled a rehearing for July 17, 1990, after directing service on the District Director.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a prisoner who sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the manner of serving him nutra-loaf—a compacted food substitute—violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff had previously lost on the claim that serving nutra-loaf itself was unconstitutional, and the remaining issue was whether the procedure (dropping it through a cuff port while the inmate stood at the back of the cell, without a tray or utensils) constituted a constitutional violation. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment after the plaintiff failed to respond or contest the facts, accepting as true that the practice was a temporary safety measure in response to inmate misuse of food items, that inmates had access to water and cleaning supplies, and that no wanton infliction of pain or deprivation of life's necessities occurred. The court also noted that no Fourteenth Amendment due process claim had been properly raised. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved an inmate at Washington State Penitentiary who sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, alleging that restriction to a diet of nutra-loaf without eating utensils constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants. Because the plaintiff failed to respond to the motion or controvert the defendants' statement of facts as required by local rules, the court accepted those facts as true, which showed the diet was nutritionally adequate and imposed for security and institutional management reasons rather than punishment. The court relied on precedents upholding similar food restrictions in prisons when they serve legitimate penological interests and do not deprive inmates of basic nutritional needs, while noting that the defendants' motion did not address the specific manner of service.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In United States v. Boshell, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and faced a Guidelines sentencing range of 151-188 months based on his role as a courier in a large-scale operation. The court decided to impose a sentence substantially below that range after considering the defendant's background as a decorated Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputy and other personal factors. The core reasoning was that 18 U.S.C. § 3661 expressly permits courts to consider without limitation any information about a defendant's background, character, and conduct for sentencing purposes, and the Sentencing Guidelines cannot validly restrict those factors or override a statute enacted and recodified by Congress.

criminal lawfederal power

The case involved a shareholder's derivative suit brought by Leo Portnoy against Gold Reserve Corporation to recover illegal short-swing profits obtained by a director in violation of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. After the corporation recovered the profits from the director, the plaintiff's attorney sought an award of fees and expenses on the grounds that the suit had motivated the recovery. The court denied the request, holding that the plaintiff's efforts were not a substantial or motivating factor because the company had already been notified of the violation by others and was independently pursuing recoupment, and that equitable and policy considerations did not favor an award where no benefit had been conferred.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved grain storage cooperatives suing their property insurers for coverage of damage to stored grain caused by defective temporary facilities. The insurers moved for summary judgment, arguing that one-year contractual limitations periods in the policies barred the suit, which was filed more than a year after the loss was discovered. The plaintiffs contended that the policies' reference to a longer period provided by applicable statute created ambiguity, allowing Washington's six-year contract statute of limitations to govern, and that the limitations period had not yet begun to run under certain policy provisions. The court granted the insurers' motion, holding that the one-year provisions were valid and unambiguous conformity clauses that applied unless a specific Washington statute prohibited shorter contractual limits, which did not exist here. The court also rejected the argument that the suit was timely under alternative triggering events in the policies.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a dispute over the validity of a creditors' election for a permanent trustee in the Chapter 7 liquidation of debtor Kenneth D. Oxborrow's estate after conversion from Chapter 11. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order finding that no trustee was elected at the § 341 meeting and that the interim trustees therefore became permanent trustees. The core reasoning was that although the 20% quorum requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 702(c)(1) was satisfied, the separate 20% requesting requirement under § 702(b) was not, as creditors holding only 14% of eligible claims had requested the election. The court also upheld the bankruptcy court's rulings on voter eligibility, claim amounts, and standing while declining to reach the proxy-solicitation issue.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Salgado, the defendant, a long-term resident alien, moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to vacate his 1964 guilty plea conviction for failing to pay a marijuana transfer tax, which had led to his deportation and now threatened his ability to obtain lawful status or benefits under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). The court held a conference, found the facts undisputed, and concluded that the equities strongly favored relief because Salgado had lived lawfully in the United States for decades after re-entering with a valid green card, with his immigration issues only surfacing during a Social Security check. Although the court acknowledged procedural questions such as whether Rule 60 applies to criminal judgments and the twenty-four-year delay, it determined that Salgado's rights under IRCA had only recently accrued, making the motion timely, and that vacating the judgment was warranted to avoid an unfair outcome in this unusual case. The court therefore ordered the 1964 judgment vacated.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

The case involved Mr. Gutierrez, an undocumented Mexican national on probation for misdemeanors in Washington state court, whose probation was revoked solely on the basis of INS agents' affidavits stating he was present illegally, violating a condition against returning while undocumented. The federal district court addressed whether a state court could determine alienage status and revoke probation on that ground after enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The court decided that questions of whether an individual is in the United States illegally are exclusively federal and must be resolved through federal administrative proceedings or Title 8 prosecutions, not by state courts. It reasoned that federal jurisdiction over alienage questions is exclusive and that states lack authority to interfere with Congress's comprehensive federal scheme for handling illegal immigration and legalization. The court issued declaratory relief accordingly but declined to enter a permanent injunction.

immigrationcriminal lawfederal power

In Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., a class of present and future retirees sued the company alleging that medical benefits promised in collective bargaining agreements were vested and could not be terminated after the company shut down, bringing claims under the Labor Management Relations Act and ERISA. A jury found for the plaintiffs on liability issues after considering extrinsic evidence of intent such as plan summaries and management statements. The court denied the company's post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, holding that substantial evidence supported the verdict and that the jury's findings were not against the clear weight of the evidence. The court entered judgment ordering the company to reinstate lifetime medical benefits for retirees and certain laid-off employees.

labor & employmenthealthcarebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns claims by employees and retirees against Bunker Hill Company and Gulf Resources under section 301 of the LMRA and ERISA, alleging breaches of collective bargaining agreements regarding pension and medical benefits, pursued in part on an alter ego theory against Gulf. The court ruled on multiple defense summary judgment motions, denying the statute of limitations defense because the claims more closely resembled contract actions governed by longer state or ERISA periods rather than the six-month NLRA period from DelCostello. It denied summary judgment on prospective damages and future medical insurance costs, granted motions to strike punitive damages under ERISA and the LMRA, partially granted summary judgment regarding deferred vested retirees, and denied the motion to strike the jury demand on the alter ego claim as it presented factual issues.

labor & employmentprocedurehealthcare

This case involved a dispute over coverage under a builder's risk insurance policy between insurer Allianz and contractor Impero. Impero sought reimbursement for repairs to defective concrete walls in a sewage treatment plant caused by improper concrete mixing and testing during construction. The court granted summary judgment to Allianz, holding that the policy did not cover the costs. The decision was based on the policy's exclusion for the cost of making good faulty or defective workmanship, as the claim involved only repairing the contractor's own defective work without damage to other property.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Holst v. Bowen, a claimant sought judicial review of the denial of Social Security disability benefits after an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the claimant was never disabled, contrary to a prior finding of a closed period of disability. The court held that the ALJ improperly disregarded the district court's remand order by refusing to apply the medical improvement standard from Patti v. Schweiker, instead conducting a full sequential analysis based on new evidence. The core reasoning was that the prior finding of disability during the closed period became the law of the case upon remand, and the ALJ was bound to follow the court's mandate without variation, as failure to do so would undermine the judicial review process.

procedurehealthcarefederal power

This case involved a Social Security disability claimant who, after an initial denial, obtained a remand from the district court for reconsideration without application of the non-severity regulation and for re-weighing of medical expert testimony. Following supplemental administrative proceedings in which the claimant was found disabled, he sought attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The court first held that it possessed authority to enter a final judgment affirming the agency's favorable decision rather than dismissing the action as moot. On the merits of the fee request, the court denied fees, concluding that the government's position had been substantially justified because the non-severity regulation had not yet been invalidated at the time of the original decision, any delay from failure to notify the claimant of class membership was limited, and precedent precluded fees for improper weighing of conflicting medical evidence.

procedurefederal power

The case involved a Death Row inmate challenging his administrative transfer to the Intensive Management Unit (IMU) and various conditions of confinement there, including alleged violations of due process rights regarding the transfer, inadequate access to legal materials and supplies, confiscation of personal property, restrictions on contact visits and telephone use, and other deprivations under the Eighth Amendment. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice. It reasoned that the Due Process Clause does not protect against non-punitive transfers to more restrictive housing, that state law requires segregation for death row inmates without creating a protected liberty interest, that the prison's request system and supplies provided adequate access to the courts, and that none of the challenged conditions denied necessities of life or otherwise rose to a constitutional violation.

criminal lawcivil rights