In Re Burrus involved a habeas corpus petition filed in the U.S. Supreme Court by Thomas E. Burrus, who had been imprisoned for three months by a federal district court in Nebraska for contempt after he and his wife forcibly removed their granddaughter from her father's custody in violation of a court order. The underlying dispute arose when the child's father, an Ohio citizen, sought federal habeas relief to obtain custody from the Nebraska-resident grandparents who had cared for the child since infancy following the mother's death. The Court denied the petition, holding that neither the district court nor the Supreme Court possessed jurisdiction over the child custody matter because no federal statute conferred such authority and federal courts lack common-law parens patriae power to decide domestic relations cases. The opinion emphasized that custody determinations are governed by the law of the forum court rather than the petitioner's home state and that the contempt imprisonment remained valid due to the absence of original federal jurisdiction.
The case was an appeal from the dismissal of an intervention by the Des Moines and Fort Dodge Railroad Company in a foreclosure suit by the Central Trust Company of New York against the Des Moines and Northwestern Railway Company (formerly the Adel Company) over a railroad mortgage, with the Wabash company also involved due to its lease. The intervention sought enforcement of a 1879 traffic agreement that granted the appellant rights to portions of earnings, facilities, and hauling fees in exchange for track use between Waukee and Des Moines. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the contract did not create a lien on the railroad property binding on the mortgage or subsequent parties. The core reasoning was that the agreement imposed only personal obligations rather than property interests, any claimed damages for unperformed future terms were speculative, and the Adel Company's charter duty to complete its own connecting line was inconsistent with the long-term exclusive arrangement.
The case involved Samuel Norris suing his former agents and attorneys, James B. Haggin and Lloyd Tevis, alleging they fraudulently obtained title to over a million dollars in property, including a large ranch, by exploiting his mental and physical incapacity following a head injury. The suit, originally filed in state court and removed to federal circuit court, was dismissed on demurrer. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff's long delay in bringing the action—more than twenty years after the events and after regaining capacity—constituted laches barring relief in equity, especially since the transactions were matters of public record through recorded deeds, mortgages, and court judgments. The court noted that the fraud, if any, was not concealed and could have been discovered earlier through reasonable inquiry.
The case involved a dispute over whether the Texas & Pacific Railway Company had a perpetual contractual obligation to maintain its eastern terminus, Texas office, main machine shops, and car works in the city of Marshall, Texas, in exchange for bonds and land donated by the city. The Supreme Court held that the contract did not impose such an everlasting commitment, interpreting "permanent establishment" as requiring initial setup and operation for a reasonable period rather than forever. The Court further reasoned that even if the contract were perpetual, a court of equity could not enforce it through specific performance because doing so would require ongoing judicial supervision of the company's operations, which is beyond the proper functions of the court. The decree granting relief was reversed, and the bill was ordered dismissed.
This case was an ejectment action in which holders of a lode mining patent (Campbell et al.) sued the holder of an overlapping placer mining patent (Iron Silver Mining Co.) to recover possession of land that had been part of the public domain. The lower court ruled for the lode claimants after finding that their claim was excepted from the placer patent because it had been discovered and located before the placer application. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial. It held that a placer patent excludes only lodes that were known at the time of the placer application, and the trial court's findings and legal conclusions did not adequately establish such prior knowledge or the facts needed to support the exception from the placer grant.
The case concerned David Neagle, a U.S. deputy marshal assigned to protect Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field, who fatally shot David S. Terry during an altercation in California; Neagle was then arrested and held by state authorities on murder charges. The Supreme Court reviewed the circuit court's order discharging Neagle via habeas corpus. The Court held that Neagle was properly released because he was in custody for an act done in pursuance of federal law and authority. The core reasoning was that the President and Attorney General had directed protection for federal judges, that this constituted authority under the laws of the United States within the meaning of the habeas statute, and that state prosecution was therefore preempted.
