In Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc., plaintiff Penny Brannon sued her former employer and its human resources manager, claiming her termination for excessive absenteeism violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) because two periods of absence in December 1993 and January 1994 qualified as protected leave. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the absences involved serious health conditions under the FMLA criteria of incapacity for more than three days with continuing treatment. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff's own upper respiratory infection and her child's illness met the statutory and regulatory requirements for FMLA coverage, including medical documentation and notice to the employer, so the absences should not have counted toward the company's absenteeism point total leading to termination.
The case arose when private marinas leasing federal land at Center Hill Lake from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began charging a $5 fee for boat launches, prompting boat owners to sue to halt the fees or cap them at the $3 rate the Corps could charge at its own facilities. The court considered motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, focusing on the interpretation of federal statutes governing recreation at water resource projects. It ruled that the Corps possesses authority under 16 U.S.C. § 460d and related laws, including 1993 amendments on user fees, to permit its lessees to charge higher fees at boat launching sites they operate. The decision turned on distinctions in the statutes between facilities run directly by the Corps and those managed by private concessionaires under leases, finding no prohibition on the latter charging $5.
The plaintiff sued his employer, Fleetguard, Inc., and its parent company under Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, alleging he was fired due to his religious beliefs and that the company retaliated after he filed a discrimination complaint. The court addressed whether punitive damages could be recovered under the THRA and whether the plaintiff could amend his complaint to add a common-law retaliatory discharge claim. It held that punitive damages are unavailable under the THRA's employment discrimination provisions because the statute's enumerated remedies do not include them and its 1989 amendment addressed only compensatory damages. The court further ruled that the THRA provides the exclusive state-law remedies for religious discrimination claims, barring any supplemental common-law action. This conclusion rested on the statute's text, legislative history, and comparisons to other THRA sections that explicitly authorize punitive damages.
This case involves a breach of contract claim in which plaintiff Harry Talkington alleged that the president of Anchor Gasoline Corporation orally promised him deferred compensation of $1,000 per month for each month worked, in addition to salary, as part of his continued employment with a subsidiary coal company after an initial written agreement expired. The defendant raised the statute of frauds as a defense and disputed liability of the parent corporation. Following a bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiff, holding the oral agreement enforceable due to the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the defendant's assurances that a written memorandum would be prepared and signed, and awarded $33,000 in damages plus prejudgment interest, calculated only through the period of full-time employment.
The case concerned a dispute between James Cable Partners, which held a 25-year exclusive cable television franchise granted by the City of Jamestown in 1977 and assigned in 1988, and the city, which sought to operate a competing cable system after obtaining its own franchise in 1990. Following state court litigation that resulted in an injunction barring the city from competition, the city argued that section 7(a) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act retroactively nullified the exclusivity and permitted multiple franchises. James Cable filed for declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court, and the city counterclaimed on the Act's retroactive effect; the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on stipulated facts. The court examined the statutory language prohibiting exclusive franchises, the legislative history of cable regulation, and whether the federal Act overrode the prior state judgment and franchise terms.
The case involves Kenneth Wayne O'Guinn's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Tennessee conviction for first-degree murder and aggravated rape, for which he received a death sentence. The court granted the petition after finding that O'Guinn's confession was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because Alabama investigators misinformed him about his Miranda rights to counsel, leading to an unknowing waiver that Tennessee authorities then relied upon without providing new warnings. The court also determined that O'Guinn received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial. The core reasoning was that the confession was not knowing and voluntary under Miranda v. Arizona and related precedents, that the state court findings were erroneous given the record, and that counsel's performance at sentencing fell below constitutional standards.
