Leland Clure Morton

In Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc., plaintiff Penny Brannon sued her former employer and its human resources manager, claiming her termination for excessive absenteeism violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) because two periods of absence in December 1993 and January 1994 qualified as protected leave. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that the absences involved serious health conditions under the FMLA criteria of incapacity for more than three days with continuing treatment. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff's own upper respiratory infection and her child's illness met the statutory and regulatory requirements for FMLA coverage, including medical documentation and notice to the employer, so the absences should not have counted toward the company's absenteeism point total leading to termination.

labor & employmentfamily law

The case arose when private marinas leasing federal land at Center Hill Lake from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began charging a $5 fee for boat launches, prompting boat owners to sue to halt the fees or cap them at the $3 rate the Corps could charge at its own facilities. The court considered motions for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment, focusing on the interpretation of federal statutes governing recreation at water resource projects. It ruled that the Corps possesses authority under 16 U.S.C. § 460d and related laws, including 1993 amendments on user fees, to permit its lessees to charge higher fees at boat launching sites they operate. The decision turned on distinctions in the statutes between facilities run directly by the Corps and those managed by private concessionaires under leases, finding no prohibition on the latter charging $5.

environmentfederal powerproperty

The plaintiff sued his employer, Fleetguard, Inc., and its parent company under Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, alleging he was fired due to his religious beliefs and that the company retaliated after he filed a discrimination complaint. The court addressed whether punitive damages could be recovered under the THRA and whether the plaintiff could amend his complaint to add a common-law retaliatory discharge claim. It held that punitive damages are unavailable under the THRA's employment discrimination provisions because the statute's enumerated remedies do not include them and its 1989 amendment addressed only compensatory damages. The court further ruled that the THRA provides the exclusive state-law remedies for religious discrimination claims, barring any supplemental common-law action. This conclusion rested on the statute's text, legislative history, and comparisons to other THRA sections that explicitly authorize punitive damages.

labor & employmentcivil rightsreligious liberty

This case involves a breach of contract claim in which plaintiff Harry Talkington alleged that the president of Anchor Gasoline Corporation orally promised him deferred compensation of $1,000 per month for each month worked, in addition to salary, as part of his continued employment with a subsidiary coal company after an initial written agreement expired. The defendant raised the statute of frauds as a defense and disputed liability of the parent corporation. Following a bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiff, holding the oral agreement enforceable due to the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the defendant's assurances that a written memorandum would be prepared and signed, and awarded $33,000 in damages plus prejudgment interest, calculated only through the period of full-time employment.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a dispute between James Cable Partners, which held a 25-year exclusive cable television franchise granted by the City of Jamestown in 1977 and assigned in 1988, and the city, which sought to operate a competing cable system after obtaining its own franchise in 1990. Following state court litigation that resulted in an injunction barring the city from competition, the city argued that section 7(a) of the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act retroactively nullified the exclusivity and permitted multiple franchises. James Cable filed for declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court, and the city counterclaimed on the Act's retroactive effect; the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on stipulated facts. The court examined the statutory language prohibiting exclusive franchises, the legislative history of cable regulation, and whether the federal Act overrode the prior state judgment and franchise terms.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involves Kenneth Wayne O'Guinn's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Tennessee conviction for first-degree murder and aggravated rape, for which he received a death sentence. The court granted the petition after finding that O'Guinn's confession was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because Alabama investigators misinformed him about his Miranda rights to counsel, leading to an unknowing waiver that Tennessee authorities then relied upon without providing new warnings. The court also determined that O'Guinn received ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial. The core reasoning was that the confession was not knowing and voluntary under Miranda v. Arizona and related precedents, that the state court findings were erroneous given the record, and that counsel's performance at sentencing fell below constitutional standards.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves an insurance dispute in which the plaintiffs sought coverage for heavy equipment destroyed by fire, but the defendant insurers denied the claim citing arson and fraudulent overvaluation. The plaintiffs sued for the property loss, a 25% bad faith penalty under Tennessee law, interest, and additional consequential damages including lost profits, a lost lease, reimbursement of a fine, and mental anguish. The court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the claims for mental anguish, lost profits, lost lease, and fine reimbursement. It reasoned that no tort claim for bad faith or outrageous conduct was available, that mental anguish damages are not recoverable in this contract action, and that the specific statutory scheme in T.C.A. Sec. 56-7-105 limits insurer liability for bad-faith claim denials to the loss plus interest and a penalty of up to 25%, precluding other consequential damages.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a class action by Tennessee residents challenging the Secretary of Health and Human Services' handling of attorney fee approvals under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, seeking additional benefits for affected individuals. The court granted the plaintiffs' application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after determining they were the prevailing party through a settlement that provided full relief to the named plaintiffs and the certified class, and that the government's position was not substantially justified due to the agency's failure to follow its own regulations. The court rejected the full amount requested as excessive, reducing compensable hours for certain pre-representation and duplicative activities, and applying inflation-adjusted hourly rates based on the consumer price index for the specific years services were rendered rather than current rates. It awarded $1,547.65 to one attorney and $6,034.02 to Legal Services of Middle Tennessee after these adjustments.

healthcarefederal power

The case involves a claim for Social Security disability benefits in which the plaintiff established a prima facie case by showing a severe impairment that prevented her past work, shifting the burden to the Secretary to prove she could perform other substantial gainful activity. The dispute centered on application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines grids, specifically whether rule 201.17 (directing disabled) or 201.19 (directing not disabled) applied based on the claimant's age, education level as illiterate, work experience, and maximum sustained work capability, along with nonexertional factors like low IQ and comprehension difficulties. The court explained that grids may dictate a conclusion only if a rule identically matches the claimant's characteristics, that nonexertional impairments can render a rule inapplicable or require vocational testimony, and that a rule finding disabled can account for additional impairments. The opinion adopts the magistrate's report in full on the standards of judicial review and the relevant portions addressing the grids.

healthcarefederal power

In Sumners v. Sullivan, attorneys petitioned the court for approval of fees following their successful representation of a plaintiff in a Social Security disability benefits claim. After the court remanded the case, the Secretary awarded $39,586 in past-due benefits and withheld $9,896.50 (25 percent) pending a fee determination; the attorneys sought the full amount under their contingency agreement, while the Secretary objected and proposed a lower lodestar calculation. The court granted the petition in part, awarding $5,440.80 after reducing claimed hours for clerical, extension, and duplicative work to reach 42.05 compensable hours, applying a $90 hourly rate at the high end of the spectrum, and adding a modest upward adjustment for the contingent nature of the representation. The core reasoning relied on Rodriquez v. Bowen, which treats contingency fee agreements as a rebuttable presumption but still requires the court to ensure the fee is reasonable and not a windfall, leading to rejection of both the full 25 percent and the Secretary's unenhanced lodestar.

federal powerprocedurehealthcare

In Goad v. Macon County, Tenn., the plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that multiple defendants violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force and denying reasonable medical attention while he was a pretrial detainee. Some defendants settled for $10,000 before trial; the jury found three remaining defendants liable, awarding $8,500 in compensatory damages and separate punitive damages against two of them. The court applied 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to determine the effect of the settlement, concluding that Tennessee law permitting set-offs for jointly liable parties was consistent with federal law for compensatory awards but inconsistent for punitive damages because it would undermine the goal of punishing specific violators. Accordingly, the settlement fully offset the compensatory damages but left the punitive awards intact.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy judge's decision that the sale of a repossessed jet airplane was commercially unreasonable following nonpayment of debt. The district court reviewed the full record, including witness testimony and findings of fact, and determined that the bankruptcy judge's conclusions were supported, noting the sale occurred in a hurried and improper manner. The court adopted the bankruptcy opinion in full and affirmed the ruling, dismissing the appeal.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling that a Tennessee state court default judgment against the debtor for assault and battery did not have preclusive effect on the dischargeability of the resulting debt. The district court held that collateral estoppel applied because the state court necessarily determined that the debtor's conduct was willful and wanton when awarding both compensatory and punitive damages. Under Tennessee law, such damages require a showing of malice or conscious disregard, which aligns with the "willful and malicious" standard of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). The court therefore reversed the bankruptcy court and ruled the $85,000 debt nondischargeable without reaching the underlying factual findings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this diversity case applying Tennessee law, the lessors and their subrogated insurer sued the tenant for fire damage to the leased industrial building that was caused by the tenant's negligence. The lease required the lessor to obtain fire insurance on the building and provided that the tenant would be responsible for damage it caused, but also included provisions for the tenant to maintain liability insurance and for rent abatement in case of damage through no fault of the tenant. The court held that the insurance procurement clause was intended for the mutual benefit of both parties absent a clear contrary expression, predicting that the Tennessee Supreme Court would follow the modern rule adopted by the majority of jurisdictions and thus barring the subrogation action. Judgment was entered for the defendants on the main claim, while the tenants' counterclaim for lost profits and repair costs was dismissed for lack of supporting evidence.

propertytorts & liability

The case concerned whether Mack Sanders' debt to First National Bank & Trust Company was dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 523, based on alleged misrepresentations in his financial statement. The bankruptcy court ruled the debt non-dischargeable, finding that the bank reasonably relied on the false statement in extending credit and that this reliance caused the extension. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that the factual findings of reliance and causation were not clearly erroneous, that the bankruptcy court applied the correct legal standard of proof focused on preventing bad-faith creditor actions, and that the entire debt was attributable to the misrepresentation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff who sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when her wages were garnished pursuant to a prior judgment without the notice required by Tennessee statute or the Constitution. The errors stemmed from omissions by court clerks, the sheriff's department, and her employer in providing or forwarding the proper garnishment notice, though the plaintiff received and was shown a document outlining some rights and limits. Legislative changes mooted any injunctive relief, leaving only a damages claim. The court entered judgment for all defendants, finding no constitutional violation warranting liability after considering issues of notice sufficiency, qualified immunity for officials, and the nature of ministerial acts by the county.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned enforcement of a 1978 bankruptcy court money judgment in favor of First American National Bank against debtor William Hardison for loans fraudulently obtained, which the bankruptcy court had ruled partially nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act. After Hardison later inherited interests in family trusts, the bank sought garnishment of those assets from the trustee bank. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings, finding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under section 17(c)(3) to enter a money judgment and that the trust interests were reachable because the spendthrift trusts had terminated, leaving only ministerial distribution duties.

procedureproperty

The United States brought this action under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 seeking a permanent injunction to bar the defendant from conducting surface coal mining without a permit. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and granted the injunction. It held that the defendant qualified as a 'permittee' under 30 U.S.C. § 1271(c) because he had received multiple federal and state cessation orders for unpermitted mining, failed to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge them, and his pattern of violations interfered with enforcement of the Act's permitting requirements. The court found that past violations and the defendant's statements indicated a likelihood of future noncompliance, making injunctive relief appropriate to prevent environmental harm.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case was a breach of contract dispute between Fen Hin Chon Enterprises, Ltd. (FHC), a Hong Kong company, and Porelon, Inc., a Delaware corporation, over a licensing agreement granting FHC exclusive rights to use Porelon's technology and trademarks for pre-inked handstamps in Hong Kong and Macao. The agreement, originally from 1974 and renewed in 1983, included royalty payments and exclusivity provisions, but Porelon's agent Wil Ooms engaged in dealings with competitor Mark Universal, Ltd., that interfered with FHC's rights, including supply disruptions and support for unauthorized competition. After a bench trial, the court held that Porelon breached the contract and entered judgment for FHC in the amount of $575,281.10, based on findings of lost profits and related damages supported by the evidence of sales projections, costs, and market interference. The decision rested on the contract terms prohibiting termination at will and requiring good-faith performance of exclusivity obligations.

business & regulatory

This case involves an appeal from a bankruptcy court order avoiding liens held by Kenworth of Tennessee, Inc. (later assigned to Associates Commercial Corp.) on four truck tractors owned by the debtor in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court ruled that the liens were unperfected because the debtor never obtained Tennessee certificates of title noting the liens, despite Kenworth providing the necessary documents, and that mere possession of two of the vehicles by Kenworth at the time of the bankruptcy filing did not perfect the security interests. The district court affirmed, holding that under Tennessee law, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-3-126(b), notation on the certificate of title is the exclusive method for perfecting liens on motor vehicles, with a narrow exception only for liens that depend on possession for their existence rather than for perfection, such as artisan's liens. The court rejected arguments based on UCC § 47-9-305 for perfection by possession and found no basis for equitable liens. The liens were therefore avoided as unperfected security interests.

propertybusiness & regulatory