This case is a declaratory judgment action in which insurer Aetna sought a ruling that its liability policy issued to First Security Bank did not cover claims brought by former bank employee Claudia Ervin against the bank and its employee Wheeler in a pending state-court suit. Ervin alleged wrongful termination, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, emotional distress, lost wages, reputational harm, and punitive damages arising from her 1985 discharge. The court granted Aetna summary judgment, holding that the policy provided no coverage because Ervin's claims did not allege bodily injury, property damage, or an occurrence as defined in the policy and did not arise out of the specific defamation torts listed in the personal-injury endorsement. Applying Montana law, the court determined coverage based solely on the allegations in Ervin's complaint and concluded that emotional distress and employment-related economic harms fell outside the policy's terms.
business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability
This case was a personal injury suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act brought by Wanda Dischner, an employee of independent contractor Irby Construction, who was injured when a tower leg slipped during a BPA project in Montana. The complaint alleged the United States owed duties to provide a safe workplace and supervise the contractor's crane operations. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, ruling that the government cannot be held liable for the negligence of independent contractors and that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA barred claims based on the agency's reserved rights of oversight and inspection. The court also rejected arguments for nondelegable duties or strict liability under state law or ultra-hazardous activity doctrines, and dismissed the government's third-party indemnification claim against Irby as moot.
The case involved a widow suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence by OSHA inspectors who allegedly failed to identify and require corrections for safety hazards at her husband's chemical plant workplace, resulting in his fatal accident. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss, holding that the claims were barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The reasoning centered on the fact that OSHA's inspections and enforcement of workplace safety standards are discretionary regulatory functions that Congress intended to shield from tort liability, even if performed negligently.
The case involved an inmate at Montana State Prison suing prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to various conditions including inadequate dental care, law library access, meal times, privacy, classification, cell overcrowding, record accuracy, lack of work/education opportunities, and property confiscation. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the entire action. The core reasoning was that the allegations did not meet constitutional standards, such as failing to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under Estelle v. Gamble, not establishing denial of meaningful access to courts under Bounds v. Smith, and lacking any federally protected right in areas like employment or where state remedies existed for property claims.
This case concerns efforts by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to build a reregulating dam as part of the LAURD project downstream from Libby Dam in Montana, which the Libby Rod & Gun Club challenged as unauthorized by Congress and noncompliant with NEPA. The court had previously enjoined construction, a ruling affirmed on appeal as to the lack of congressional authorization. Defendants moved under Rule 60(b) to dissolve the injunction, arguing that NEPA deficiencies had been fixed and that a recent Supreme Court decision in California v. Sierra Club undermined plaintiffs' standing to challenge authorization. The court denied the motion, holding that the new standing precedent was not controlling here, that the Ninth Circuit's final rulings on authorization and standing were res judicata, and that defendants failed to meet Rule 60(b)(5) requirements for relief from the injunction.
The case concerned whether an aircraft liability insurance policy provided coverage for a crash that damaged property at a refinery, where the pilot lacked a valid medical certificate at the time of the flight but was otherwise qualified and the lack of certification had no causal connection to the accident. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on two issues: whether the policy's pilot warranty clause and exclusion provision barred coverage for pilots without a medical certificate, and whether a causal link between the breach and the loss was required to allow the insurer to deny coverage. Applying Montana rules of insurance contract interpretation that favor the insured and strictly construe exclusions, the court held that the exclusion did not incorporate the medical certificate requirement and that modern authority requires a causal connection between the policy breach and the loss. Because no such connection existed and the breach was merely technical, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motions, ordering that coverage be provided.