This case is a declaratory judgment action in which insurer Aetna sought a ruling that its liability policy issued to First Security Bank did not cover claims brought by former bank employee Claudia Ervin against the bank and its employee Wheeler in a pending state-court suit. Ervin alleged wrongful termination, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, emotional distress, lost wages, reputational harm, and punitive damages arising from her 1985 discharge. The court granted Aetna summary judgment, holding that the policy provided no coverage because Ervin's claims did not allege bodily injury, property damage, or an occurrence as defined in the policy and did not arise out of the specific defamation torts listed in the personal-injury endorsement. Applying Montana law, the court determined coverage based solely on the allegations in Ervin's complaint and concluded that emotional distress and employment-related economic harms fell outside the policy's terms.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

This case was a personal injury suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act brought by Wanda Dischner, an employee of independent contractor Irby Construction, who was injured when a tower leg slipped during a BPA project in Montana. The complaint alleged the United States owed duties to provide a safe workplace and supervise the contractor's crane operations. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, ruling that the government cannot be held liable for the negligence of independent contractors and that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA barred claims based on the agency's reserved rights of oversight and inspection. The court also rejected arguments for nondelegable duties or strict liability under state law or ultra-hazardous activity doctrines, and dismissed the government's third-party indemnification claim against Irby as moot.

torts & liabilityfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a widow suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence by OSHA inspectors who allegedly failed to identify and require corrections for safety hazards at her husband's chemical plant workplace, resulting in his fatal accident. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss, holding that the claims were barred by the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The reasoning centered on the fact that OSHA's inspections and enforcement of workplace safety standards are discretionary regulatory functions that Congress intended to shield from tort liability, even if performed negligently.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentfederal power

The case involved an inmate at Montana State Prison suing prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to various conditions including inadequate dental care, law library access, meal times, privacy, classification, cell overcrowding, record accuracy, lack of work/education opportunities, and property confiscation. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the entire action. The core reasoning was that the allegations did not meet constitutional standards, such as failing to show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under Estelle v. Gamble, not establishing denial of meaningful access to courts under Bounds v. Smith, and lacking any federally protected right in areas like employment or where state remedies existed for property claims.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case concerns efforts by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to build a reregulating dam as part of the LAURD project downstream from Libby Dam in Montana, which the Libby Rod & Gun Club challenged as unauthorized by Congress and noncompliant with NEPA. The court had previously enjoined construction, a ruling affirmed on appeal as to the lack of congressional authorization. Defendants moved under Rule 60(b) to dissolve the injunction, arguing that NEPA deficiencies had been fixed and that a recent Supreme Court decision in California v. Sierra Club undermined plaintiffs' standing to challenge authorization. The court denied the motion, holding that the new standing precedent was not controlling here, that the Ninth Circuit's final rulings on authorization and standing were res judicata, and that defendants failed to meet Rule 60(b)(5) requirements for relief from the injunction.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether an aircraft liability insurance policy provided coverage for a crash that damaged property at a refinery, where the pilot lacked a valid medical certificate at the time of the flight but was otherwise qualified and the lack of certification had no causal connection to the accident. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on two issues: whether the policy's pilot warranty clause and exclusion provision barred coverage for pilots without a medical certificate, and whether a causal link between the breach and the loss was required to allow the insurer to deny coverage. Applying Montana rules of insurance contract interpretation that favor the insured and strictly construe exclusions, the court held that the exclusion did not incorporate the medical certificate requirement and that modern authority requires a causal connection between the policy breach and the loss. Because no such connection existed and the breach was merely technical, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motions, ordering that coverage be provided.

business & regulatory

This diversity action sought a declaratory judgment on whether comprehensive general liability and umbrella insurance policies issued to a condominium developer provided coverage for claims arising from faulty construction of the Stillwater condominiums, including leaking roofs and defective wiring and plumbing. The underlying suit by the condominium association alleged breach of warranty, breach of contract, strict liability, and negligence, and settled with the association acquiring the developer's rights under the policies. The court granted the insurers' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policies afforded no coverage and imposed no duty to defend. It held that the policies' exclusions for property damage to the insured's own products or work applied to claims seeking repair or replacement of the defective construction itself, and that an exception to a contract-exclusion provision did not create coverage, consistent with the majority of other jurisdictions addressing analogous facts.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved a plaintiff injured at work when a patient grabbed her and wrenched her neck, which triggered pain from her pre-existing degenerative arthritis and caused total disability. She had an accident insurance policy from Colonial Life & Accident Insurance that paid initial benefits but then denied further coverage, relying on policy language requiring that loss result directly, independently, and exclusively of all other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external and accidental means. Both parties moved for summary judgment on undisputed facts. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, applying Montana precedent from Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. that excludes coverage when a disease or bodily infirmity contributes to the loss, and rejecting contrary authority from other states or arguments based on the policy's incontestability clause.

business & regulatory

Mr. Much was injured in May 1975 when his holstered Ruger revolver discharged into his leg while he crawled under brush, and he filed this products liability suit against the manufacturer in September 1979, after Montana's three-year statute of limitations for tort actions had expired. The plaintiff argued that the defendant fraudulently concealed defects in the revolver's safety through advertisements, which should toll the limitations period, and alternatively urged the court to apply a discovery rule so that the period would begin only when he discovered or should have discovered that a defect caused his injury. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding no fraudulent concealment because the injury was immediately obvious to the plaintiff, there were no post-injury communications or affirmative acts of concealment by Ruger, and Montana statutes and precedent do not extend a discovery rule to standard tort actions like this one outside narrow areas such as fraud or malpractice.

gunstorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a challenge by environmental groups to the U.S. Forest Service's issuance of a special use permit allowing Burlington Northern to build a logging road across federal lands in a Montana wilderness study area to reach its checkerboard-patterned private holdings, which originated from 19th-century railroad land grants. Burlington Northern sought access for logging that would disqualify the area from future wilderness designation, prompting the plaintiffs to sue for injunctive relief on grounds including lack of statutory or common-law access rights. The court addressed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on three issues: easement by necessity, implied easement, and access under 16 U.S.C. § 478. It granted Burlington Northern's motions on easement by necessity and implied easement (and partially on the statutory claim), granted the federal defendants' motion on the implied easement issue, and denied the plaintiffs' motions, reasoning that historical land grants and property law principles created enforceable access rights while federal agencies retained regulatory authority over the manner of access under statutes like the Federal Land Policy and Management Act.

environmentpropertyfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case was a strict products liability action in which plaintiff Tim A. Zahrte sued Sturm, Ruger & Co. after a .30 caliber single-action revolver discharged when tossed onto a stoop, injuring his hand; he alleged a design defect created a false-safety position allowing unintended firing from a light blow. Following a three-week trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of his injury. The district court denied the plaintiff's post-trial motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court had instructed the jury on comparative fault principles drawn from decisions in other jurisdictions, concluded that Montana's comparative negligence statute did not govern strict liability claims, and upheld the jury's determination that assumption of risk barred recovery.

torts & liabilityguns

This case concerns a grand jury investigation into possible violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1163, involving embezzlement or theft from an Indian tribal organization, specifically the Blackfeet Tribe's Hardship Give-Away Program. The grand jury issued a subpoena duces tecum for tribal records, which defendant Boggs and the intervening Blackfeet Tribe moved to quash on grounds including misuse for a pending indictment, tribal property protections, unreasonable interference with tribal governance, and sovereign immunity. The court denied the motion to quash, holding that no indictment had been returned so the subpoena was not improper discovery, the cited statutes did not create immunity from federal process, the subpoena was specific and relevant, and Indian tribes possess only limited sovereignty subject to Congress's plenary power as reflected in the statute's text and legislative history. The court ordered Boggs to produce the records and the tribe not to interfere.

criminal lawfederal power

Thomas McGuinn was convicted of deliberate homicide in Montana state court in 1977. He filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a jury instruction that the law presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts. Following Sandstrom v. Montana, the court held that this instruction violated due process by relieving the prosecution of its burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt and that other instructions did not cure the defect or render the error harmless. The court rejected arguments based on procedural default or harmless error under Chapman v. California. The petition was granted, ordering McGuinn's release unless the state grants a new trial within sixty days.

criminal lawprocedure

In Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Poteat, an environmental group sought a preliminary injunction under Rule 65 to halt the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers from constructing additional power units at Libby Dam and a downstream reregulating dam on the Kootenai River in Montana. The plaintiffs alleged violations of congressional authorization requirements under 33 U.S.C. § 401, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act, and other statutes. The court granted the injunction, finding a likelihood of success on the claims that Congress had not authorized the reregulating dam and that the environmental impact statement inadequately considered project alternatives. It determined that the plaintiffs faced substantial and irreparable environmental harm outweighing the defendants' damages, and that the public interest favored halting construction pending compliance, while denying relief on the remaining statutory counts.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

In McGee v. Riekhof, a Montana resident sued a Utah ophthalmologist for negligence after the doctor advised via telephone from Utah that the patient could return to work following retinal surgery, allegedly causing a re-detachment of the retina in Montana. The plaintiff claimed the advice constituted negligent diagnosis and failure to warn, without alleging negligence in the Utah surgery itself. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Montana's long-arm statute. The court denied the motion, holding that the telephone consultation amounted to an act in Montana causing the tort to accrue there, satisfying both the statutory requirement and due process minimum contacts standards from cases like International Shoe and Hanson v. Denckla, as the doctor purposefully provided services knowing they would affect the patient in Montana.

proceduretorts & liability

In Burk v. Gulf Oil Corporation, plaintiff Donald Burk, a branded distributor of Gulf products in Montana, sued to enjoin Gulf from terminating their agreements upon expiration, claiming violations of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 and related FEA regulations, while Gulf counterclaimed for unpaid debts and return of equipment. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether termination was permitted under the Act. Relying on legislative history showing that Congress had removed proposed dealer-protection provisions from the final Act, the court concluded that the statute did not regulate oil companies' ability to end franchise agreements with independent marketers. It further held that Gulf's actions did not constitute prohibited retaliatory conduct under 10 C.F.R. § 210.61, as notice of non-renewal predated the Act and was unrelated to any FEA allocations, and that terminations aligned with normal business practices under § 210.62.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In United States v. Reiser, the defendant was indicted under federal law for failing to submit to induction into the armed forces pursuant to Selective Service statutes that required registration and service only by male citizens. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the sex-based classification burdened one sex and violated his Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. The court examined the history of legal distinctions between men and women, the fundamental nature of military service as a duty of citizenship, and the standards for reviewing sex-based classifications under equal protection doctrine, including the rational basis test and stricter scrutiny requirements. The core reasoning focused on whether the government's objectives justified the exclusion of women from the draft pool and noted that discriminatory treatment in one area affects equality in others, while considering factors like combat roles and administrative needs.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

In Fife v. Crist, inmates at the Montana State Prison filed civil rights complaints challenging the procedures used in disciplinary actions and the conditions in forms of extraordinary confinement such as the Hole and maximum security, seeking declaratory relief, injunctions, and damages. The court found that the prison's disciplinary processes lacked required due process protections including advance written notice of charges, the opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence when it would not compromise safety, written statements of evidence relied upon and reasons for decisions, and impartial disciplinary committees. Drawing on the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, the court declared these procedures unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and enjoined their future use, but held that the ruling was not retroactive so as to impose damages or require modification of past records, given the good-faith reliance by officials on prior law and the administrative burdens involved. The defendants were given 60 days to submit a compliant disciplinary plan. The case was tagged with topics including criminal law, civil rights, and procedure.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case challenged the approval and construction of a federal-aid primary highway in Montana's West Fork drainage, intended to serve a private recreational community development. The plaintiffs argued that preparation of the required environmental impact statement had been improperly delegated to the state highway administration and that the road's designation as a federal-aid primary highway exceeded statutory authority. The court dismissed the delegation claim, finding that the process complied with NEPA, CEQ guidelines, and congressional intent as the federal agency retained responsibility. However, it ruled the primary highway designation invalid because the project mainly benefited private commercial interests rather than national defense, interstate commerce, or the general welfare as required by 23 U.S.C. § 103(b), and it enjoined funding and construction under that designation.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a high school student, Steven Moran, who was prohibited by his school district's policy from participating in extracurricular activities, including varsity football, solely because he was married. The student sought a preliminary injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the policy violated his rights to equal protection by discriminating against married students without a valid justification. The court granted the injunction, finding that the policy likely infringed on equal protection rights and that the student's opportunity to participate in sports for potential scholarships constituted a protectable interest. The board's stated reasons for the rule, such as discouraging teenage marriage and ensuring focus on academics, were deemed insufficient to support the classification, especially given the student's compliance with state marriage laws and lack of disciplinary issues. The injunction allows the student to participate pending a full hearing on the policy's validity.

civil rightsfamily lawprocedure