This case was a medical malpractice action under the Federal Tort Claims Act brought by Vincente Rosario and his mother against the United States, alleging that negligent care at a VA hospital during an arteriogram on January 28, 1985, caused permanent injuries, with the mother also claiming loss of filial consortium. After a seven-day bench trial, the court entered judgment for the defendant. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the hospital's treatment fell below the applicable standard of care, and that the mother had not shown financial dependency on the son.
This case involves McLean Hospital suing former spouses Patricia and Robert Lasher for unpaid bills from Robert's 1987 psychiatric hospitalization, with Robert and Patricia asserting third-party claims against his insurer Durham Life Insurance Co. for denying coverage under an ERISA-governed health plan. After removal to federal court and amendments dropping state-law claims in favor of an ERISA claim, Durham moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on grounds including failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the denial not being arbitrary or capricious, exhaustion of policy benefits, and material misrepresentations on the insurance application. The court denied both motions, adopting the magistrate judge's report that the pleadings sufficiently alleged an ERISA violation and that disputed facts existed on issues such as notice of denial procedures, policy ambiguity, the nature of treatment received, and whether any misrepresentations were material or waived.
This case involved plaintiff Cashman's appeal of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of Title II disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, based on a back injury from a 1980 ladder fall; although he was later found disabled starting in 1987 and awarded SSI benefits, the Secretary determined he was not disabled on or before March 31, 1984, when his insured status expired. The district court reviewed the administrative record under the substantial evidence standard and denied the plaintiff's motion to reverse the decision, affirming the Secretary's findings. The court noted that the ALJ properly weighed conflicting medical evidence, including reports from treating physicians and non-examining advisors, and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence despite the plaintiff's claims of ongoing pain and limitations. Judicial review was limited to checking for legal error or lack of evidentiary support, without reweighing the facts de novo.
In this case, plaintiff Margaret Boyle sued her former employer, the Boston Foundation, and its president Anna Faith Jones, alleging age discrimination under federal and state law after she resigned at age 62, claiming harassment by Jones; she also asserted state-law claims for intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Jones. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations on the defendants' motions. It granted partial summary judgment to the Boston Foundation on the state discrimination claim, limiting recovery to $20,000 under the charitable immunity statute, because the foundation is a public charity. It denied Jones's motion to dismiss the interference claim, finding the allegations sufficient to state a claim. It granted summary judgment to Jones on the emotional distress claim after treating the motion as one for summary judgment, because the conduct occurred in the course of employment and thus fell under the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation statute.
This case involves an auto dealership and its principals suing their inventory financer for breach of contract to provide a capital loan, breach of fiduciary duty and good faith, and violations of Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes, with the defendant filing counterclaims for violations of security agreements, promissory notes, and guaranties. The court reconsidered and vacated its November 26, 1991 preliminary injunction that had required the financer to reinstate floorplan financing and forward credits while limiting the dealership's out-of-trust sales. The core reasoning was that the dealership had not maintained the status quo as represented, with out-of-trust debt increasing substantially instead of remaining around $200,000, which undermined the equitable basis for the injunction. As an interlocutory order, the court held it had authority to vacate the injunction when doing so was consonant with equity.
This case involves a dispute between B.P.G. Autoland Jeep-Eagle, Inc., an automobile dealership, and its financing provider, Chrysler Credit Corporation (CCC), along with related individual plaintiffs and guarantors. After CCC terminated floorplan financing based on alleged defaults under a security agreement and promissory note, the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and good faith, and violations of Massachusetts and Connecticut unfair trade practices statutes; CCC filed counterclaims. The court addressed the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Applying Connecticut law per the contract's choice-of-law clause, the court granted the injunction, ordering CCC to reinstate financing, limiting the out-of-trust amount, and imposing conditions on interest payments and collateralization. The decision rested on findings that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on their good-faith claim, irreparable harm, and that unclean-hands defenses did not bar equitable relief.
