David Sutherland Nelson

This case was a medical malpractice action under the Federal Tort Claims Act brought by Vincente Rosario and his mother against the United States, alleging that negligent care at a VA hospital during an arteriogram on January 28, 1985, caused permanent injuries, with the mother also claiming loss of filial consortium. After a seven-day bench trial, the court entered judgment for the defendant. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the hospital's treatment fell below the applicable standard of care, and that the mother had not shown financial dependency on the son.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involves McLean Hospital suing former spouses Patricia and Robert Lasher for unpaid bills from Robert's 1987 psychiatric hospitalization, with Robert and Patricia asserting third-party claims against his insurer Durham Life Insurance Co. for denying coverage under an ERISA-governed health plan. After removal to federal court and amendments dropping state-law claims in favor of an ERISA claim, Durham moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on grounds including failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the denial not being arbitrary or capricious, exhaustion of policy benefits, and material misrepresentations on the insurance application. The court denied both motions, adopting the magistrate judge's report that the pleadings sufficiently alleged an ERISA violation and that disputed facts existed on issues such as notice of denial procedures, policy ambiguity, the nature of treatment received, and whether any misrepresentations were material or waived.

healthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved plaintiff Cashman's appeal of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of Title II disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, based on a back injury from a 1980 ladder fall; although he was later found disabled starting in 1987 and awarded SSI benefits, the Secretary determined he was not disabled on or before March 31, 1984, when his insured status expired. The district court reviewed the administrative record under the substantial evidence standard and denied the plaintiff's motion to reverse the decision, affirming the Secretary's findings. The court noted that the ALJ properly weighed conflicting medical evidence, including reports from treating physicians and non-examining advisors, and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence despite the plaintiff's claims of ongoing pain and limitations. Judicial review was limited to checking for legal error or lack of evidentiary support, without reweighing the facts de novo.

healthcare

In this case, plaintiff Margaret Boyle sued her former employer, the Boston Foundation, and its president Anna Faith Jones, alleging age discrimination under federal and state law after she resigned at age 62, claiming harassment by Jones; she also asserted state-law claims for intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Jones. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations on the defendants' motions. It granted partial summary judgment to the Boston Foundation on the state discrimination claim, limiting recovery to $20,000 under the charitable immunity statute, because the foundation is a public charity. It denied Jones's motion to dismiss the interference claim, finding the allegations sufficient to state a claim. It granted summary judgment to Jones on the emotional distress claim after treating the motion as one for summary judgment, because the conduct occurred in the course of employment and thus fell under the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation statute.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

This case involves an auto dealership and its principals suing their inventory financer for breach of contract to provide a capital loan, breach of fiduciary duty and good faith, and violations of Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes, with the defendant filing counterclaims for violations of security agreements, promissory notes, and guaranties. The court reconsidered and vacated its November 26, 1991 preliminary injunction that had required the financer to reinstate floorplan financing and forward credits while limiting the dealership's out-of-trust sales. The core reasoning was that the dealership had not maintained the status quo as represented, with out-of-trust debt increasing substantially instead of remaining around $200,000, which undermined the equitable basis for the injunction. As an interlocutory order, the court held it had authority to vacate the injunction when doing so was consonant with equity.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a dispute between B.P.G. Autoland Jeep-Eagle, Inc., an automobile dealership, and its financing provider, Chrysler Credit Corporation (CCC), along with related individual plaintiffs and guarantors. After CCC terminated floorplan financing based on alleged defaults under a security agreement and promissory note, the plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and good faith, and violations of Massachusetts and Connecticut unfair trade practices statutes; CCC filed counterclaims. The court addressed the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Applying Connecticut law per the contract's choice-of-law clause, the court granted the injunction, ordering CCC to reinstate financing, limiting the out-of-trust amount, and imposing conditions on interest payments and collateralization. The decision rested on findings that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on their good-faith claim, irreparable harm, and that unclean-hands defenses did not bar equitable relief.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs suing the City of Boston, its police department, the Internal Affairs Department, the police commissioner, and individual officers for civil rights violations, seeking injunctive relief and damages based on an alleged unprovoked police assault in 1988 and a subsequent false arrest. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). It dismissed claims against the Boston Police Department and Internal Affairs Department because they are not proper party defendants, and dismissed the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claim due to insufficient allegations. The court denied dismissal of the remaining claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fifth Amendment, and negligence, finding the complaint's allegations adequate to withstand the motion.

civil rightsprocedure

This case is a civil lawsuit by plaintiff Krafchick against defendant Zayre of East Providence, Inc. The defendant moved under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) to refer the matter to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts. The court granted the unopposed motion after finding that TJX Companies, Inc. has an indemnification agreement with Ames Department Stores, Inc., which is in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, making the case related to those proceedings. The court declined to address the separate motion to extend the time for filing an answer, leaving that issue for the bankruptcy judge.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves claims by the estate of Arthur Maguire against Dr. Dae Yung Chun for gross negligence and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to Maguire's serious medical needs while in the custody of the City of Boston. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing insufficient evidence of gross negligence and claiming qualified immunity as a public employee. After de novo review, the district court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant's conduct constituted gross negligence and whether he was a public employee or independent contractor. The court also addressed the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to reflect the defendant's employment status and add a negligence count. The determination of these factual disputes was left to the jury.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a high school teacher, Toby Klang Ward, who sued the Belmont School Committee and three of its members after they voted not to reappoint her or grant her tenure, alleging that the decision violated her First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to her classroom discussions of abortions, reproduction, and Proposition 2½, as well as a letter she wrote to a local newspaper editor. The amended complaint included additional claims under § 1985, due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and state-law wrongful termination. Upon de novo review, the court dismissed Counts II through V in full, dismissed Count I against the School Committee as drafted, and granted summary judgment to individual defendants on certain aspects of the First Amendment claim related to the newspaper letter and classroom discussions. However, the court granted the plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to assert viable claims that the denial was based on those discussions without prior notice that such topics were impermissible, while upholding an order compelling limited discovery subject to protective conditions.

free speechcivil rights

This case involved a homeowners association suing the Town of Hull and the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engineering (DEQE) over alleged pollution from a municipal landfill into the Weir River, claiming violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). The plaintiffs accused the DEQE of failing to enforce these federal laws against the town. The court adopted the magistrate's recommendation to grant the DEQE's motion to dismiss and deny the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. The core reasoning was that neither RCRA nor the FWPCA provides a private cause of action against a state environmental agency for breaching its duty to enforce the statutes' provisions.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a personal injury claim by plaintiff John Farren, a millwright who fell through an opening in a catwalk at a General Motors assembly plant in Massachusetts in 1984 while performing work for contractor ASI. Farren sued GM for negligence, prompting GM to file third-party claims against ASI and Giffin for contractual indemnity based on their construction contracts with GM; additional crossclaims and fourth-party claims followed among the contractors. ASI moved for summary judgment on GM's indemnity claim against it. The magistrate recommended denying the motion except for one aspect, finding factual disputes over whether the injury arose from ASI's work or GM's sole negligence under the contract terms, but granting partial relief limiting ASI's liability to 50% of GM's pro rata share due to Giffin's separate indemnity obligation. The core reasoning interprets the indemnity provisions in the GM-ASI contract under applicable law and concludes that summary judgment is inappropriate where issues of negligence, control, and causation remain for trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a petition by the NLRB's Acting Regional Director for a temporary injunction under Section 10(l) of the NLRA to halt picketing by Local 33 of the Carpenters Union at Euro-vest, Inc.'s Boston job site. The Director alleged that the union's activities violated Section 8(b)(7)(C) by picketing for recognitional purposes without filing an election petition within 30 days. The court denied the injunction, finding no reasonable cause to believe a violation had occurred. Although evidence existed of recognitional meetings in August 1987, the court held that this did not support a presumption of ongoing recognitional intent in the October picketing, especially given the union's disclaiming signs and the six-week gap, consistent with precedents like Barss v. Tosches.

labor & employment

Carol D. Seligson sued MIT for wrongful termination as a regional director of the Alumni Association, alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act, and retaliatory discharge after she filed an EEOC charge. A jury returned a verdict for MIT on all counts, which the court adopted for the non-Title VII claims and confirmed through its own findings for the Title VII claim. The court ruled for MIT, holding that Seligson did not prove sex discrimination in pay or that her termination was retaliatory, as salary disparities were based on differences in qualifications, experience, and job duties across regions, while the discharge stemmed from documented performance problems and workplace conflicts rather than her EEOC filing.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved claims by injured crew members and representatives of deceased crew from the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter CUYAHOGA against the Argentine shipping company ELMA, owner of the vessel SANTA CRUZ, seeking damages for a 1978 collision in the Chesapeake Bay that sank the CUYAHOGA. The court decided that ELMA bore no liability, entering judgment for the defendant after a trial on the issues of fault. The core reasoning was that multiple errors by the CUYAHOGA's captain and crew—including misjudgments of course, violations of navigational rules, and failure to properly signal maneuvers—were the sole causes of the collision, while the SANTA CRUZ and its pilot complied with all applicable rules, maintained proper lookouts, and took appropriate evasive actions once the situation became clear; this built on prior related rulings holding the United States fully responsible without any contribution from ELMA.

torts & liability

In Stewart v. Amaral, petitioner Robert Stewart sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after his state convictions for second-degree murder and armed assault, claiming the prosecution violated his right to a fair trial by allowing key witness Lawrence Goldman to commit perjury and by concealing exculpatory evidence regarding alleged promises or inducements to the witness. Following evidentiary hearings, the district court denied the petition, finding no due process violation. The court reasoned that the evidence did not establish undisclosed promises to Goldman that contradicted his trial testimony, that any inconsistencies between Goldman's pretrial statements and trial testimony amounted only to cumulative impeachment material rather than creating a reasonable doubt, and that certain claims regarding the statements had not been exhausted in state court. The opinion also referenced the affirmance of the underlying convictions by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a trademark dilution claim under the Massachusetts Anti-Dilution Statute, where PPG Industries, a manufacturer of glass, paint, and chemicals, alleged that Clinical Data's use of the marks PPG and PCG for pediatric medical diagnostic services diluted the distinctive quality of its own PPG trademark. The court had previously granted summary judgment for the defendant on related infringement and unfair competition claims based on a prior federal ruling finding no likelihood of confusion. After trial on the dilution claim, the court entered judgment for the defendant, finding that while the plaintiff's mark had acquired distinctive secondary meaning through extensive advertising and use, there was insufficient evidence of a likelihood of dilution given the parties' unrelated fields of business, the defendant's descriptive acronym usage in a specialized medical context, and the lack of predatory intent. The decision emphasized the statutory requirement of showing dilution despite no competition or source confusion between the parties.

business & regulatory

The case involved plaintiff Julia Vigeant suing Zimmer, Inc. for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability related to an allegedly defective knee prosthesis implanted in 1977. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by Massachusetts' three-year statute of limitations. The court denied summary judgment on the negligence and warranty claims, finding that the plaintiff did not reasonably learn of a potential link between her injury and the defendant's product until after November 1979, placing her November 1982 filing within the limitations period under the discovery rule. However, the court dismissed the strict liability claim because Massachusetts law does not recognize a separate strict products liability doctrine apart from warranty claims.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved Massachusetts Fair Share, Inc., a nonprofit organization, and its president suing multiple Massachusetts towns under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for local ordinances and bylaws that restricted or prohibited door-to-door canvassing, petitioning, and solicitation of donations, which the plaintiffs claimed violated their First Amendment rights. The court addressed categories of restrictions including permit denials, limits on solicitation hours, bans after sunset or daylight, and limits on solicitations for goods and services. It granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs against twelve towns, finding the challenged provisions unconstitutional on their face or as applied because they were not narrowly tailored and improperly burdened protected speech activities, while ruling that the bylaws of four other towns either did not apply to the plaintiffs' activities or could not be enforced against them. The core reasoning emphasized that door-to-door solicitation intertwined with advocacy is protected under the First Amendment, that any regulations must avoid vague or overly broad restrictions giving officials excessive discretion, and that the towns failed to justify the specific time-based limits at issue.

free speechcivil rights

The case involved a father suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the wrongful death of his 21-year-old son, a Marine, in a car accident in Maryland in 1979. The court had previously granted partial summary judgment on liability and, after a trial on damages, awarded the plaintiff $138,185, comprising $58,185 for lost household contributions and $80,000 for mental anguish and suffering. The court reasoned that Maryland's wrongful death statute, as amended in 1983, permitted recovery for both pecuniary losses and non-pecuniary damages like emotional suffering for parents of an unmarried child under 21, and that federal courts should apply the law in effect at the time of decision. It based the damages on expert testimony adjusted for the circumstances and found the total loss amounted to that sum.

torts & liabilityfederal power