District Court, D. Connecticut — appointed by Ronald Reagan
Winchester Industries, Inc. v. Sentry Insurance
District Court, D. Connecticut · 2008-02-07 · cited 3×
This case concerns a dispute over whether an insurance company must defend and indemnify its policyholders in a lawsuit arising from a fatal car accident. The court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the commercial auto and umbrella policies do not provide coverage for the accident because the vehicle involved was owned by the insured company and thus excluded from the policy's hired and non-owned auto coverage. The court reasoned that the policy language clearly limited coverage to non-owned vehicles, an initial letter offering umbrella coverage was later corrected upon review, and there was insufficient evidence to support a claim of coverage by estoppel based on the insurer's conduct or statements.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
AZTEC. ENERGY PARTNERS, INC. v. Sensor Switch, Inc.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 2007-10-02 · cited 9×
In this diversity case, Aztec Energy Partners, a Georgia company, sued Sensor Switch, a Connecticut company, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, statutory theft, and CUTPA violations after Sensor Switch refused to refund the value of unused or defective motion-sensing products that Aztec had returned and instead resold them to a third party, seeking $344,118.96 in damages. Sensor Switch moved to dismiss the conversion, statutory theft, and CUTPA counts under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, holding that the claims failed as a matter of law because Aztec had voluntarily transferred the products to Sensor Switch under the parties' contract, precluding any unauthorized assumption of ownership or bailment, and the alleged conduct did not constitute theft or unfair trade practices beyond an ordinary breach of contract.
business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure
United States v. Russell
District Court, D. Connecticut · 2007-08-22 · cited 6×
The case involved an indictment charging attorney Philip D. Russell with violating two federal obstruction of justice statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 1519, by destroying a laptop computer belonging to his client's employee that contained photographs of naked boys and information about child sexual exploitation. Russell moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the charges failed to allege a sufficient nexus between his conduct and any reasonably foreseeable federal proceeding or investigation, that § 1519 was not intended to cover destruction of contraband, and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague due to the absence of a mens rea requirement. The court denied the motions, holding that a facially valid indictment returned by a grand jury is sufficient to proceed to trial without pre-trial evaluation of evidentiary sufficiency, that the statutes implicitly require a nexus or knowing culpable conduct that satisfies constitutional standards, and that the indictment adequately informed the defendant of the charges. The ruling emphasized that challenges to the government's evidence must await trial rather than dismissal of the indictment.
criminal lawprocedure
Stuart & Sons, L.P. v. Curtis Publishing Co.
District Court, D. Connecticut · 2006-09-29 · cited 15×
This case concerns a dispute over the ownership of three original Norman Rockwell oil paintings created for covers of the Saturday Evening Post magazine in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The plaintiffs, heirs of the magazine's former art director Kenneth Stuart Sr., asserted ownership based on Stuart Sr.'s long possession of the works, which he had received from Rockwell and displayed publicly without objection. The defendants, including the Curtis Publishing Co., counterclaimed for declaratory judgment confirming their title and sought an accounting of additional artwork. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and denied the defendants' motion, holding that the defendants' claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations for conversion and replevin, as they had notice of Stuart Sr.'s possession and ownership assertions as early as 1986 (and implicitly earlier) but took no action until 2001; laches also precluded relief due to the prejudicial delay. The court further noted that any related counterclaim for an accounting was similarly time-barred or abandoned.
propertyprocedure
Ordon v. Karpie
District Court, D. Connecticut · 2006-06-09 · cited 2×
In this case, Dr. Andrew Ordon sued his former attorney Karen Karpie and her law firm for legal malpractice, claiming that Karpie negligently failed to advise him that settling a complaint before the Connecticut Medical Examining Board could lead to reciprocal discipline in other jurisdictions. The court had previously granted summary judgment to the defendants on the grounds that Ordon failed to present sufficient expert testimony to prove causation for his malpractice claim. On Ordon's motion for reconsideration, the court granted the motion in part to address whether the complaint included claims for negligent misrepresentation or infliction of emotional distress and whether Ordon's own deposition testimony could serve as expert evidence on causation. Upon reconsideration, the court adhered to its prior ruling, concluding that the complaint alleged only legal malpractice and that Ordon's lay testimony was inadmissible and insufficient to establish causation under Connecticut law. The court therefore denied the remainder of the motion, entered judgment for the defendants, and closed the case.
proceduretorts & liability
Ordon v. Karpie
District Court, D. Connecticut · 2006-03-31 · cited 1×
In this case, Dr. Andrew Ordon sued his former attorney Karen Karpie and her law firm for negligence and breach of contract, claiming that Karpie advised him to settle disciplinary charges before the Connecticut Medical Examining Board without warning him of potential reciprocal discipline in other states like California, which led to a reprimand, delays in his California practice, and financial losses. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Dr. Ordon had not provided expert testimony on causation. The court granted the motion, ruling that the complaint asserted a legal malpractice claim and that Dr. Ordon failed to disclose any expert testimony sufficient to establish causation, an essential element of such a claim under Connecticut law. All material facts were undisputed, including the settlement terms and subsequent actions by other state boards. The decision turned on the absence of proper expert evidence rather than the merits of the underlying advice.
torts & liabilityprocedure