Alan Harris Nevas

This case concerns a dispute over whether an insurance company must defend and indemnify its policyholders in a lawsuit arising from a fatal car accident. The court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the commercial auto and umbrella policies do not provide coverage for the accident because the vehicle involved was owned by the insured company and thus excluded from the policy's hired and non-owned auto coverage. The court reasoned that the policy language clearly limited coverage to non-owned vehicles, an initial letter offering umbrella coverage was later corrected upon review, and there was insufficient evidence to support a claim of coverage by estoppel based on the insurer's conduct or statements.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this diversity case, Aztec Energy Partners, a Georgia company, sued Sensor Switch, a Connecticut company, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, statutory theft, and CUTPA violations after Sensor Switch refused to refund the value of unused or defective motion-sensing products that Aztec had returned and instead resold them to a third party, seeking $344,118.96 in damages. Sensor Switch moved to dismiss the conversion, statutory theft, and CUTPA counts under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, holding that the claims failed as a matter of law because Aztec had voluntarily transferred the products to Sensor Switch under the parties' contract, precluding any unauthorized assumption of ownership or bailment, and the alleged conduct did not constitute theft or unfair trade practices beyond an ordinary breach of contract.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved an indictment charging attorney Philip D. Russell with violating two federal obstruction of justice statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 1519, by destroying a laptop computer belonging to his client's employee that contained photographs of naked boys and information about child sexual exploitation. Russell moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the charges failed to allege a sufficient nexus between his conduct and any reasonably foreseeable federal proceeding or investigation, that § 1519 was not intended to cover destruction of contraband, and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague due to the absence of a mens rea requirement. The court denied the motions, holding that a facially valid indictment returned by a grand jury is sufficient to proceed to trial without pre-trial evaluation of evidentiary sufficiency, that the statutes implicitly require a nexus or knowing culpable conduct that satisfies constitutional standards, and that the indictment adequately informed the defendant of the charges. The ruling emphasized that challenges to the government's evidence must await trial rather than dismissal of the indictment.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a dispute over the ownership of three original Norman Rockwell oil paintings created for covers of the Saturday Evening Post magazine in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The plaintiffs, heirs of the magazine's former art director Kenneth Stuart Sr., asserted ownership based on Stuart Sr.'s long possession of the works, which he had received from Rockwell and displayed publicly without objection. The defendants, including the Curtis Publishing Co., counterclaimed for declaratory judgment confirming their title and sought an accounting of additional artwork. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and denied the defendants' motion, holding that the defendants' claims were barred by the three-year statute of limitations for conversion and replevin, as they had notice of Stuart Sr.'s possession and ownership assertions as early as 1986 (and implicitly earlier) but took no action until 2001; laches also precluded relief due to the prejudicial delay. The court further noted that any related counterclaim for an accounting was similarly time-barred or abandoned.

propertyprocedure

In this case, Dr. Andrew Ordon sued his former attorney Karen Karpie and her law firm for legal malpractice, claiming that Karpie negligently failed to advise him that settling a complaint before the Connecticut Medical Examining Board could lead to reciprocal discipline in other jurisdictions. The court had previously granted summary judgment to the defendants on the grounds that Ordon failed to present sufficient expert testimony to prove causation for his malpractice claim. On Ordon's motion for reconsideration, the court granted the motion in part to address whether the complaint included claims for negligent misrepresentation or infliction of emotional distress and whether Ordon's own deposition testimony could serve as expert evidence on causation. Upon reconsideration, the court adhered to its prior ruling, concluding that the complaint alleged only legal malpractice and that Ordon's lay testimony was inadmissible and insufficient to establish causation under Connecticut law. The court therefore denied the remainder of the motion, entered judgment for the defendants, and closed the case.

proceduretorts & liability

In this case, Dr. Andrew Ordon sued his former attorney Karen Karpie and her law firm for negligence and breach of contract, claiming that Karpie advised him to settle disciplinary charges before the Connecticut Medical Examining Board without warning him of potential reciprocal discipline in other states like California, which led to a reprimand, delays in his California practice, and financial losses. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Dr. Ordon had not provided expert testimony on causation. The court granted the motion, ruling that the complaint asserted a legal malpractice claim and that Dr. Ordon failed to disclose any expert testimony sufficient to establish causation, an essential element of such a claim under Connecticut law. All material facts were undisputed, including the settlement terms and subsequent actions by other state boards. The decision turned on the absence of proper expert evidence rather than the merits of the underlying advice.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, SubSolutions and Deco sued Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI) and its subsidiary, alleging that DAI's policy requiring Subway franchisees to purchase Point-of-Sale (POS) computer systems from an exclusive vendor violated federal antitrust laws under the Sherman and Clayton Acts by creating an unlawful tying arrangement, and also constituted tortious interference with business expectancies and unfair trade practices under Connecticut law. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled in favor of DAI, granting it summary judgment on all claims. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs failed to establish essential elements of a tying claim, including sufficient economic power in the tying market to coerce acceptance of the tied product and that the arrangement was an unreasonable restraint on trade; without a viable antitrust claim, the related state-law claims also failed as a matter of law.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case concerns a condominium owners' association suing the developer of a converted apartment building in Connecticut for alleged defects in the structure and common elements, claiming breaches of express and implied warranties under the Connecticut Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA) and the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA). The district court reviewed a magistrate judge's recommendation on whether the developer had properly disclaimed those warranties in the sales documents. The court held that the developer did not effectively disclaim either express or implied warranties under the CIOA or NHWA, and that the association had standing to pursue claims under the NHWA. The core reasoning was that both statutes are remedial consumer-protection laws requiring strict compliance with their technical disclaimer rules and must be construed in favor of purchasers.

propertyprocedure

In this case, physician Candi McCulloch sued Hartford Life Insurance and Educators Mutual Life Insurance for breach of contract, bad faith, tortious interference, and violations of Connecticut unfair trade and insurance practices statutes after her long-term disability benefits were terminated. The dispute arose after Educators transferred administration of her claim and about 35 others to Hartford under a reinsurance agreement, after which Hartford reviewed the claim, requested updated medical information, and denied continued benefits. The district court granted Hartford's motion for partial summary judgment in full, granted Educators' summary judgment motion in part and denied it in part, and denied McCulloch's cross-motions for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the record showed no evidence of bad faith or dishonest purpose by either insurer in handling the claim or entering the reinsurance agreement, that the insurer-insured relationship is contractual rather than fiduciary under Connecticut law, and that McCulloch had not demonstrated violations of the policy's proof-of-loss or examination provisions or the cited statutes.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves the EEOC suing Beauty Enterprises, Inc. on behalf of Hispanic employees of Puerto Rican origin, alleging that the company's English-only workplace rule violates Title VII and related civil rights laws by constituting national-origin discrimination. The defendant contends the rule is justified by business necessity to reduce ethnic tensions and promote safety. The court ruled on the defendant's in limine motions to exclude testimony from two EEOC experts, a linguist and a safety engineer. It denied both motions, finding the experts' opinions reliable under Daubert standards based on their methodologies, data, and qualifications, and relevant because they would assist the jury in understanding issues of discrimination and workplace safety without needing to be essential to the case. Objections to the testimony were deemed matters of weight for cross-examination rather than grounds for exclusion.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case concerns the transfer of Calf Island from the YMCA to the United States for inclusion in the Stewart B. McKinney National Wildlife Refuge, along with related challenges by neighboring landowner Marilyn Tsai and the Calf Island Community Trust. The plaintiffs objected to the transfer on grounds including restrictive covenants, a prescriptive easement, invalidity of the YMCA's deed, and various procedural and substantive flaws in the government's eminent domain action under statutes such as the Declaration of Taking Act and NEPA. The court granted the YMCA's motion for summary judgment and the government's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, dismissing all objections. The core reasoning was that judicial review of eminent domain takings is narrowly limited to confirming a congressionally authorized public purpose, that the government had properly invoked its authority for wildlife conservation and related uses, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to raise additional claims about compensation or pre-taking procedures.

propertyfederal powerenvironmentprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Astech-Marmon, an asbestos abatement contractor in Bridgeport, Connecticut, sued the individual and corporate defendants for alleged violations of the federal RICO statute, Connecticut's CUTPA, and tortious interference with business expectancies. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants, through a pattern of bribery and kickbacks involving city officials, rigged the award of municipal asbestos abatement contracts under the city's Clean and Green program, excluding the plaintiff despite its status as the sole licensed local provider with bidding preferences. The defendants moved to dismiss the civil RICO claims, arguing insufficient allegations of injury and proximate cause. The court denied the motion, holding that the complaint adequately pleaded concrete damages and proximate causation based on the plaintiff's readiness and ability to perform the work at lower cost if the bidding process had not been corrupted, without requiring the plaintiff to have actually submitted a bid.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff Timothy Hayes sued his former employer Compass Group and supervisor Cary Orlandi, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, and ERISA, along with state-law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation, after his termination at age 47 following nearly 25 years of employment. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts. The court denied summary judgment on the age-discrimination claims under the ADEA and CFEPA, finding that Hayes had raised a genuine factual dispute as to whether the employer's stated reason of poor performance was pretextual, based on his history of positive evaluations, explanations accepted by his supervisor, and other evidence that performance issues were not as severe as claimed. The court granted summary judgment on the ERISA, emotional-distress, and defamation claims, concluding that the evidence did not support those theories as a matter of law.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved low-income tenants at New Era Court in Bridgeport, Connecticut, who sued HUD and other defendants over the administration of a project-based Section 8 housing subsidy contract, including decisions on rent levels, contract renewals, and related notices. The plaintiffs alleged various federal statutory, constitutional, and state law claims stemming from changes to their housing assistance. The court granted HUD's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. It reasoned that the complaint failed to allege a concrete injury in fact or causation traceable to HUD's actions, as the tenants continued to receive subsidies and the alleged harms like rent adjustments or procedural delays were not legally cognizable injuries under Article III.

federal powerprocedurecivil rights

In DiCicco v. Voccola, a former police sergeant sued the City of Shelton and her police chief supervisor for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII sex discrimination protections, and the Equal Protection Clause via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging she faced heightened scrutiny, discriminatory remarks, and suspension due to her age and sex after prior conflicts involving the chief's son. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, with the chief also asserting qualified immunity. The court denied the motion in full, finding genuine disputes of material fact over whether the suspension and other actions stemmed from discriminatory or bad-faith motives rather than legitimate performance concerns. Evidence included alleged age- and sex-based comments by the chief, claims of disparate treatment compared to younger male sergeants, and the timing of discipline after the plaintiff refused to overlook the son's prior violations. These factual issues precluded summary judgment and also defeated the qualified immunity claim at this stage.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this habeas corpus case under 18 U.S.C. § 2255, petitioners claimed they were denied their Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community due to underrepresentation of African-Americans and Hispanics caused by defects in the jury wheels. Because the claim was not raised on direct appeal, petitioners needed to show cause and prejudice, and they sought to rely on expert testimony from a social psychologist to establish prejudice by arguing that racially heterogeneous juries are less likely to convict. The court held a Daubert hearing and reviewed the expert's report and testimony to assess admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. It concluded the testimony was inadmissible because it was not based on a reliable methodology or foundation, relying instead on subjective belief, unsupported speculation, and an analytical gap between cited studies, polls, and the expert's conclusions, with no evidence of testing, peer review, or general acceptance in the field.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In United States v. Jones, the defendant was convicted by a jury of the VICAR murder of Monteneal Lawrence under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) as part of a RICO enterprise involving narcotics trafficking, a conviction that would have made him eligible for the federal death penalty. The court granted Jones's motion for judgment of acquittal, finding the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction. The core reasoning was that no rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones committed the murder to maintain or increase his position in the enterprise, as the evidence showed only a personal motive of jealous rage over the victim's infidelity, unrelated to the drug-trafficking activities or objectives of the enterprise.

criminal law

In Morales v. United States, petitioner Richard Morales, convicted in 1995 of racketeering, narcotics conspiracy, and related offenses as a member of the Latin Kings enterprise, filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his conviction and life sentence on grounds including ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a biased juror, an Apprendi violation in sentencing, and improper delegation of jury deliberation oversight to a magistrate judge without consent. The court denied the petition in full. It reasoned that counsel's performance was not deficient because the courtroom was not closed during voir dire, the magistrate's limited ministerial role in overseeing a read-back of testimony did not implicate constitutional rights or require consent, and the other claims lacked merit under Strickland and other precedents.

criminal lawprocedure

In Wright v. Santopietro, plaintiffs Albert Wright and David Compás sued Waterbury police officer Mark Santopietro under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable force, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after officers stopped their vehicle, ordered them out at gunpoint, handcuffed them briefly, searched the car, and released them upon determining they were not the suspects sought in an attempted-murder investigation. The defendant moved for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity and lack of evidence supporting the claims. The court granted the motion, holding that Santopietro's involvement was minimal (activating emergency lights and preparing a report), plaintiffs could not identify him, no excessive force occurred, and there was insufficient evidence of injuries or damages to create a triable issue.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Philip A. Giordano, the former Mayor of Waterbury, Connecticut, who was charged in an 18-count federal indictment with violating the civil rights of two minor victims by sexually abusing them (Counts One and Two), conspiring to use interstate facilities to transmit the victims' names (Count Three), and using such facilities to entice the minors for sexual activity (Counts Four through Eighteen). After a jury trial resulting in guilty verdicts on 17 counts, Giordano moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, arguing insufficient evidence of a federally protected right, lack of action under color of law, and absence of federal jurisdiction because the relevant calls were intrastate. The court denied the motion, holding that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient for a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements, including that Giordano acted under color of law as mayor and that cellular telephones qualify as facilities of interstate commerce regardless of call origin or destination.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure