Ralph Wilson Nimmons jr

This case involves plaintiffs, an association of people with disabilities, moving for reconsideration of the court's prior order dismissing Count II of their complaint. The claim challenged Florida's voting assistance provisions under Article VI, Section 1 of the state constitution, which guarantees a "direct and secret" vote; plaintiffs argued that newly discovered extrinsic evidence from a task force and legislative history showed the provision bars third-party assistance except in limited circumstances. The court denied the motion, holding that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy not intended to allow reargument of issues already decided or introduction of evidence that does not demonstrate a clear error, change in law, or misunderstanding by the court. The opinion emphasized that the prior ruling correctly applied Florida interpretive principles, including the persuasive weight of legislative enactments like Section 101.051, Florida Statutes, and found no basis to revisit the conclusion that the statutory assistance satisfies the constitutional requirement.

electionscivil rightsprocedure

This case was a class action lawsuit brought by the American Association of People with Disabilities and individual visually and manually impaired voters in Duval County against Florida's Secretary of State, Director of Elections, the Duval County Supervisor of Elections, and Jacksonville City Council members. The plaintiffs claimed that the optical scan and limited touchscreen voting systems used or purchased in the county prevented them from voting unassisted, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Article VI, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution, which requires elections by direct and secret vote. The court addressed the defendants' motions to dismiss. On the state constitutional claim, the court held that the Florida Constitution does not require unassisted voting, reasoning from historical legislative practice allowing third-party assistance, the lack of any contemporaneous indication that the constitutional language mandated otherwise, and the fact that newer statutory standards for accessible systems exceed constitutional minimums without redefining them.

electionscivil rights

In Anderson v. United States, a civilian contractor sued the United States for physical and mental injuries sustained when two bombs from a military FA-18C aircraft missed their target during a training exercise at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, and struck near his work site. The plaintiff brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and, alternatively, under the Suits in Admiralty Act, Public Vessels Act, and Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, alleging negligence by the government in failing to provide adequate protection and in the pilot's and range control officer's actions. The defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to meet pre-suit requirements. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the plaintiff could not establish jurisdiction under the FTCA or the admiralty statutes because the claims did not satisfy the applicable statutory prerequisites, such as those governing the timing and nature of the claims or the connection to a vessel.

federal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involved First Guaranty Bank, as trustee, filing suit in Florida state court to terminate a trust valued under $50,000 after years of related probate litigation, with defendants removing the action to federal court on diversity grounds by asserting that their counterclaim exceeded the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. The court examined whether a counterclaim could be considered in calculating the amount in controversy for removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's complaint controlled the amount in controversy. It reasoned from the limited nature of federal jurisdiction, the strict construction required for removal statutes, and the prevailing view among courts that counterclaims cannot be used to satisfy the jurisdictional amount in removal cases. The court therefore remanded the matter to the state court where it originated.

procedurefederal power

In Celli v. City of St. Augustine, a self-described street artist challenged the city's enforcement of Ordinance 82-54 (Section 22-6), which banned the sale or display of goods on public sidewalks and streets except by permitted nonprofits for religious, literary, scientific, charitable, or educational purposes, after police stopped him from selling his political newspaper and visual art containing poems and statements. Following a jury trial that found the city had enforced the ordinance against the plaintiff on March 5, 1998, causing $23,500 in damages, the court addressed the reserved legal issues and ruled the ordinance unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's materials constituted protected First Amendment speech, public sidewalks are traditional public forums, and the ordinance imposed an impermissible content-based or speaker-based restriction that failed constitutional scrutiny, leading to entry of judgment for the plaintiff, a permanent injunction against enforcement, and a declaration that the ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied.

free speechcivil rights

The case concerned an ERISA dispute in which long-time employee Gloria J. Brown sought long-term disability benefits and a disability pension under BellSouth plans after suffering seizures and major depression that caused her to take short-term disability leave starting in 1993. The plan administrator denied the claims, finding that Brown did not meet the plans' definition of disability, which required inability to perform any job paying at least half her prior base pay within a 35-mile radius, based on medical reviews including psychiatric evaluations. Brown sued, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the court reviewed the administrative record, plan terms granting the administrator discretionary authority, and evidence such as conflicting doctor reports on Brown's condition and work capacity. The court applied ERISA standards to determine whether the denial was supported and whether the review process was full and fair.

labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure

This case involved an appeal by the United States from a bankruptcy court judgment finding that debtor Elizabeth Binkley's federal income tax liabilities for 1980 through 1986, including 1984, were dischargeable in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling after reviewing the record under a clearly erroneous standard for factual findings. The core reasoning was that under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C), tax debts from fraudulent returns are nondischargeable only upon proof of the debtor's own knowing and intentional wrongdoing; a spouse's fraud cannot be imputed to the debtor, and the evidence showed Mrs. Binkley lacked knowledge of false information on the joint return and had no intent to evade taxes.

taxes

The case involved Nolan Wilkes, Jr., as personal representative of his father's estate, suing the United States to recover estate taxes paid after an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) that purchased estate assets defaulted on installment tax payments elected under 26 U.S.C. § 2210. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and denied the defendant's motion, ruling that the estate was not liable for the unpaid taxes upon the ESOP's default. The core reasoning was that the plain language of § 2210 provides for the transfer of tax liability to the ESOP, discharging the estate from further responsibility, and legislative history and other arguments did not alter this interpretation.

taxesfederal power

The case arose from the 1996 arrest of plaintiff Douglas Evans after he intervened in a violent fistfight outside his home, during which the arresting officer struck him with a baton. Evans sued both the officer, John Jason Marshall, and the City of Neptune Beach, asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Fourth Amendment violations involving excessive force and false arrest/imprisonment, along with various state common-law claims. The court granted summary judgment to both defendants on the § 1983 claims, concluding that the officer's actions were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given the circumstances of the ongoing fight and the plaintiff's failure to comply with commands. With the federal claims resolved, the court exercised its discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) to dismiss the remaining state-law claims without prejudice.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Burns v. Rice, a former Barnett employee brought a putative class action under ERISA against the company's former board members, alleging they breached fiduciary duties by passing a resolution that prevented a change-in-control provision in the BEST employee savings plan from triggering during the 1997 merger with NationsBank, thereby blocking allocation of over 3 million shares from the plan's suspense account to participants. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the board's action was a settlor function involving plan design rather than a fiduciary act subject to ERISA duties. It further reasoned that the shares at issue were not accrued or vested benefits under the plan or ERISA definitions, as they remained unallocated until a qualifying change in control occurred after the board's resolution.

labor & employment

This case involves a Federal Tort Claims Act suit by Thomas Dali, an active-duty U.S. Navy member, and his wife to recover damages for injuries from a plane crash during flight instruction provided by the Jax Navy Flying Club, an instrumentality of the Navy. The plaintiffs alleged negligence by club employees in maintaining and inspecting Dali's aircraft. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the Feres doctrine bars FTCA claims by service members for injuries arising out of or in the course of activity incident to military service. The core reasoning was that Dali's membership in the flying club, the maintenance work, and the crash occurred while he was on active duty and on liberty, with the activities tied directly to his military status under Navy regulations.

federal powertorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved three real estate development companies suing the City of Jacksonville under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that actions by the City's Environmental Protection Board deprived them of due process rights by interfering with their ability to develop and sell land and harming their business reputation. The EPB had sent a letter to the Duval County School Board raising unproven concerns about contamination from a nearby former landfill at a proposed school site within the plaintiffs' development, after which the School Board ended negotiations to buy the land. The court granted the City's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs' allegations did not state a cognizable claim under the Due Process Clause because they failed to identify a protected property interest that was deprived by the EPB's conduct and because any random or unauthorized acts would be addressed through adequate state-law remedies rather than a federal constitutional claim.

civil rightsproperty

This case involved a dispute over a life insurance claim following the death of the insured, where the defendant insurer denied benefits based on a policy exclusion for losses occurring while the insured's blood alcohol level was 0.10% or higher. The court initially denied the defendant's summary judgment motion, finding the exclusion ineffective because it lacked the causal connection language required by Illinois statute § 357.25. On reconsideration, the defendant submitted declarations showing that the Illinois Department of Insurance Director had specifically approved the policy's variant intoxication exclusion language and captioning under the Director's authority to permit deviations from statutory standards. The court granted the defendant's motion for reconsideration and summary judgment, holding that the approved policy terms were enforceable as written, and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case arose from a June 1994 armed standoff in downtown Lake City, Florida, in which Si Edward Ogletree held police officers at bay for two hours after assaulting and kidnapping his ex-girlfriend, and was fatally shot by Columbia County Sheriff's Office officers when he raised his handgun toward an approaching Special Response Team. The plaintiff, suing on behalf of Ogletree's estate, brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment against the City of Lake City and Columbia County, along with related state-law claims. The court granted the defendants' motions for final summary judgment on the federal claims, concluding that the officers' use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because Ogletree was armed, had committed violent crimes, and posed an immediate threat by pointing his gun at officers. The court further held that the absence of a constitutional violation precluded municipal liability and dismissed the state claims without prejudice.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involved a product liability suit by the plaintiff against Baxter Healthcare for the death of Mary Milkiewicz, allegedly caused by a defective porcine heart valve implanted during surgery; the claims included negligence in design, manufacture, sale, inspection, and failure to warn, as well as strict liability for an unreasonably dangerous defect. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that all state-law claims were preempted by the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA, relying on the Supreme Court's Medtronic v. Lohr decision regarding Class III medical devices that underwent premarket approval (PMA). The court denied the motion, reasoning that preemption under MDA Section 360k(a) applies only if the claims impose requirements different from or in addition to FDA-approved specifications, but the record lacked sufficient information to determine whether the plaintiff's claims were based on deviations from those specifications or on other grounds.

torts & liabilityhealthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Goyette, Dean Witter sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the Goyettes from arbitrating claims before the NASD alleging that investments purchased in 1988 were unsuitable, on the ground that the claims were ineligible under the six-year time limit in Section 15 of the NASD Code of Arbitration Procedures. The court granted the injunction, enjoining arbitration of the claims until the court could determine whether they fell within the parties' arbitration agreement. The court reasoned that arbitration is a matter of contract whose scope—including the occurrence or event triggering the Section 15 bar—is for judicial determination, that the Goyettes' purchases occurred more than six years before the 1996 arbitration filing, and that Dean Witter satisfied the four prerequisites for preliminary injunctive relief.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a pro se prisoner plaintiff who sued correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that their negligence in failing to secure cell doors allowed another inmate to assault him while he was in administrative confinement, and that he received inadequate follow-up psychological care afterward. The court evaluated the claims under the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard for conditions of confinement and medical needs. It concluded that the officers' actions constituted at most negligence, which does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation requiring a culpable state of mind, and noted potential issues with exhaustion of administrative remedies.

civil rightscriminal law

This case involved a wrongful death suit brought by the estate of Susan Reynard against cellular phone manufacturer NEC America and service provider GTE Mobilnet, alleging that electromagnetic radiation from a defective portable phone either caused or accelerated her fatal brain tumor. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supported by expert affidavits stating that no scientific evidence linked cellular phone emissions at the relevant power levels to brain cancer initiation or promotion. The plaintiffs offered an opposing expert affidavit, but the court found it unreliable and inadmissible under the Daubert standard because it lacked sufficient scientific basis and was contradicted by the broader medical literature. The court therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding causation, dismissed the remaining motions as moot, and directed entry of judgment for the defendants.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved two plaintiffs who suffered on-the-job back injuries while working in Florida and who sought wage-loss or impairment benefits under the state's workers' compensation statute, Florida Statutes § 440.15. They filed suit individually and as class representatives against their employers, insurers, and the State of Florida, alleging that the workers' compensation provisions discriminated against them on the basis of disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and seeking a declaratory judgment that the statutes were invalid. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds including that the plaintiffs were not qualified individuals with disabilities under the ADA, that the ADA does not require equal benefits or preempt workers' compensation laws, and that the Florida statute provides at least equal protection. The court granted all motions to dismiss, holding that the challenged provisions of the workers' compensation law do not distinguish between disabled and non-disabled individuals in a discriminatory manner and instead offer complementary protection consistent with or greater than the ADA.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved former employees of a failed savings and loan association who held retirement benefit agreements that the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), as receiver, disaffirmed after taking over the institution in 1990; the RTC allowed their claims for unpaid benefits via receiver's certificates but later notified them that Florida's newly enacted Depositor Preference Statute (Fla. Stat. § 658.84) would give depositors priority over general creditors like the plaintiffs for any distributions after July 3, 1992. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the statute applied only to receiverships commenced after that date, plus claims for unjust enrichment and specific relief. The court granted the RTC's cross-motion for summary judgment (and denied plaintiffs'), holding that the statute's plain terms govern distributions made after its effective date regardless of when the receivership or claims arose, consistent with federal statutes and regulations authorizing the RTC to apply state priority rules in liquidation proceedings.

business & regulatoryfederal power