Opinions consistently apply established standards of review such as clearly erroneous for facts and de novo for law, along with binding doctrines like Feres without questioning their validity. United States v. Binkley (In Re … ↗ Dall v. United States ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
This case involves plaintiffs, an association of people with disabilities, moving for reconsideration of the court's prior order dismissing Count II of their complaint. The claim challenged Florida's voting assistance provisions under Article VI, Section 1 of the state constitution, which guarantees a "direct and secret" vote; plaintiffs argued that newly discovered extrinsic evidence from a task force and legislative history showed the provision bars third-party assistance except in limited circumstances. The court denied the motion, holding that reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy not intended to allow reargument of issues already decided or introduction of evidence that does not demonstrate a clear error, change in law, or misunderstanding by the court. The opinion emphasized that the prior ruling correctly applied Florida interpretive principles, including the persuasive weight of legislative enactments like Section 101.051, Florida Statutes, and found no basis to revisit the conclusion that the statutory assistance satisfies the constitutional requirement.
This case was a class action lawsuit brought by the American Association of People with Disabilities and individual visually and manually impaired voters in Duval County against Florida's Secretary of State, Director of Elections, the Duval County Supervisor of Elections, and Jacksonville City Council members. The plaintiffs claimed that the optical scan and limited touchscreen voting systems used or purchased in the county prevented them from voting unassisted, violating the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Article VI, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution, which requires elections by direct and secret vote. The court addressed the defendants' motions to dismiss. On the state constitutional claim, the court held that the Florida Constitution does not require unassisted voting, reasoning from historical legislative practice allowing third-party assistance, the lack of any contemporaneous indication that the constitutional language mandated otherwise, and the fact that newer statutory standards for accessible systems exceed constitutional minimums without redefining them.
In Anderson v. United States, a civilian contractor sued the United States for physical and mental injuries sustained when two bombs from a military FA-18C aircraft missed their target during a training exercise at Vieques Island, Puerto Rico, and struck near his work site. The plaintiff brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and, alternatively, under the Suits in Admiralty Act, Public Vessels Act, and Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, alleging negligence by the government in failing to provide adequate protection and in the pilot's and range control officer's actions. The defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the plaintiff's failure to meet pre-suit requirements. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that the plaintiff could not establish jurisdiction under the FTCA or the admiralty statutes because the claims did not satisfy the applicable statutory prerequisites, such as those governing the timing and nature of the claims or the connection to a vessel.
The case involved First Guaranty Bank, as trustee, filing suit in Florida state court to terminate a trust valued under $50,000 after years of related probate litigation, with defendants removing the action to federal court on diversity grounds by asserting that their counterclaim exceeded the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. The court examined whether a counterclaim could be considered in calculating the amount in controversy for removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's complaint controlled the amount in controversy. It reasoned from the limited nature of federal jurisdiction, the strict construction required for removal statutes, and the prevailing view among courts that counterclaims cannot be used to satisfy the jurisdictional amount in removal cases. The court therefore remanded the matter to the state court where it originated.
In Celli v. City of St. Augustine, a self-described street artist challenged the city's enforcement of Ordinance 82-54 (Section 22-6), which banned the sale or display of goods on public sidewalks and streets except by permitted nonprofits for religious, literary, scientific, charitable, or educational purposes, after police stopped him from selling his political newspaper and visual art containing poems and statements. Following a jury trial that found the city had enforced the ordinance against the plaintiff on March 5, 1998, causing $23,500 in damages, the court addressed the reserved legal issues and ruled the ordinance unconstitutional. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's materials constituted protected First Amendment speech, public sidewalks are traditional public forums, and the ordinance imposed an impermissible content-based or speaker-based restriction that failed constitutional scrutiny, leading to entry of judgment for the plaintiff, a permanent injunction against enforcement, and a declaration that the ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied.
The case concerned an ERISA dispute in which long-time employee Gloria J. Brown sought long-term disability benefits and a disability pension under BellSouth plans after suffering seizures and major depression that caused her to take short-term disability leave starting in 1993. The plan administrator denied the claims, finding that Brown did not meet the plans' definition of disability, which required inability to perform any job paying at least half her prior base pay within a 35-mile radius, based on medical reviews including psychiatric evaluations. Brown sued, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the court reviewed the administrative record, plan terms granting the administrator discretionary authority, and evidence such as conflicting doctor reports on Brown's condition and work capacity. The court applied ERISA standards to determine whether the denial was supported and whether the review process was full and fair.
