Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit — appointed by Ronald Reagan
Wade v. Reynolds
Ohio Court of Appeals · 1986-06-26 · cited 14×
The case concerned a medical malpractice claim originally filed in 1980 and dismissed without prejudice in 1984, then refiled in 1985 outside the four-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.11(B). The trial court dismissed the refiled action, holding that the savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, does not apply to medical malpractice claims. The appellate court reversed, ruling that R.C. 2305.19 does apply because the malpractice statute expressly carves out only the legal-disability provision (R.C. 2305.16) and does not mention the savings statute. The court noted that the comprehensive limitations scheme treats R.C. 2305.19 as generally available and that the Ohio Supreme Court had assumed its applicability in prior precedent.
procedurehealthcaretorts & liability
Leighner v. Leighner
Ohio Court of Appeals · 1986-06-24 · cited 82×
This case involved a divorced husband's appeal from a trial court order denying his motion to terminate or modify his obligation to pay $1,500 monthly sustenance alimony to his ex-wife under the terms of their divorce decree. The decree provided for payments until the wife's death or remarriage, with language allowing the husband to seek review after two years and requiring the wife to make good-faith efforts to improve her financial position through employment. The court held that modification requires a threshold showing of a substantial, unforeseen change in circumstances since the original order, which the husband failed to establish; the wife's modest increase in earnings was offset by other factors, and the decree language did not eliminate the need to prove changed circumstances. The appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that the alimony remained necessary and reasonable based on the wife's earning capacity, depleted assets, and pre-divorce standard of living.
family law
State v. Scheurell
Ohio Court of Appeals · 1986-06-24 · cited 3×
The case involved a defendant's appeal from his conviction for vehicular homicide under R.C. 2903.07, along with the jury's separate finding that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time, which triggered permanent revocation of his driving privileges. The defendant raised three assignments of error concerning alleged improper cross-examination and closing argument by the prosecutor, a jury instruction allowing consideration of blood alcohol test results without expert testimony to interpret them, and insufficient evidence to support the alcohol influence finding. The court overruled all assignments of error and affirmed the conviction and revocation, holding that defense counsel's failure to object and the trial court's cautionary instructions prevented reversal on the first issue, that the statute expressly authorized admission of the test results, and that the defendant could not complain on appeal about the absence of expert explanation for the sub-presumptive test result because he had successfully objected to the state's attempt to elicit such testimony. The court further concluded that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding on alcohol influence.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Loless
Ohio Court of Appeals · 1986-02-27 · cited 9×
In State v. Loless, the defendant was convicted of inducing panic under R.C. 2917.31 after delivering a letter to Ohio media outlets falsely claiming he had altered 22 bridges so they might collapse, intending to pressure the Ohio Department of Transportation over a contract dispute. He appealed, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it was vague, overbroad, and punished protected speech under the First Amendment. The court rejected these claims, holding that the statute targets only the circulation of known false reports that cause public alarm or inconvenience, conduct falling outside First Amendment protection similar to a false cry of fire in a crowded theater. It further found the language sufficiently definite using ordinary terms and noted that the defendant's threats were not protected expression. The court affirmed the conviction after the defendant entered a no-contest plea.
criminal lawfree speech
Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck Co.
Ohio Court of Appeals · 1985-12-03 · cited 127×
The case involved a customer who alleged she was detained for hours by Sears security personnel after a dispute over approving a personal check for purchases, during which she was searched, publicly paraded, and later charged with disorderly conduct (of which she was acquitted); her complaint raised multiple tort claims including false imprisonment, slander, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, citing the statute of limitations, the existence of probable cause, and reliance on advice of counsel. The appellate court affirmed in part, holding that the claims for slander, false imprisonment, and false arrest were properly dismissed as time-barred, but reversed in part because the complaint adequately stated claims for invasion of privacy and emotional distress that were not addressed, and because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the defenses of probable cause and advice of counsel for the malicious prosecution claim, requiring remand for further proceedings.
torts & liabilityprocedurecriminal law
Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
Ohio Court of Appeals · 1985-12-03 · cited 3×
This case concerns a trial court's denial of a motion to admit an out-of-state attorney pro hac vice to represent plaintiff Robert Guccione in a civil action against Hustler Magazine in Ohio. On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court, which held the denial order appealable, the court of appeals examined whether the trial court abused its discretion under Gov. Bar R. I, Section 9(D). The court reviewed the record, including deposition testimony and proceedings, and concluded that the trial court could reasonably anticipate the out-of-state counsel's firm being called as witnesses and that the attorneys' evasive conduct provided an independent basis for denial. Admission of out-of-state counsel was treated as a privilege subject to the trial court's discretion rather than a right, leading the court to overrule the assignment of error and affirm the trial court's order.
procedure