Alan Eugene Norris

The case concerned a medical malpractice claim originally filed in 1980 and dismissed without prejudice in 1984, then refiled in 1985 outside the four-year limitations period in R.C. 2305.11(B). The trial court dismissed the refiled action, holding that the savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, does not apply to medical malpractice claims. The appellate court reversed, ruling that R.C. 2305.19 does apply because the malpractice statute expressly carves out only the legal-disability provision (R.C. 2305.16) and does not mention the savings statute. The court noted that the comprehensive limitations scheme treats R.C. 2305.19 as generally available and that the Ohio Supreme Court had assumed its applicability in prior precedent.

procedurehealthcaretorts & liability

This case involved a divorced husband's appeal from a trial court order denying his motion to terminate or modify his obligation to pay $1,500 monthly sustenance alimony to his ex-wife under the terms of their divorce decree. The decree provided for payments until the wife's death or remarriage, with language allowing the husband to seek review after two years and requiring the wife to make good-faith efforts to improve her financial position through employment. The court held that modification requires a threshold showing of a substantial, unforeseen change in circumstances since the original order, which the husband failed to establish; the wife's modest increase in earnings was offset by other factors, and the decree language did not eliminate the need to prove changed circumstances. The appellate court affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court in concluding that the alimony remained necessary and reasonable based on the wife's earning capacity, depleted assets, and pre-divorce standard of living.

family law

The case involved a defendant's appeal from his conviction for vehicular homicide under R.C. 2903.07, along with the jury's separate finding that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time, which triggered permanent revocation of his driving privileges. The defendant raised three assignments of error concerning alleged improper cross-examination and closing argument by the prosecutor, a jury instruction allowing consideration of blood alcohol test results without expert testimony to interpret them, and insufficient evidence to support the alcohol influence finding. The court overruled all assignments of error and affirmed the conviction and revocation, holding that defense counsel's failure to object and the trial court's cautionary instructions prevented reversal on the first issue, that the statute expressly authorized admission of the test results, and that the defendant could not complain on appeal about the absence of expert explanation for the sub-presumptive test result because he had successfully objected to the state's attempt to elicit such testimony. The court further concluded that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding on alcohol influence.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Loless, the defendant was convicted of inducing panic under R.C. 2917.31 after delivering a letter to Ohio media outlets falsely claiming he had altered 22 bridges so they might collapse, intending to pressure the Ohio Department of Transportation over a contract dispute. He appealed, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it was vague, overbroad, and punished protected speech under the First Amendment. The court rejected these claims, holding that the statute targets only the circulation of known false reports that cause public alarm or inconvenience, conduct falling outside First Amendment protection similar to a false cry of fire in a crowded theater. It further found the language sufficiently definite using ordinary terms and noted that the defendant's threats were not protected expression. The court affirmed the conviction after the defendant entered a no-contest plea.

criminal lawfree speech

The case involved a customer who alleged she was detained for hours by Sears security personnel after a dispute over approving a personal check for purchases, during which she was searched, publicly paraded, and later charged with disorderly conduct (of which she was acquitted); her complaint raised multiple tort claims including false imprisonment, slander, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, citing the statute of limitations, the existence of probable cause, and reliance on advice of counsel. The appellate court affirmed in part, holding that the claims for slander, false imprisonment, and false arrest were properly dismissed as time-barred, but reversed in part because the complaint adequately stated claims for invasion of privacy and emotional distress that were not addressed, and because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the defenses of probable cause and advice of counsel for the malicious prosecution claim, requiring remand for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedurecriminal law

This case concerns a trial court's denial of a motion to admit an out-of-state attorney pro hac vice to represent plaintiff Robert Guccione in a civil action against Hustler Magazine in Ohio. On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court, which held the denial order appealable, the court of appeals examined whether the trial court abused its discretion under Gov. Bar R. I, Section 9(D). The court reviewed the record, including deposition testimony and proceedings, and concluded that the trial court could reasonably anticipate the out-of-state counsel's firm being called as witnesses and that the attorneys' evasive conduct provided an independent basis for denial. Admission of out-of-state counsel was treated as a privilege subject to the trial court's discretion rather than a right, leading the court to overrule the assignment of error and affirm the trial court's order.

procedure

In Mahle v. Mahle, the plaintiff husband sought a divorce under Ohio's living-apart statute (R.C. 3105.01(K)) after the couple had lived separately for over a year without cohabitation, while the defendant wife raised defenses of recrimination, condonation, and estoppel and sought to preserve alimony and benefits awarded in a prior alimony-only action. The trial court granted the divorce, excluding evidence of the traditional defenses as irrelevant, and the appellate court affirmed the divorce grant in part but reversed and remanded on certain alimony modification issues. The court reasoned that the statute expressly provides that pleas of recrimination or res judicata do not bar divorce on this ground and that condonation is not a bar, reflecting the legislature's adoption of a no-fault remedy grounded in the public policy that prolonged separation demonstrates an irretrievably broken marriage without reference to marital misconduct.

family law

Informatics, Inc. appealed a Board of Tax Appeals decision upholding the Tax Commissioner's assessment of sales and use taxes on post-1976 lease payments for computer equipment after a statutory amendment eliminated a prior exemption for such leases. The company argued that applying the new tax to leases executed before the amendment violated Ohio's constitutional ban on retroactive laws, along with equal protection and interstate commerce claims. The court adopted a rule from other jurisdictions that lease payments made after a taxing statute's effective date are taxable unless the lease creates irrevocable, fixed obligations (a fixed term, unconditional payment duty, and no termination option), treating only those as analogous to completed installment sales exempt from later taxation. It sustained challenges to the retroactivity ruling and evidence on novation, overruled the remaining assignments of error, reversed the Board's decision, and remanded for re-examination of the leases under the new standard.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs who sued defendants for breach of a contract to sell five parcels of real property, seeking specific performance, a real estate commission, damages, and an injunction to block any sale to third parties. The trial court advanced and consolidated the hearing on the preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits under Civ. R. 65(B)(2), then entered final judgment granting plaintiffs specific performance and injunctive relief. On appeal, the court reversed, ruling that consolidation was improper because the limited issues relevant to preserving the status quo via preliminary injunction were not the same as those raised by the claims for specific performance and damages, and defendants had not yet had time to answer the complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

propertyprocedure

In State v. Hairston, the defendant appealed his aggravated robbery conviction and sentence enhancement based on a 1976 prior conviction for attempted aggravated robbery entered after a guilty plea. The trial court found the prior conviction specification true using the judgment entry and testimony from the defendant's parole officer. The defendant argued that the state failed to prove the prior guilty plea was voluntary and thus constitutionally valid, citing Supreme Court cases on uncounseled convictions. The court held that because the defendant was represented by counsel in the prior case and raised no evidence of involuntariness, the trial court could presume the plea was voluntary under precedents like Henderson v. Morgan, satisfying the state's burden beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant indicted for aggravated robbery with a firearm specification, where the jury convicted him of the robbery but returned a verdict on the specification finding that the offense was not committed with a firearm or deadly weapon, due to a modified verdict form. The defendant contended that the inconsistent verdicts required acquittal on the aggravated robbery charge because the presence of a deadly weapon was an essential element. The court rejected this argument and affirmed the conviction. It reasoned that under Ohio law, consistent with Dunn v. United States and United States v. Powell, verdicts on multiple counts need not be consistent, as inconsistencies may result from jury lenity or compromise without undermining the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Fidelity Title Service suing C.V. Perry & Co. on a promissory note assigned from Buckeye Services Corp. that was originally executed by Ball Homes, Inc. and C.V. Perry & Co. as comakers in connection with a real estate lot purchase secured by a vendor's lien. Ball Homes confessed judgment, but C.V. Perry & Co. defended on grounds that it signed only as an accommodation maker and that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course because it acquired the overdue note with notice of defenses. The trial court found C.V. Perry & Co. to be an accommodation maker, admitted oral evidence of the accommodation agreement, held that the plaintiff took the note subject to all defenses including breach of a condition precedent regarding collection on the lien, and entered judgment for the defendant. The appeals court affirmed, ruling that an accommodation maker is not liable to a subsequent non-holder in due course under the UCC as adopted in Ohio.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a divorced mother's motion to end her ex-husband's visitation with their three young children after he insisted on including his male companion during visits, despite her objections. The trial court denied termination but modified the visitation order to require it occur only in the Columbus area and prohibit any unrelated males from being present. The appeals court reversed, holding that the modification failed to adequately protect the children's best interests given uncontroverted expert testimony that the children would be harmed by learning of their father's homosexuality and evidence of the father's unwillingness to accept restrictions. The court reasoned that while visitation need not be terminated if adequate safeguards could be imposed, the trial court abused its discretion by not adding further conditions, such as requiring visits in the mother's presence and barring the father from disclosing his lifestyle, and remanded for reconsideration of appropriate limits or possible termination.

family law

The case involved a defendant appealing his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in his breath, as measured by an intoxilyzer machine. The trial court excluded expert testimony that, based on the defendant's reported alcohol consumption, the test result would have been lower if the machine had functioned properly. The appellate court ruled that while defendants may not use expert testimony to challenge the general reliability of intoxilyzers approved by the Ohio Director of Health, they may introduce such testimony to contest the accuracy of a specific test result by showing that something went wrong with that particular test. The court therefore reversed the judgment in part and remanded for a new trial to permit the limited expert opinion on the expected result under the defendant's claimed circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dental malpractice claim by plaintiff Camille McKee against dentist Benjamin Williams, alleging negligent orthodontic treatment from 1975 onward that caused injuries to her teeth, gums, and bones. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant, ruling that the one-year statute of limitations under R.C. 2305.11(A) barred the October 1983 complaint because the plaintiff had discovered her legal injury by June 15, 1982, at the latest. The appeals court reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact about the discovery date. The court reasoned that accrual of the malpractice claim requires discovery not only of physical injury but also its cause and the responsible party, and the plaintiff's deposition testimony about her June 1982 meeting with an attorney was ambiguous enough to support a later discovery date of October 14, 1982, when construed in her favor under Civ. R. 56. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved an employer, Kenner Products, seeking a writ of mandamus to vacate an Industrial Commission order granting claimant Marie Johnson a lump-sum advancement of over $8,000 from her permanent total disability workers' compensation benefits to pay debts for items including a color television, central air conditioner, and Chrysler Cordoba automobile. The court granted the writ in part, ordering the commission to vacate the advancement for the television and air conditioner, permit the employer to recoup those funds, and reconsider the automobile portion. The core reasoning was that the commission failed to apply R.C. 4123.64, which requires special circumstances for such advancements to provide financial relief or further rehabilitation, and violated its own administrative rules under Ohio Adm. Code 4121-3-10(B) that prohibit payments for luxury items and require documented need for automobiles, without making required findings or considering the rule's criteria in conjunction.

labor & employment

In this divorce case, the father appealed the trial court's award of custody of the couple's two-year-old daughter to the mother, arguing that the court improperly applied a presumption favoring mothers for young children under the outdated tender years doctrine. The mother did not file a brief on appeal. The appellate court held that Ohio's Divorce Reform Act requires the best interest of the child as the sole standard for custody decisions and eliminated any remaining application of the tender years presumption. Accepting the father's uncontested statement of facts and issues, the court concluded that the evidence showed custody with the father served the child's best interests. It therefore reversed the custody portion of the judgment and remanded with instructions to award custody to the father.

family law

This case concerns the effect of a stepparent adoption on a child's rights to inherit or seek companionship from relatives of a deceased natural parent under Ohio statutes. The concurring opinion agrees with the majority's result on the first assignment of error but reaches it by analyzing changes in adoption law. It explains that the prior decision in Graziano v. Davis misinterpreted the old statute R.C. 3107.13, which allowed only a narrow inheritance exception, but the current R.C. 3107.15(B) explicitly preserves a child's rights from a deceased parent—including the applicability of statutes like R.C. 3109.11—after a stepparent adoption. The opinion further notes that R.C. 3109.05(B) on visitation does not apply here because the parents' marriage was not terminated.

family law

This case concerned whether the Board of Commissioners of Franklin County qualified as the competent operator of a proposed new solid waste landfill under Ohio environmental regulations requiring direct daily operational control by the operator. In an earlier appeal the court had remanded the matter because evidence showed the commissioners planned to hire an unidentified outside firm for day-to-day management. After additional hearings, the Environmental Board of Review found that the commissioners would retain actual control through county employees in the Department of Sanitary Engineering, would adopt resolutions accepting regulatory responsibility, and had demonstrated competence by running an existing landfill. The court reviewed the record under the standard of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and affirmed the Board's order, holding that the commissioners satisfied the operator requirements even if they used contractors remaining under their direct supervision.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a medical malpractice action arising from the delivery of Ryan Yeager, where plaintiffs claimed that fetal heart monitor tracings showed distress requiring an immediate cesarean section, but the defendant physician did not breach the standard of care. The trial court admitted textbook pages showing examples of severe late decelerations and instructed the jury using the term "judgment" in describing the standard of care. The majority of the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendant, finding no abuse of discretion in admitting the exhibits and no error in the jury charge. The dissenting judge reasoned that the textbook exhibits were irrelevant and likely to mislead the jury by inviting improper comparisons without expert testimony connecting them to the plaintiff's tracings, and that the cumulative effect of the evidentiary ruling and jury instruction deprived plaintiffs of a fair trial.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure