James Benton Parsons

In this case, plaintiff Richard Roe sued doctors, a hospital, and blood suppliers including the American Red Cross in state court for negligence after contracting HIV from contaminated blood transfusions during a 1984 splenectomy. The Red Cross removed the case to federal court under its federal charter, and Roe moved to remand, arguing that not all defendants had consented to removal as generally required. The court denied the remand motion, holding that the Red Cross's independent statutory right to remove under 36 U.S.C. § 2, as confirmed by the Supreme Court in American National Red Cross v. S.G., does not require consent from codefendants. The court further exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against the other defendants, finding no basis to decline it under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

procedurefederal power

This case involves a state-law negligence and medical malpractice action originally filed in Illinois state court, in which plaintiff Richard Roe named three doctors as respondents in discovery under 735 ILCS 5/2-402 but never moved to convert them to defendants. After removal to federal court on the basis of the American Red Cross's federal charter, the doctors moved to dismiss, arguing that the six-month statutory window and the applicable statute of limitations had both expired without compliance. The court granted the motion, holding that Illinois precedent requires strict adherence to the statute's procedural requirements, including a timely motion supported by probable cause, and that the plaintiff's inaction deprived the court of jurisdiction over the respondents in discovery.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned a plaintiff's negligence claims against a hospital, doctors, and blood suppliers after he contracted HIV from contaminated transfusions received during spleen surgery in 1984. The American Red Cross removed the action to federal court under its congressional charter, prompting the plaintiff to move for remand of the entire case to state court on grounds that jurisdiction was lacking over the non-Red Cross defendants. The court determined it possessed original jurisdiction over the Red Cross claim based on the Supreme Court's ruling in American National Red Cross v. S.G. and supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) because they arose from the same case or controversy. Core reasoning centered on the mandatory nature of supplemental jurisdiction for factually interrelated claims and the 1990 amendments to removal statutes that limited prior authority to remand.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved a personal injury lawsuit filed by Shirley Hudson against the Wabash Inn's operator (Jay-N-Vee) and the building owner (First National Bank of Chicago) after her husband Robert was found unconscious at the bottom of a staircase leading to the restroom, suffering permanent injuries with no witnesses to the incident. The plaintiff alleged that Robert's fall resulted from the defendants' negligence in maintaining an unreasonably slippery tile floor and an inadequately designed or maintained staircase that violated Chicago Building Code requirements. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing a lack of evidence linking any alleged defects to the injury. The court granted the motion, holding that under Illinois law the plaintiff bore the burden of affirmatively proving proximate causation and that the absence of any direct evidence or eyewitness testimony would force any verdict in her favor to rest on speculation rather than fact.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved National Advertising Co.'s challenge to Chicago's zoning ordinance and electrical code, which imposed setback, height, and permit requirements on advertising signs near major highways. National's applications for 16 signs were denied, and appeals to the Zoning Board of Appeals were unsuccessful, leading to a lawsuit alleging violations of due process, equal protection, and First Amendment rights under both pre- and post-1990 versions of the regulations. The court granted the City's motion to dismiss, ruling that challenges to the superseded pre-amendment laws were moot because the provisions no longer had legal effect and National had no vested rights to permits. It also held that the claims against the current laws failed to state a viable claim, as National did not demonstrate purposeful discrimination or invidious classification to support an equal protection violation. The decision rested on principles that constitutional challenges require ongoing legal effect or specific factual allegations of discriminatory intent beyond mere denial of permits.

business & regulatoryfree speechcivil rights

This case involves a patent infringement lawsuit filed by Baxter International Inc. and Baxter Healthcare Corporation against Cobe Laboratories, Inc., in which Baxter alleged infringement of four patents and Cobe countered by challenging the patents' validity and seeking declaratory relief. The specific dispute before the court concerned Cobe's motion to compel inventor Herbert Cullis to answer deposition questions regarding the patents' interpretation, validity, and contribution to the art. The court granted the motion to compel but directed the parties to resume the deposition under specific conditions, requiring Cobe to first establish a foundation for Cullis's knowledge based on his involvement with the patents and allowing the court to later rule on any objections to the testimony. The reasoning drew on precedents showing that inventors often possess relevant insights due to their association with the subject matter, while emphasizing the need for fair discovery practices that avoid oppression and ensure reliable testimony.

procedureproperty

In United States v. Obiuwevbi, the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 of making false statements to a Customs inspector at O'Hare Airport about the amount of currency he was transporting out of the country on a flight to Nigeria. After the verdict, Obiuwevbi moved for a new trial, claiming he was selected for questioning solely because of his race and seeking suppression of the evidence under the Fourth Amendment. The court denied the motion following a post-conviction hearing, concluding that the inspector acted on behavioral observations and established courier profiles tied to money laundering risks on certain routes, not race, and that border searches are reasonable without probable cause or a warrant.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a dissolved Illinois corporation, T-K City Disposal, seeking to compel its former insurer, Commercial Union, to defend it in a CERCLA action brought by the U.S. EPA over hazardous substances at a landfill the company had operated before its 1975 dissolution. The court addressed whether CERCLA preempts state corporate dissolution law and whether the dissolved entity had capacity to sue under Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Illinois Business Corporation Act. Both parties agreed that CERCLA does not preempt state law, and the court held that Illinois statutes limit a dissolved corporation's ability to sue or be sued to five years after dissolution. Because more than five years had passed, T-K lacked capacity to maintain the action against its insurer. The complaint was therefore dismissed with prejudice.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

Henkel Corporation sued Coral, Inc. for infringing its reissued patent on a low-temperature cleaning composition and process for aluminum cans in the food and beverage industry. The court granted Henkel's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining Coral from further manufacturing or selling its competing cleaner product. The ruling rested on determinations that Henkel showed a likelihood of success on the merits, would suffer irreparable harm absent relief, that the balance of hardships favored Henkel, and that the public interest supported enforcement of the valid patent.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved the Federal Trade Commission seeking court enforcement of a subpoena against the Illinois State Bar Association for documents in an ongoing Bureau of Competition investigation into the Association's issuance of ethics opinions on lawyer advertising and solicitation. The court ordered the Association to comply fully with the subpoena, including by producing the names and addresses of members who had requested such advice. The court reasoned that the information was not shielded by attorney-client privilege, was relevant to determining the effects of the opinions on members' conduct and the Association's own motives, and that the underlying investigation was within the FTC's statutory authority under the FTC Act.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

In Janko v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, plaintiff Loretta M. Janko brought a Title VII claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) against her former employer, alleging she was terminated because she is a Gypsy, which she argued constituted discrimination based on national origin; she also appended a state law claim. The defendant moved to dismiss, contending that "Gypsy" does not qualify as a national origin under the statute because it is not tied to a specific country. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint sufficiently pleaded a claim. It reasoned that Supreme Court precedent in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji establishes that Title VII protects against discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics, including those associated with Gypsies as an ethnic group with historical ties to regions from India to the Mediterranean.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this case, plaintiff Gotshall sued his brokerage firm A.G. Edwards and its employee after losing approximately two million dollars in an investment account, alleging violations of the federal Securities Act of 1933 and Exchange Act of 1934. The defendants moved to stay the federal proceedings and compel arbitration under the parties' brokerage agreements, which contained arbitration clauses but also explicit exceptions stating that arbitration could not be compelled for disputes under federal securities laws; they also moved to dismiss or require repleading on other grounds. The court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the contract's specific disclaimer controlling and distinguishing the Supreme Court's McMahon decision because that case involved an agreement without such an exception. The court also denied the motions to dismiss for lack of private causes of action or insufficient particularity in pleading fraud under Rule 9(b), as well as related requests for more definite statements or to strike claims, allowing the case to proceed in federal court.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns two consolidated actions by plaintiffs seeking permission to erect a creche and a menorah on Chicago's Daley Center Plaza during the holiday season, after the Public Building Commission initially granted but then withdrew or conditioned approval on a $100,000 litigation bond for indemnification. Plaintiffs contended that the Plaza is a public forum, the displays constitute protected speech under the First Amendment, and the bond requirement or denial violated their free speech, equal protection, and Section 1983 rights. Defendants argued that the Establishment Clause barred such religious structures and that the bond was necessary to address potential lawsuits and adverse public impact. The court had previously issued a temporary restraining order allowing the creche to remain until after Christmas 1987, and the opinion addresses ongoing motions for summary judgment and preliminary injunction while severing a related claim about displays at O'Hare Airport. The court made findings limiting relief on the airport claim, such as requiring substitution of secular holiday music near decorations, but did not resolve the plaza claims in the provided excerpt.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

The case involved a state employee suing the Illinois Comptroller under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of himself and a class, alleging that wage offsets to collect defaulted student loans under the State Comptroller Act deprived them of property without adequate predeprivation notice and hearing, in violation of due process. The district court initially certified the class and ruled the statute unconstitutional on its face and as applied, granting summary judgment and injunctive relief. On remand from the Seventh Circuit, which noted new regulations adopted during the litigation, the court found that the updated procedures and practices now comply with due process requirements. Because there was no ongoing violation of federal law, the Eleventh Amendment barred declaratory and injunctive relief, the dispute was deemed moot, and the case was dismissed.

civil rightsprocedure

In this case, Robert Palucki, a 41-year-old division manager at a Sears store, sued his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after being terminated in 1982, alleging that his firing was based on age rather than performance. Sears moved for summary judgment, arguing that Palucki's discharge resulted from his repeated failures to meet job expectations following a departmental reorganization that assigned him to manage a larger consolidated unit. The court granted the motion after reviewing deposition testimony and other evidence, finding no genuine issue of material fact because Sears had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination supported by documented performance issues, and Palucki offered no evidence linking the decision to his age. The court emphasized that an employee's subjective beliefs about his own performance or coworkers' unsubstantiated suspicions do not create a triable claim of pretext.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned a challenge by property owners, managers, and real estate groups to Chicago's Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, a comprehensive regulation of landlord-tenant relationships that took effect in late 1986. Plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance unconstitutionally interfered with their property interests and sought a preliminary injunction after a temporary restraining order had been issued. The court denied the injunction and vacated the restraining order, holding that the ordinance fell within the city's police power to promote health, welfare, and safety. It reasoned that legislative classifications and regulations are presumed valid if any set of facts could sustain them, that plaintiffs failed to plead facts overcoming this presumption, and that courts may not act as a superlegislature to assess the wisdom of such measures.

propertybusiness & regulatory

Pittway Corporation sued Black & Decker for patent infringement, alleging that Black & Decker's rechargeable 'Flashliter' flashlights copied Pittway's patented three-position switch mechanism that allows the device to be plugged directly into an outlet for recharging without external accessories. Pittway sought a preliminary injunction to stop Black & Decker from manufacturing, selling, or advertising the product and to prevent liquidation of existing inventory. The court granted the injunction after finding that Pittway demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits based on its valid patent and evidence of copying, that irreparable injury would occur without relief, that the balance of harms favored Pittway, and that the public interest supported enforcement of patent rights. The decision rested on the constitutional purpose of patents to promote innovation through temporary exclusivity and the standard four-factor test for preliminary injunctive relief in patent cases.

propertybusiness & regulatory

Jane Doe sued her former employer, the First National Bank of Chicago, under Title VII alleging she was discharged because she had an abortion and one supervisor disapproved. The court assumed without deciding that Title VII could cover adverse actions based on an employee's abortion, consistent with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's legislative history and EEOC guidance. After trial the court found Doe failed to prove she was meeting legitimate job expectations or that the relevant decision-makers knew of the abortion and held animus toward it. The bank instead established that termination rested on documented performance deficiencies that were not shown to be pretextual, leading to judgment for the defendants.

abortionlabor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved former U.S. Senator Adlai Stevenson and other plaintiffs challenging an Illinois Election Code provision that set a December filing deadline for independent candidates seeking state and county offices. After resigning his Democratic nomination for governor due to objections to his running mate, Stevenson sought to file as an independent but was barred by the statute's single filing date, which he claimed violated First Amendment freedom of association and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. The court first confirmed its jurisdiction over the constitutional challenge and the plaintiffs' standing despite not having submitted untimely filings. It then ruled that the deadline was constitutional on its face and as applied, as it struck a fair balance between the state's regulatory interests and candidates' access rights under Supreme Court precedents such as Anderson v. Celebrezze, without imposing an unconstitutional burden.

electionscivil rights

This case arose from a commodities trading dispute in which investor John Blum sued brokerage firm Saul Stone & Company and its agent Bonnie Frost for alleged fraud and related claims after an $80,000 investment was lost, prompting Stone to seek indemnification from Blum's agent Jerry Browning in a separate action. After consolidation, Stone moved for summary judgment, arguing that Blum's amended complaint alleging a partnership was barred by the statute of limitations and failed to name all partners, and alternatively seeking to strike Washington state securities and consumer protection claims. The court denied summary judgment, holding under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c), 17(a), and 21 that the claims related back to the original complaint, real parties in interest could be joined, and dismissal for misjoinder was inappropriate. It granted partial summary judgment on the state-law claims, however, because the Commodity Exchange Act preempts state regulation of commodity futures trading and the customer agreement's choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses did not govern the tort claims or require application of Washington law.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability