In Bergstrom v. Burlington Northern Railroad, plaintiffs sued the defendant railroad in North Dakota state court, seeking over $29,000 in damages and an order requiring the railroad to install a culvert to allow water to drain from their land. The railroad removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, asserting that the total amount in controversy exceeded $50,000 when the cost of the requested equitable relief was included. The court addressed how to value equitable relief for the jurisdictional threshold, ultimately accepting the railroad's estimate of at least $30,000 for culvert construction and applying the "either viewpoint" rule that considers the cost to the defendant. Finding that plaintiffs had not shown to a legal certainty that the amount was below the threshold, the court denied the motion to remand and retained jurisdiction over the case.
In this case, Burlington Northern Railroad sought to hold the North Dakota State Board of Equalization in contempt for violating 1982 court injunctions that barred the state from taxing the railroad's personal property, which the court had found discriminatory under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4-R Act). The Board argued that the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Department of Revenue of Oregon v. ACF Industries had overturned those injunctions and eliminated the court's jurisdiction. The court held that it retained jurisdiction under federal question authority and the 4-R Act itself, and that ACF Industries did not apply because North Dakota's tax system was not a generally applicable ad valorem tax with exemptions but instead singled out railroad property for taxation while exempting most other commercial personal property. Accordingly, the court granted the railroad's motion and ordered the Board to comply with the prior injunctions for the 1994 tax year.
This case involves three consolidated personal injury lawsuits brought by recipients of Vitek's Proplast TMJ jaw implants, which were made using PTFE (Teflon) supplied by DuPont; the plaintiffs alleged negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation, claiming DuPont failed to warn of dangers associated with using the material in medical implants. DuPont moved for summary judgment on the ground that, as a bulk supplier of raw material to an FDA-regulated medical device manufacturer, it had no duty to ensure the safety of Vitek's finished product. The court granted the motion, holding that DuPont had communicated its concerns about PTFE's suitability for medical use to Vitek but lacked conclusive knowledge of the specific risks at issue, and that a component supplier has no obligation to warn end users about dangers arising from the design or assembly of the final product.
John Ronsberg sued the United States after the IRS assessed him a one-hundred-percent penalty under 26 I.R.C. § 6672 as a responsible person for Pavement Maintenance, Inc.'s unpaid employment and withholding taxes covering three quarters from July 1982 through March 1983. The dispute focused on the interpretation of 26 I.R.C. § 6671, with Ronsberg arguing that the penalty must be assessed and noticed on a quarterly basis exactly like the underlying taxes, while the government maintained that only the general assessment procedures for taxes apply. Ronsberg moved for summary judgment, claiming the lump-sum notice of $126,603.91 was invalid. The court denied the motion, concluding that the penalty creates separate personal liability, the statute does not require identical quarterly assessment, and the IRS notice stating the amount and demanding payment met all statutory requirements.
This case involved a dispute over whether an insurance company had a duty to defend its insured bank under a comprehensive general liability policy in an underlying lawsuit. The bank, First National, was sued by Jerry Harmon Motors and Jerry Harmon for allegedly willfully and maliciously breaching contracts and dishonoring checks, resulting in economic losses and emotional harm. The insurer, St. Paul, declined coverage and defense on the ground that the policy covered only accidental events, not intentional acts. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that under North Dakota law the duty to defend is determined solely by the allegations in the underlying complaint, which described intentional conduct outside the policy's coverage for accidental events. The court therefore dismissed the bank's claim for breach of the duty to defend or indemnify.
This case concerned the ownership of the bed of Devils Lake in North Dakota, adjacent to the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe Reservation. The Tribe claimed that the United States holds title to the lake bed in trust for the Tribe as part of the reservation established by the 1867 Treaty. The court granted summary judgment to the United States and dismissed the claims against all defendants. The core reasoning was that the Tribe had already litigated and settled these claims in prior proceedings before the Indian Claims Commission in docket 363, receiving compensation that covered the lake bed claims dating back to the 1870s.
