Paul Benson

In Bergstrom v. Burlington Northern Railroad, plaintiffs sued the defendant railroad in North Dakota state court, seeking over $29,000 in damages and an order requiring the railroad to install a culvert to allow water to drain from their land. The railroad removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, asserting that the total amount in controversy exceeded $50,000 when the cost of the requested equitable relief was included. The court addressed how to value equitable relief for the jurisdictional threshold, ultimately accepting the railroad's estimate of at least $30,000 for culvert construction and applying the "either viewpoint" rule that considers the cost to the defendant. Finding that plaintiffs had not shown to a legal certainty that the amount was below the threshold, the court denied the motion to remand and retained jurisdiction over the case.

procedureproperty

In this case, Burlington Northern Railroad sought to hold the North Dakota State Board of Equalization in contempt for violating 1982 court injunctions that barred the state from taxing the railroad's personal property, which the court had found discriminatory under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4-R Act). The Board argued that the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Department of Revenue of Oregon v. ACF Industries had overturned those injunctions and eliminated the court's jurisdiction. The court held that it retained jurisdiction under federal question authority and the 4-R Act itself, and that ACF Industries did not apply because North Dakota's tax system was not a generally applicable ad valorem tax with exemptions but instead singled out railroad property for taxation while exempting most other commercial personal property. Accordingly, the court granted the railroad's motion and ordered the Board to comply with the prior injunctions for the 1994 tax year.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves three consolidated personal injury lawsuits brought by recipients of Vitek's Proplast TMJ jaw implants, which were made using PTFE (Teflon) supplied by DuPont; the plaintiffs alleged negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation, claiming DuPont failed to warn of dangers associated with using the material in medical implants. DuPont moved for summary judgment on the ground that, as a bulk supplier of raw material to an FDA-regulated medical device manufacturer, it had no duty to ensure the safety of Vitek's finished product. The court granted the motion, holding that DuPont had communicated its concerns about PTFE's suitability for medical use to Vitek but lacked conclusive knowledge of the specific risks at issue, and that a component supplier has no obligation to warn end users about dangers arising from the design or assembly of the final product.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

John Ronsberg sued the United States after the IRS assessed him a one-hundred-percent penalty under 26 I.R.C. § 6672 as a responsible person for Pavement Maintenance, Inc.'s unpaid employment and withholding taxes covering three quarters from July 1982 through March 1983. The dispute focused on the interpretation of 26 I.R.C. § 6671, with Ronsberg arguing that the penalty must be assessed and noticed on a quarterly basis exactly like the underlying taxes, while the government maintained that only the general assessment procedures for taxes apply. Ronsberg moved for summary judgment, claiming the lump-sum notice of $126,603.91 was invalid. The court denied the motion, concluding that the penalty creates separate personal liability, the statute does not require identical quarterly assessment, and the IRS notice stating the amount and demanding payment met all statutory requirements.

taxesfederal power

This case involved a dispute over whether an insurance company had a duty to defend its insured bank under a comprehensive general liability policy in an underlying lawsuit. The bank, First National, was sued by Jerry Harmon Motors and Jerry Harmon for allegedly willfully and maliciously breaching contracts and dishonoring checks, resulting in economic losses and emotional harm. The insurer, St. Paul, declined coverage and defense on the ground that the policy covered only accidental events, not intentional acts. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that under North Dakota law the duty to defend is determined solely by the allegations in the underlying complaint, which described intentional conduct outside the policy's coverage for accidental events. The court therefore dismissed the bank's claim for breach of the duty to defend or indemnify.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned the ownership of the bed of Devils Lake in North Dakota, adjacent to the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe Reservation. The Tribe claimed that the United States holds title to the lake bed in trust for the Tribe as part of the reservation established by the 1867 Treaty. The court granted summary judgment to the United States and dismissed the claims against all defendants. The core reasoning was that the Tribe had already litigated and settled these claims in prior proceedings before the Indian Claims Commission in docket 363, receiving compensation that covered the lake bed claims dating back to the 1870s.

propertyfederal power

This case involved a dispute over ownership of land around Devils Lake in North Dakota, where plaintiffs claimed title to areas that had become dry due to reliction but were later resubmerged as water levels rose. The court addressed objections to a special master's report on the riparian nature of the lands and the effect of prior quiet title judgments, tax payments, and a 1971 quitclaim deed from the State to the United States. The court accepted the master's findings with modifications and held that the lands retained their riparian character, so title to areas below the ordinary high water mark reverted to the lake bed owner through submergence, unaffected by the quiet title actions. It concluded that plaintiffs' title does not extend below the ordinary high water mark, except possibly for limited rights under North Dakota Century Code section 47-01-15, which the parties agreed did not require further determination here.

property

In United States v. Hill, the defendant was charged under federal law with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and related offenses after officers stopped him for driving with a suspended license during a narcotics surveillance, seized a handgun from his car in plain view, and later obtained statements from him and his girlfriend along with a rifle from his home via warrant. Hill moved to suppress the handgun, rifle, his girlfriend's statements, and his own incriminating statements about the guns, arguing that the traffic stop was a pretext for a drug investigation and that his statements violated Miranda rights after he invoked counsel. The court denied suppression of the handgun, rifle, girlfriend's statement, and Hill's statements to officers, finding the stop valid for the license violation with the gun in plain view, that Hill initiated further contact with police to discuss the weapons, and that he knowingly waived his rights; it did, however, suppress evidence of the controlled substances found on Hill. The core reasoning centered on the officers' legitimate basis for the arrest independent of other motives and the voluntary nature of the post-Miranda discussions initiated by the defendant.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

The case concerned a defendant convicted in 1985 of converting grain mortgaged to the Commodity Credit Corporation, who received probation and an order to pay restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3579. After partial payment, the defendant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and obtained a bankruptcy court ruling that the remaining restitution balance was a dischargeable debt. On a probation officer’s petition, the district court held that the original restitution obligation remained fully enforceable. The court reasoned that bankruptcy judges lack jurisdiction to alter or discharge obligations imposed by a criminal judgment, as confirmed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelly v. Robinson that criminal penalties are not dischargeable debts under the Bankruptcy Code.

criminal lawprocedure

In Re Glinz was a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case filed by farmers Arvel and Marjorie Glinz who had defaulted on secured loans from Travelers Insurance Company. The bankruptcy court approved a settlement between the debtors and Travelers involving conveyance and leaseback of encumbered land plus adequate protection payments, and authorized a sale of unencumbered estate land to fund those payments, over objections from the unsecured creditors committee about inadequate notice of the sale and hearing. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's orders, reasoning that the committee's attorney had actual notice and opportunity to object at the hearing, the judge properly exercised independent judgment in approving the settlement, and conversion to Chapter 7 was barred by statute because the debtors were farmers who had not requested it.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The United States sued to recover amounts due on three defaulted promissory notes secured by real estate mortgages obtained through the Farmers Home Administration and sought foreclosure of the property along with a 60-day redemption period. Defendants admitted the defaults but claimed entitlement to a one-year redemption period under North Dakota statutes, leading to cross-motions for summary judgment on that issue. The court ruled that federal law governs rights under nationwide federal loan programs and permits a flexible equitable redemption period tailored to case facts, granting the government's motion for a 60-day period after the foreclosure sale due to the borrowers' extended nonpayment and lack of restructuring efforts while denying the defendants' motion.

propertyfederal powerprocedure

The case involved eleven defendants charged with the murder and assault of Jerome Edward Peltier, an Indian, near Fort Totten within the exterior boundaries of the Devils Lake Sioux Indian Reservation. The defendants moved to dismiss the charges for lack of federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153, arguing that the 1904 Act disestablished the reservation or that the crimes occurred on the state-owned bed of Devils Lake. The court denied the motion, upholding jurisdiction. It reasoned that there was a presumption against disestablishment, the 1904 Act's language and history did not clearly evince congressional intent to disestablish the reservation boundaries, later congressional actions affirmed the reservation's continued existence, and federal jurisdiction extends to all lands within reservation boundaries regardless of ownership.

criminal lawfederal powerproperty

In this bankruptcy case, joint Chapter 7 debtors Wanda and Michael Reisnour appealed a ruling that disallowed Michael's claim for a North Dakota "in lieu of homestead" exemption after Wanda claimed the full homestead exemption on their jointly owned property. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, holding that under North Dakota law, the homestead exemption and in-lieu exemption are mutually exclusive, and Michael's consent to Wanda's homestead claim precluded his separate in-lieu claim. The court reasoned that North Dakota has opted out of federal exemptions, so 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) allowing independent exercise by joint debtors does not override state limits, and the "in lieu" provision cannot be used as an additional exemption.

propertyprocedurefederal power

This case involved a bankruptcy trustee's effort to recover two payments made by the debtor company via cashier's checks shortly before an involuntary Chapter 7 filing, on the ground that they were preferential transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). The bankruptcy court had dismissed the claims, ruling that payments by cashier's check were not transfers of the debtor's property. On appeal, the district court held that the broad statutory definition of transfer can encompass indirect payments by cashier's check when they deplete the debtor's assets, and that whether such payments constitute avoidable preferences depends on the specific facts of each case. The court therefore remanded the proceeding for further findings on whether the payments depleted the estate and whether the pension-fund payment was made to a creditor. The core reasoning emphasized looking past the form of the transaction to determine if the debtor parted with an interest in its property.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involves Leonard Peltier's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 1977 conviction for the first-degree murder of two FBI agents, claiming that the government's nondisclosure of an October 2, 1975, FBI teletype violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland by undermining ballistics evidence linking an AR-15 rifle to the crime. The court denied the motion and held that Peltier was not entitled to a new trial. It found that the teletype was preliminary information whose meaning—that the Wichita AR-15 could not be associated with tested casings via firing pin analysis—was identical to an October 31, 1975, lab report already in evidence at trial, making the document cumulative rather than material. The court reasoned that the jury had already considered the apparently inconsistent lab reports and Agent Hodge's testimony explaining the timing of examinations, so the nondisclosure did not affect the trial outcome or create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In this case, plaintiff Jeanice Little, a Caucasian woman, alleged that defendant Devils Lake-Sioux Manufacturing Corporation, a company 51% owned by the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe and located on the reservation, violated Title VII by terminating her employment after an altercation and denying her an internal grievance process that was routinely provided to Native American employees. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Title VII exclusion in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) for businesses on or near Indian reservations with publicly announced Indian preference employment practices. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, holding that the exclusion applied because the company was subject to Indian hiring preferences under 25 U.S.C. § 450e(b) due to its government contracts and tribal ownership, combined with the board chairman's statement of a publicly announced preference policy, creating no genuine issue of material fact.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, plaintiff Leland Patzner sued Stutsman County deputies Joyce Burkett and Deborah Myerchin and the county itself under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers made an illegal warrantless entry and arrest at his home for driving under the influence without consent or probable cause, used excessive force while dragging and carrying him due to his amputated legs, and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment at the jail, while also claiming the county was liable for inadequate training and supervision. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims. It reasoned that the officers had probable cause based on witness statements and exigent circumstances justified the home entry for a recent DUI-related accident, the force used was reasonable given Patzner's resistance and refusal to cooperate, there was no county policy or custom under Monell v. Department of Social Services that caused any violation and no showing of grossly negligent training, and municipalities are immune from punitive damages.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case involved non-Indian defendants charged under federal law with distributing and possessing peyote, a Schedule I controlled substance. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting membership in the Native American Church and claiming an exemption from prosecution under 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31, along with alleged violations of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. The court denied the motions to dismiss, holding that the regulatory exemption applies only to bona fide members of the Native American Church, which by history, tradition, and bylaws is limited to persons with Native American ancestry, and that the government had a compelling interest in uniform enforcement of drug laws that outweighed any free-exercise claim. The court also found the exemption language was not unconstitutionally vague and rejected equal-protection and due-process arguments. The accompanying discovery motion was denied in part and deemed moot in part.

criminal lawreligious liberty

This case is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a juvenile plaintiff against multiple county and city officials, alleging improper authorization and handling of her detention and related proceedings. The court dismissed claims against numerous defendants including sheriffs, county commissioners, mayors, aldermen, and the cities themselves, holding that respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 claims and that mere allegations of failure to act are insufficient without direct responsibility or affirmative conduct. The court also addressed motions regarding absolute judicial immunity for juvenile supervisor Dennis Herbeck, analyzing whether his role in authorizing a pick-up order under North Dakota Century Code § 27-20-13 constituted a traditionally judicial function entitled to complete protection from suit. Additionally, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss claims against two specific defendants.

civil rightsprocedurefamily law

This case involved the United States seeking forfeiture of a Rockwell International Commander aircraft under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) after it was used to transport illegal drugs. Following a jury verdict finding that owner ESM Aviation was not privy to or consenting in the illegal activity, the court granted the government's motions for reconsideration and a directed verdict on the innocent owner defense. The court determined that ESM had leased the plane to an uncertified operator and failed to implement sufficient precautions or investigations to prevent smuggling, despite the aircraft's base in a high-drug-activity area. As a result, the court ordered the aircraft forfeited to the United States.

criminal lawproperty