The case concerned Defendant Houston's motion to suppress digital and physical evidence seized pursuant to search warrants issued in South Dakota and Wisconsin. The warrants were based on statements from a 12-year-old girl describing sexual contact by her uncle when she was 4 or 5, along with corroborating 2009 emails from Houston and observations of him viewing questionable images on a family computer. The court analyzed whether probable cause existed for searching the defendant's computers for evidence of child molestation and child pornography, citing Eighth Circuit precedent in United States v. Colbert that recognizes an intuitive link between such acts without requiring a categorical distinction. It concluded that the specific facts presented, including the admitted contact and potential for images or related evidence on the computers, established probable cause for the warrants' scope.
In Cone v. Rainbow Play Systems, Inc., plaintiff Fred Cornell Cone alleged that his employer wrongfully terminated his employment due to age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Cone was terminated following a series of workplace incidents involving horseplay and a physical altercation with a coworker, after which Cone was placed on an indefinite performance agreement that he later violated. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and the but-for causation standard from Gross v. FBL Financial Services, finding that the employer articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination and that Cone failed to produce affirmative evidence showing those reasons were pretext for age discrimination. Accordingly, the court granted the motion for summary judgment.
In United States v. Flynn, a criminal defense attorney was indicted on federal charges of possessing and distributing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B), 2252(b)(2), 2252(a)(2), and 2252(b)(1). The defendant sought a jury instruction based on S.D.C.L. § 22-24A-19, which exempts attorneys acting in official duties from certain child pornography prohibitions, arguing his actions were for client representation. The court examined whether 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) preempts the state statute via the Supremacy Clause but found no express or field preemption and deferred conflict preemption analysis. It concluded that whether the defendant qualifies for the exemption and is entitled to the proposed instruction are factual questions for trial, as a defendant may receive an instruction on a supported theory of defense even if the evidence is weak.
The case concerned claims by The First National Bank in Sioux Falls against First National Bank South Dakota for alleged Lanham Act violations, common law service mark infringement, unfair competition, and breach of a prior preliminary injunction over use of the marks 'First National,' 'First National Bank,' and 'The First National Bank in Sioux Falls.' The court had earlier rejected the defendants' res judicata defense after reviewing changes in the parties' locations, advertising, and promotional activities along with Restatement factors. The opinion sets out extensive factual findings on the plaintiff's long history and registration of its marks, their acquisition of secondary meaning within a defined Sioux Falls market area, the banks' overlapping commercial services, and geographic expansion, while addressing evidentiary and injunctive issues in the ongoing trademark dispute.
In Olson v. City of Elk Point, the plaintiff claimed that city officials violated his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by entering his property and removing valuable personal items, including tools, equipment, and a fuel tank, along with debris that violated local ordinances, without adequate notice or a hearing. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that notice had been provided, the removal was authorized, and qualified immunity applied to the officials. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact on whether the notice adequately covered all removed items and whether the officials reasonably believed their actions were lawful, which prevented summary judgment on the constitutional claim or immunity.
The case involves Donald Moeller's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his South Dakota convictions for first-degree rape and first-degree murder of a child and resulting death sentence. The court decided to sever the habeas claims from Moeller's separate claim challenging the state's lethal injection protocol under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stay discovery on the protocol issue until rulemaking is complete, and address only the habeas claims in this opinion. The core reasoning is that although joinder of claims was initially permitted after Hill v. McDonough, subsequent delays from protocol development and counsel changes make severance appropriate to facilitate resolution, consistent with precedents allowing such separation and encouraging avoidance of multiplicity.
