Lawrence L. Piersol

The case concerned Defendant Houston's motion to suppress digital and physical evidence seized pursuant to search warrants issued in South Dakota and Wisconsin. The warrants were based on statements from a 12-year-old girl describing sexual contact by her uncle when she was 4 or 5, along with corroborating 2009 emails from Houston and observations of him viewing questionable images on a family computer. The court analyzed whether probable cause existed for searching the defendant's computers for evidence of child molestation and child pornography, citing Eighth Circuit precedent in United States v. Colbert that recognizes an intuitive link between such acts without requiring a categorical distinction. It concluded that the specific facts presented, including the admitted contact and potential for images or related evidence on the computers, established probable cause for the warrants' scope.

criminal lawprocedure

In Cone v. Rainbow Play Systems, Inc., plaintiff Fred Cornell Cone alleged that his employer wrongfully terminated his employment due to age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Cone was terminated following a series of workplace incidents involving horseplay and a physical altercation with a coworker, after which Cone was placed on an indefinite performance agreement that he later violated. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework and the but-for causation standard from Gross v. FBL Financial Services, finding that the employer articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination and that Cone failed to produce affirmative evidence showing those reasons were pretext for age discrimination. Accordingly, the court granted the motion for summary judgment.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In United States v. Flynn, a criminal defense attorney was indicted on federal charges of possessing and distributing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B), 2252(b)(2), 2252(a)(2), and 2252(b)(1). The defendant sought a jury instruction based on S.D.C.L. § 22-24A-19, which exempts attorneys acting in official duties from certain child pornography prohibitions, arguing his actions were for client representation. The court examined whether 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) preempts the state statute via the Supremacy Clause but found no express or field preemption and deferred conflict preemption analysis. It concluded that whether the defendant qualifies for the exemption and is entitled to the proposed instruction are factual questions for trial, as a defendant may receive an instruction on a supported theory of defense even if the evidence is weak.

criminal lawfederal power

The case concerned claims by The First National Bank in Sioux Falls against First National Bank South Dakota for alleged Lanham Act violations, common law service mark infringement, unfair competition, and breach of a prior preliminary injunction over use of the marks 'First National,' 'First National Bank,' and 'The First National Bank in Sioux Falls.' The court had earlier rejected the defendants' res judicata defense after reviewing changes in the parties' locations, advertising, and promotional activities along with Restatement factors. The opinion sets out extensive factual findings on the plaintiff's long history and registration of its marks, their acquisition of secondary meaning within a defined Sioux Falls market area, the banks' overlapping commercial services, and geographic expansion, while addressing evidentiary and injunctive issues in the ongoing trademark dispute.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Olson v. City of Elk Point, the plaintiff claimed that city officials violated his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by entering his property and removing valuable personal items, including tools, equipment, and a fuel tank, along with debris that violated local ordinances, without adequate notice or a hearing. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that notice had been provided, the removal was authorized, and qualified immunity applied to the officials. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact on whether the notice adequately covered all removed items and whether the officials reasonably believed their actions were lawful, which prevented summary judgment on the constitutional claim or immunity.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

The case involves Donald Moeller's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his South Dakota convictions for first-degree rape and first-degree murder of a child and resulting death sentence. The court decided to sever the habeas claims from Moeller's separate claim challenging the state's lethal injection protocol under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, stay discovery on the protocol issue until rulemaking is complete, and address only the habeas claims in this opinion. The core reasoning is that although joinder of claims was initially permitted after Hill v. McDonough, subsequent delays from protocol development and counsel changes make severance appropriate to facilitate resolution, consistent with precedents allowing such separation and encouraging avoidance of multiplicity.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

Sancom, a competitive local exchange carrier, sued Sprint, a long-distance carrier, in federal court for failing to pay federal and state tariffs for originating and terminating telephone access services. Sprint counterclaimed, alleging that Sancom had conspired with third-party conference calling companies to generate illegitimate access charges that were then split as profits, and it also brought third-party claims against those companies. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the FCC had primary jurisdiction over the tariff and access charge issues in light of its pending decision in a similar case, Qwest v. Farmers & Merchants. The court denied the motions without prejudice, reasoning that the FCC's reconsideration in Farmers & Merchants would substantially affect this case, that numerous factual and mixed questions of law remained unresolved, and that the parties could later raise the issues on summary judgment once the record was developed.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case concerns landlords who sued the South Dakota Housing Development Authority for breaching Section 8 Housing Assistance Payment contracts by implementing 1994 congressional amendments and a related HUD notice that limited annual rent adjustments to comparability studies rather than full automatic factors. SDHDA filed a third-party complaint against the HUD Secretary, asserting district court jurisdiction via federal question authority combined with sovereign immunity waivers in the Administrative Procedure Act or 42 U.S.C. § 1404a. The Secretary moved to dismiss, contending that the Tucker Act placed exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims because the claims were effectively against the United States. The court examined precedents distinguishing suits against federal instrumentalities from those against the United States, focusing on whether any monetary recovery would come from agency funds or public Treasury funds.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a defendant charged in a superseding indictment with murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111, major crimes in Indian Country under 18 U.S.C. § 1153, and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. The court granted the defendant's pre-trial motion to dismiss the indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B). The core reasoning was that the indictment failed to allege the defendant's Indian status, an essential element of an offense under § 1153, and that merely citing the statute did not cure the omission because an indictment must set forth all essential elements to properly state an offense.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, defendants were charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine after a traffic stop on Interstate 90, during which a drug dog alerted to their vehicle, leading to a search that uncovered hidden drugs and subsequent custodial statements by defendant Salazar. The court considered motions to suppress both the physical evidence and Salazar's statements, adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation to deny suppression of the evidence but rejecting the recommendation to suppress only the first three minutes of Salazar's interrogation. The court held that the initial traffic stop, dog sniff, and vehicle search were lawful, as there was no pretextual motive or unreasonable detention, and the evidence was not the fruit of any Fourth Amendment violation. However, because Salazar was not given Miranda warnings until three minutes into his custodial interrogation and the surrounding circumstances differed from those in Oregon v. Elstad, the court suppressed all of his post-arrest statements.

criminal lawprocedure

S.J. Louis Construction, Inc. brought a diversity action in federal court against Lewis & Clark Regional Water System seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that the defendant violated South Dakota competitive bidding laws when awarding a pipeline construction contract to another bidder despite the plaintiff's administrative protest. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of standing. Applying South Dakota law, the court granted the motion because precedent establishes that competitive bidding statutes protect the public rather than disappointed bidders, conferring no enforceable rights on unsuccessful bidders, and the plaintiff identified no other basis for standing under the grant agreement that funded the project.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerns a former South Dakota inmate, Randy Dahl, who brought a federal § 1983 claim along with state-law claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress against corrections officials after he was held in prison roughly 19 months past the expiration of his sentence. The extended incarceration resulted from the revocation of good-time credits under a statute allowing revocation for refusal to participate in sex-offender treatment; the statute had been amended after Dahl’s offenses but before his sentencing, and records inaccurately listed his offense date. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the merits and on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the state tort claims based on statutory immunity and dismissed most other claims, but denied summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against defendant Weber.

criminal lawcivil rightstorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved ranchers challenging a USDA rule that relaxed import restrictions on cattle and beef products from Canada, designated as a minimal-risk region for BSE (mad cow disease), by allowing imports of live cattle born after March 1999 and most edible products from Canadian cattle of any age. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the rule's implementation, arguing that the agency violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to provide adequate notice and opportunity for public comment on key provisions regarding over-thirty-months beef. The court granted the motion in part, remanding the case to the USDA to conduct notice-and-comment proceedings on the beef provisions without vacating the rule, and stayed the remaining claims. The core reasoning was that the agency did not properly follow APA procedures for the OTM beef imports, though it had authority under the Animal Health Protection Act to regulate such imports to prevent disease spread, and the balance of equities supported limited injunctive relief pending further administrative action.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

This case involves an inmate at the South Dakota State Penitentiary suing prison officials and a food contractor over a disciplinary policy that suspended his kosher diet for 30 days after he was found to have consumed non-kosher food, along with related claims that the religious diet rules and procedures violated his religious freedoms and due process rights. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims except one, dismissing challenges to the revised policy, declaratory and injunctive relief requests, and most other allegations. It denied summary judgment only on the inmate's claim against three officials for unlawful denial of the kosher diet under the pre-February 2007 version of the policy, which remained actionable under RLUIPA for nominal damages only in an official-capacity suit, with the matter to be decided by the court rather than a jury because the amount in controversy did not exceed twenty dollars.

religious libertycriminal lawcivil rights

The case involves an inmate at the South Dakota State Penitentiary serving a life sentence who sued prison officials alleging violations of his First Amendment and RLUIPA religious exercise rights by denying accommodations such as a succah during Sukkot, a permanent Jewish chapel, additional Torah study time, a visiting rabbi, and certain personal religious items, along with related equal protection, retaliation, and access-to-courts claims. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' summary judgment motions on qualified immunity and the merits, denied their motion challenging the constitutionality of RLUIPA, denied a motion to strike, dismissed one defendant for lack of personal involvement, and ordered a trial on the remaining claims. The rulings rested on analysis of officials' personal involvement, exhaustion of remedies, the Spending Clause basis for RLUIPA, and whether the requested accommodations were required or barred by security or other penological interests.

religious libertycriminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

This case involved a dispute over whether the plaintiff in a patent infringement action had engaged in inequitable conduct before the Patent Office by failing to disclose certain prior art references and adverse office actions during reexamination proceedings for U.S. Patent No. 6,616,998. After a bench trial, the court found such conduct had occurred but later addressed the defendants' post-judgment motions seeking to alter the judgment and to recover attorney's fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 on the ground that the case was exceptional. The court denied both motions, holding that the case was not exceptional because the misconduct consisted only of nondisclosure (not affirmative misrepresentations), the plaintiff had disclosed some related information, and the defendants themselves could have brought the omitted materials to the reexamination panel's attention. The court therefore concluded that an award of fees was not required to prevent gross injustice. The clerk was directed to process the defendants' bill of costs under local rules.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case, on remand from the Eighth Circuit, addresses the current boundaries and status of the Yankton Sioux Reservation following Supreme Court and appellate rulings that the reservation was diminished but not disestablished. The court determined that specific categories of land within the original 1858 treaty boundaries remain part of the reservation and qualify as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a): land returned to the Tribe after federal reservation, allotted lands still held in trust, lands taken into trust under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, and Indian-owned fee lands continuously held by Indians. The decision focuses on jurisdiction over these lands rather than title, rejecting claims of full disestablishment or a single boundary line while clarifying that fee lands passing out of Indian ownership are no longer reservation lands. Core reasoning draws from prior appellate guidance on the 1894 Act's effects, the 1927 and 1934 Acts' boundary implications, and the need for a factual record on trust and fee statuses.

criminal lawfederal powerproperty

In Moeller v. Weber, a death row inmate filed an amended motion seeking leave to serve a third amended habeas corpus petition that would add claims challenging the constitutionality of South Dakota's lethal injection protocol under the Eighth Amendment, either as additional habeas grounds or as a separate cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court reviewed the motion against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's Hill v. McDonough decision allowing method-of-execution challenges in § 1983 suits, the grant of certiorari in Baze v. Rees on the three-drug protocol, and 2007 amendments to South Dakota law that gave the Department of Corrections discretion over execution substances. It addressed arguments concerning the one-year habeas statute of limitations, exhaustion, and procedural default, noting that intervening legal developments could justify considering claims not previously presented to state courts or could alter the limitations period's start date. The opinion evaluates whether these new circumstances warrant granting leave to amend despite an earlier denial without prejudice pending legislative action.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

Aaron Schnitzler, an inmate at the Mike Durfee State Penitentiary convicted of sexual contact with a child and identifying as a Jehovah's Witness, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against South Dakota Department of Corrections officials, alleging that the mandatory STOP sex offender treatment program substantially burdens his religious beliefs by requiring explicit group discussions of sexual topics. He sought injunctive relief for an exemption, modified program, or compliance with his individual program directive after refusals led to noncompliance findings. The court addressed the defendants' motion for summary judgment by analyzing First Amendment free exercise claims and RLUIPA claims, applying standards from Turner v. Safley and noting that while the state's interest in treatment is compelling, prison officials must provide specific evidence rather than conclusory assertions to justify denying proposed religious accommodations. The opinion examines undisputed facts about the program's content, the inmate's scriptural objections, and periodic reviews showing ongoing noncompliance.

religious libertycivil rightscriminal law

The case centered on counterclaims by Aluminart alleging that Larson engaged in inequitable conduct before the Patent Office during reexamination of its '998 patent for a storm door with a retractable screen. The court found that Larson and its counsel withheld material information about Aluminart's prior View and Vent door product, which Larson had learned of before filing its utility patent application, and that this nondisclosure occurred with intent to deceive the examiners. As a result, the court ruled the '998 patent unenforceable and entered judgment for the defendants on the relevant claims and counterclaims. The core reasoning was that the withheld prior art was highly material to patentability and that the circumstances supported an inference of deceptive intent during the reexamination process.

propertybusiness & regulatory