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Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
PurposivismTextualism
Opinions repeatedly apply strict textual construction to limitations periods and fee provisions, as in the Federal Tort Claims Act dismissal and the denial of RICO attorney fees absent a final treble-damages judgment. Heimila v. United States ↗ Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. L… ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
Decisions consistently resolve cases on narrow factual records and statutory text, denying class claims in the Stony Brook Title VII litigation after exhaustive evidence review and dismissing untimely or unsupported claims. Coser v. Moore ↗ Grubb v. Broadcast Music, Inc. ↗
Affiliations
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit — appointed by Ronald Reagan
District Court, E.D. New York — appointed by Gerald Ford
In this case, Computer Associates sued Altai for copyright infringement and trade-secret misappropriation involving computer programs OSCAR 3.4 and 3.5. After appeals resolved the copyright claims and remanded the trade-secret claims, the district court addressed whether those claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that Texas law governs the trade-secret claims and applies a two-year limitations period for torts that begins when the cause of action accrues upon the wrongful act causing injury. Because the claim was filed more than two years after accrual, even though within two years of discovery, the court dismissed it and denied the motion to reopen discovery as moot.
This case involved Computer Associates International, Inc. suing Altai, Inc. for copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation, alleging that Altai copied substantial portions of CA's ADAPTER program into its OSCAR component used in scheduling software. The court determined that Altai's OSCAR 3.4 infringed CA's copyright but that the rewritten OSCAR 3.5 did not, while also addressing claims of trade secret misappropriation which were found to be preempted by copyright law in part. Damages were awarded to CA in the amount of $364,444 plus interest based on Altai's profits from the infringing version, after evaluating evidence of access, substantial similarity, and preemption issues. The decision rested on findings of fact regarding the development of the programs and expert testimony on their similarities.
In Grubb v. Broadcast Music, Inc., plaintiff Diana Grubb sued her employer BMI and several executives alleging sex and race discrimination under Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, Section 1981, Section 1983, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, and related statutes, based on three incidents between 1983 and 1985 in which she was denied promotions, supervisory positions, and salary increases that went to male colleagues. The court dismissed all Title VII claims as untimely because Grubb filed her EEOC charge more than 300 days after the alleged acts. It dismissed the Section 1983 and Fourteenth Amendment claims because BMI is a private employer, and the Section 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment claims (limited to race discrimination) on summary judgment because Grubb never applied for the positions at issue and was less qualified than the selected candidates. The court also granted summary judgment on the Equal Pay Act claim, finding that Grubb's clerical role was not substantially equal to the supervisory position held by the comparator employee.
Thirty-four current and former female employees of Stony Brook brought a Title VII class action alleging a university-wide pattern and practice of sex discrimination in recruiting, hiring, placement, promotion, tenure, and compensation. The court certified a class under Rule 23(b)(2) limited to that pattern-or-practice claim and conducted a bifurcated trial on it. After reviewing extensive statistical evidence and witness testimony, the court found that plaintiffs had not proved the existence of such a university-wide pattern or practice of unlawful discrimination during the period Title VII applied to the university. The court therefore dismissed the class claims while preserving the individual plaintiffs' claims for separate resolution.
The case involved Aetna Casualty and Surety Company suing insurance broker Liebowitz under the civil RICO statute for converting premiums paid by applicants for automobile insurance through New York's assigned risk pool, along with related state-law claims for breach of contract and conversion. After Aetna obtained a preliminary injunction and the parties reached a settlement that included a consent judgment for damages and a permanent injunction barring Liebowitz from the insurance business, Liebowitz defaulted on payment, prompting Aetna to seek attorney's fees and costs under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The court denied the fee request, holding that the statute's language—modeled on Clayton Act § 4—authorizes fees only when a plaintiff recovers treble damages after a final judgment on the merits, not for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief under traditional equitable standards or entering a consent judgment without such a damages recovery. The decision rested on the text of § 1964(c), its contrast with Clayton Act § 16's "substantially prevails" standard, legislative history, and analogous antitrust precedents.
This multidistrict litigation involves Vietnam veterans and their families suing nine chemical companies for personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to dioxin-contaminated Agent Orange herbicide supplied to the U.S. military. The court addressed pretrial motions for summary judgment based on the government contract defense, which requires proving that the government set the product specifications, the defendants met those specs, and the government knew at least as much as the defendants about the associated health hazards. After reviewing discovery materials and comparing the parties' relative knowledge of dioxin risks, the court granted summary judgment to four defendants (Hercules, Thompson, Riverdale, and Hoffman-Taff) whose evidence showed the defense elements were satisfied without triable issues, while denying the motions of three others (Dow, T.H., and Uniroyal) due to remaining factual disputes; the claims against the two non-moving defendants proceeded to trial on the defense alongside liability issues.