This case arose from a foreclosure action on Warrenton Farm involving notes held by Union Bank and Fidelity Federal Savings Bank, with Hiawatha Savings and Loan asserting rights under a participation agreement and a later Foreclosure Bid Agency and Escrow Agreement for bidding at the sale. After the FSLIC (succeeded by the RTC) was appointed conservator for Fidelity and repudiated the Bid Agreement under FIRREA, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the agreement's enforceability. The court granted summary judgment to Fidelity/RTC and denied Hiawatha's motion, holding that the conservator validly repudiated the contract. The core reasoning was that FIRREA authorizes repudiation of burdensome contracts within the conservator's discretion to promote orderly administration, without a fixed time limit, and that the RTC properly exercised this authority here with no actual damages shown as of the conservator's appointment.
The case involved a federal prisoner who alleged that prison officials denied her requests for an abortion while she was incarcerated and being transferred between facilities, forcing her to carry the pregnancy to term and causing emotional and financial damages. She claimed violations of her Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendment rights as well as federal Bureau of Prisons regulations on prisoner medical care, seeking damages and declaratory relief against the defendants in their official and individual capacities. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the constitutional claims against them in their official capacities without prejudice and all other claims with prejudice. The core reasoning was that sovereign immunity barred official-capacity suits, the regulations created no private right of action, and qualified immunity or lack of merit defeated the individual-capacity claims.
The case involved BethEnergy Mines seeking to vacate an arbitrator's award under a collective bargaining agreement with the United Mine Workers union. The arbitrator had interpreted the term "operations" to include "coal lands" in the context of a lease to another company for mining rights. The court granted summary judgment to BethEnergy, vacating the award. It reasoned that the arbitrator ignored the plain meaning of the contract terms, as supported by prior cases and agreements, and thus the decision did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
This case concerned conflicting claims by Jane Blount (the insured's sister) and Tamara Bartholomew (the insured's former fiancée) to the proceeds of a life insurance policy issued by Fidelity Union on the life of William B. Blount, Jr. After the insured's death, Blount filed a claim asserting she was the sole beneficiary, while Fidelity Union's records initially showed equal shares to both women; the insurer interpleaded the funds into court. The court granted summary judgment to Blount and denied Bartholomew's motion, ruling that the insured had substantially complied with the policy's change-of-beneficiary provisions under Kentucky law by executing the form and placing it with the policy, even without returning it to the company. The decision rested on precedents finding substantial compliance sufficient where the insurer did not require receipt of the form before death or physical delivery of the policy for endorsement.
In this tax refund suit, self-employed evangelistic minister Reverend Michael Warnke and his wife sought to exclude about $47,400 in housing costs from their 1980 gross income under the parson's rental allowance provision of 26 U.S.C. § 107, after the IRS denied the claim on their amended return. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, ruling that Warnke did not qualify for the exclusion because he failed to obtain a prior rental allowance designation through official action by an employing church or other qualified organization, as mandated by Treasury Regulation § 1.107-1(b). The decision turned on statutory and regulatory interpretation, finding that the minister's own monetary commitments to home expenses did not constitute the required advance designation, while also noting limits on the refund amount sought.
This case involved taxpayers who sold their breeding cattle after they contracted brucellosis, a disease making them unsuitable for breeding, and reported the resulting gain as ordinary income on their 1976 tax return. They later sought a refund by amending the return to defer the gain under IRC § 1033(f), arguing the disease constituted environmental contamination allowing reinvestment in other farm property. The IRS denied the claim, determining that only § 1033(d) applied to disease-related sales and required reinvestment in similar property such as replacement livestock. The court granted summary judgment to the government, ruling that § 1033(d) specifically covers livestock sold due to disease while § 1033(f) is limited to environmental contamination based on the statutes' text and legislative history showing the broader rollover option applies only in contamination cases.
