Scott Elgin Reed

This case arose from a foreclosure action on Warrenton Farm involving notes held by Union Bank and Fidelity Federal Savings Bank, with Hiawatha Savings and Loan asserting rights under a participation agreement and a later Foreclosure Bid Agency and Escrow Agreement for bidding at the sale. After the FSLIC (succeeded by the RTC) was appointed conservator for Fidelity and repudiated the Bid Agreement under FIRREA, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the agreement's enforceability. The court granted summary judgment to Fidelity/RTC and denied Hiawatha's motion, holding that the conservator validly repudiated the contract. The core reasoning was that FIRREA authorizes repudiation of burdensome contracts within the conservator's discretion to promote orderly administration, without a fixed time limit, and that the RTC properly exercised this authority here with no actual damages shown as of the conservator's appointment.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a federal prisoner who alleged that prison officials denied her requests for an abortion while she was incarcerated and being transferred between facilities, forcing her to carry the pregnancy to term and causing emotional and financial damages. She claimed violations of her Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendment rights as well as federal Bureau of Prisons regulations on prisoner medical care, seeking damages and declaratory relief against the defendants in their official and individual capacities. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the constitutional claims against them in their official capacities without prejudice and all other claims with prejudice. The core reasoning was that sovereign immunity barred official-capacity suits, the regulations created no private right of action, and qualified immunity or lack of merit defeated the individual-capacity claims.

abortioncriminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

The case involved BethEnergy Mines seeking to vacate an arbitrator's award under a collective bargaining agreement with the United Mine Workers union. The arbitrator had interpreted the term "operations" to include "coal lands" in the context of a lease to another company for mining rights. The court granted summary judgment to BethEnergy, vacating the award. It reasoned that the arbitrator ignored the plain meaning of the contract terms, as supported by prior cases and agreements, and thus the decision did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned conflicting claims by Jane Blount (the insured's sister) and Tamara Bartholomew (the insured's former fiancée) to the proceeds of a life insurance policy issued by Fidelity Union on the life of William B. Blount, Jr. After the insured's death, Blount filed a claim asserting she was the sole beneficiary, while Fidelity Union's records initially showed equal shares to both women; the insurer interpleaded the funds into court. The court granted summary judgment to Blount and denied Bartholomew's motion, ruling that the insured had substantially complied with the policy's change-of-beneficiary provisions under Kentucky law by executing the form and placing it with the policy, even without returning it to the company. The decision rested on precedents finding substantial compliance sufficient where the insurer did not require receipt of the form before death or physical delivery of the policy for endorsement.

property

In this tax refund suit, self-employed evangelistic minister Reverend Michael Warnke and his wife sought to exclude about $47,400 in housing costs from their 1980 gross income under the parson's rental allowance provision of 26 U.S.C. § 107, after the IRS denied the claim on their amended return. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, ruling that Warnke did not qualify for the exclusion because he failed to obtain a prior rental allowance designation through official action by an employing church or other qualified organization, as mandated by Treasury Regulation § 1.107-1(b). The decision turned on statutory and regulatory interpretation, finding that the minister's own monetary commitments to home expenses did not constitute the required advance designation, while also noting limits on the refund amount sought.

taxes

This case involved taxpayers who sold their breeding cattle after they contracted brucellosis, a disease making them unsuitable for breeding, and reported the resulting gain as ordinary income on their 1976 tax return. They later sought a refund by amending the return to defer the gain under IRC § 1033(f), arguing the disease constituted environmental contamination allowing reinvestment in other farm property. The IRS denied the claim, determining that only § 1033(d) applied to disease-related sales and required reinvestment in similar property such as replacement livestock. The court granted summary judgment to the government, ruling that § 1033(d) specifically covers livestock sold due to disease while § 1033(f) is limited to environmental contamination based on the statutes' text and legislative history showing the broader rollover option applies only in contamination cases.

taxes

This case involved an antitrust dispute under the Sherman Act in which a smaller railroad company (TTI) alleged that larger competitors (L&N, C&O, and their parent CSX) engaged in anticompetitive conduct to maintain monopoly power over coal transportation in Kentucky. The alleged conduct included discriminatory rate-setting, refusal to provide access to facilities, and filing sham proceedings before the ICC, state regulators, and courts to block TTI's rail-to-barge coal transfer project. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction due to exclusive regulatory authority over rates and immunity for petitioning activity under the First Amendment. The court denied the motion, holding that antitrust laws are not displaced by regulation of the industry and that the sham-litigation claims could not be dismissed at the pleading stage.

business & regulatoryprocedurefree speech

This case arose from a 1976 helicopter crash in Ohio allegedly caused by the defendant's negligent overhaul of the plaintiffs' aircraft, leading to claims for personal injury, property damage, and breach of UCC warranties, along with a counterclaim for services rendered. After the suit was filed in Ohio state court and removed to federal court, it was transferred to the Eastern District of Kentucky under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) due to lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The court held that Kentucky's one-year statute of limitations applied to the personal injury claim pursuant to Sixth Circuit precedent in Martin v. Stokes because the transfer should have been under § 1406(a), barring plaintiff Kyle's claim; it also dismissed the warranty count on the grounds that the transaction primarily involved services rather than a sale of goods under the UCC. The motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim was denied due to disputed issues of material fact.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved a Kentucky bank that loaned $300,000 to the Wallace defendants, secured by a 30-day promissory note, after representations that the funds would support a new leasing business and be repaid from sales of existing car-rental operations. When the borrowers defaulted and the bank learned of alleged undisclosed illegal practices, it sued under the federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, Rule 10b-5, and a parallel Kentucky statute, claiming the loan transaction involved a fraudulent sale of securities. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the federal counts, holding that the note was not a "security" within the meaning of the statutes; it relied on Sixth Circuit precedent distinguishing short-term commercial loans from investment instruments and noted the parties' agreement that one count should be dismissed for lack of a private right of action.

business & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Ingram Industries sued defendant Touche Ross & Co., an accounting firm, alleging in Counts VII and VIII that the firm negligently and with gross negligence prepared financial information that caused the plaintiff loss, even though the plaintiff was not in direct contractual privity with the accountants. Touche Ross moved to dismiss those counts, arguing that accountants owe no duty of care to unforeseeable third parties under Kentucky law and that gross negligence is not a standalone basis for liability when fraud is separately pleaded. The court denied the motion, predicting that Kentucky would follow Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552, which imposes limited liability on accountants for negligent misinformation supplied to a known or intended limited group of users, and that gross negligence can support liability equivalent to fraud; both issues require factual development at trial rather than dismissal at the pleading stage.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved inmate Clovis Carl Green, Jr., founder of the 'Human Awareness Life Church,' who sought to file two petitions to post notices about the church and its activities in Kentucky state prisons and all federal prisons nationwide, while requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court denied the IFP motions and dismissed the petitions as frivolous and malicious under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(d). The decision rested on Green's history of filing over 500 repetitive and abusive lawsuits across multiple jurisdictions, prior findings that he had attempted to deceive courts about his finances, the lack of merit in the claims, and evidence that the filings were intended to harass rather than pursue legitimate redress. The court exercised its discretion to prevent abuse of the judicial process by vexatious litigants.

religious libertycivil rightsprocedure

The opinion addresses three consolidated cases removed from Kentucky state court involving construction subcontractors and suppliers seeking to enforce mechanic's and materialman's liens on apartment projects, along with related contract claims against general contractors and property owners. The court reconsidered prior orders denying remand and examined pending remand motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), focusing on whether cross-claims or intervenor claims created separate and independent causes of action removable to federal court. It concluded that lien priority disputes among multiple Kentucky lienholders were neither separate nor independent, that removal petitions were untimely or defective as to some parties, and that the statute must be strictly construed to limit federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court determined that removal was improvident in the Fairington cases and signaled remand where jurisdiction was not clearly established.

procedureproperty

Joel C. Schofs, a federal prisoner, filed a pro se habeas corpus petition seeking to quash a detainer lodged by Connecticut based on state larceny and forgery charges and to dismiss those charges. Schofs had sent multiple letters requesting a speedy trial and invoking the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), but Connecticut authorities deemed the requests insufficient and later sought temporary custody. The court determined that Schofs had exhausted administrative remedies and that Connecticut failed to follow required IAD procedures for lodging a valid detainer or requesting custody, including proper certification through custodial officials. It therefore granted the motion to quash the detainer and invalidated the request for temporary custody and related waivers, but denied dismissal of the underlying charges without reaching their merits.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a life insurance company filing suit to determine the proper recipient of policy proceeds after the insured was shot and killed by her husband during an argument, with the husband claiming self-defense. The court granted summary judgment awarding the base policy amount to the husband as the designated beneficiary, finding no evidence that he feloniously killed his wife and noting that other potential claimants had either renounced their claims or failed to respond. It denied summary judgment on the husband's counterclaim for accidental death benefits, holding that whether the death was accidental under the circumstances presented a factual question for a jury. The court also entered judgments on the pleadings or by default against the other defendants and denied the insurer's request for attorneys' fees, while specifying the applicable interest rates on the proceeds.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved defendant Kevin Patrick Mullinex's motion to suppress evidence of marijuana discovered on his Kentucky farm after Kentucky State Police conducted an aerial overflight and a warrantless ground search. The court denied suppression of the marijuana observed from the air and spotted from a road on the property, but granted suppression of the marijuana found inside the barn. The core reasoning was that the open fields doctrine and lack of reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance meant no Fourth Amendment violation occurred for the initial observations, while the barn qualified as curtilage requiring a warrant.

criminal lawprocedure

In Allsup v. Knox, a juvenile plaintiff sued judges, county officials, a city, and others alleging civil rights violations under the U.S. and Kentucky Constitutions stemming from his arrest for a traffic offense, pretrial detention in county jail, excessive bail, denial of counsel, and related conditions of confinement. The court addressed multiple motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), along with class certification and other procedural requests. It granted dismissal of claims against Judge Knox on grounds of judicial immunity, as his actions involved traffic matters within the court's general jurisdiction despite the plaintiff's age, and partially dismissed claims against Judge Bradley for declaratory and injunctive relief; it denied dismissal motions by Scott County, the City of Georgetown, and individual officials, allowing those claims to proceed because the complaint stated viable causes of action when facts were taken as true. The court also referred class certification to a magistrate and resolved several ancillary motions.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

Ingram Industries sued the Nowicki defendants and their auditor Touche Ross after purchasing 40% of NewEra Resources stock, alleging that overstated financial statements (including audited ones) led to the purchase in violation of federal securities laws. The complaint asserted claims under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, common law fraud, and breach of contract/warranty. The court dismissed the Section 17(a) claim, holding that the statute does not create a private right of action, but found the Section 10(b) claim adequately pleaded against Touche Ross as an aider and abettor. It also allowed the common law fraud claim to proceed under pendent jurisdiction while dismissing the contract claim against Touche Ross because the complaint did not seek to hold the firm liable on that count.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, defendant American Borate Company sought to remove a state-court action filed by plaintiff Kentucky Solar Energy Controls, Inc. to federal court on diversity grounds but filed defective removal petitions that failed to allege diversity of citizenship at the time the suit was commenced. The court permitted the defendant to file a second amended petition for removal, finding no prejudice to the plaintiff and no genuine dispute that diversity existed at both relevant times. The court also adopted the magistrate's recommendations on pending discovery motions, granting the plaintiff's motion for a protective order regarding its manufacturing formula trade secret and denying the defendant's motion to compel discovery without prejudice to refiling upon a showing of relevance to the warranty dispute over borate quantity in ulexite. The decisions rested on procedural rules for amending jurisdictional allegations and the balance of interests in protecting sensitive commercial information.

procedure

This case involves a lender's suit to recover on a defaulted loan secured by mining equipment and personal/corporate guarantees from multiple defendants. The court first confirmed diversity jurisdiction, finding the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000 because the plaintiff's good-faith claim for over $1 million was not shown to a legal certainty to be below the threshold, and remedies of repossession and suit on the guarantees are cumulative under Kentucky's UCC. Interpreting Ky. Rev. Stat. 355.9-501(1) and related precedent, the court held that repossession does not bar a suit for any deficiency. It then granted summary judgment against defendant Sara J. Wells on the guarantee but denied it against the other defendants due to unresolved factual issues.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Paul C. Turner filing a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Calvin Steward, along with motions for habeas corpus (later withdrawn) and appointment of counsel, while the defendant moved to dismiss. The court denied the motion for appointment of counsel, reasoning that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies only in criminal cases and that in civil actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, such appointment is warranted only in exceptional circumstances, which were not present here. It also denied a formal request for the court to appoint counsel. The defendant's motion to dismiss was referred to a United States Magistrate for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

civil rightsprocedure