In Brown v. J.C. Penney Casualty Company, the plaintiff sought to recover insurance proceeds under a homeowners policy for damage to a residence and its contents caused by a fire. The court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover for the building because he lacked an insurable interest at the time of the loss, as the property had been sold at a tax foreclosure sale prior to the fire, extinguishing his ownership and redemption rights. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the contents due to evidence indicating he had set the fire himself. The decision was based on Missouri law requiring an insurable interest at both the time of contracting and the loss, and on circumstantial evidence establishing the incendiary origin of the fire by a preponderance of the evidence.
This case involved a dispute between Manufacturers Railway Company and Riverway Harbor Service St. Louis, Inc., where the plaintiff sought damages for the destruction of wooden piling clusters at its Mississippi River dock facility allegedly caused by the defendant's towboat during barge positioning on April 27, 1985. The court decided in favor of the defendant, dismissing the action with prejudice after finding no liability. The core reasoning was that the incident occurred during routine docking maneuvers that a properly constructed piling cluster should withstand, the presumption of fault for collisions with stationary objects did not apply, and the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's negligence caused the damage.
This case involved a bank suing a Missouri limited partnership and its general and limited partners, along with guarantors, to recover balances due on two promissory notes after default on a vessel purchase loan secured by a ship mortgage. The limited partners settled with the bank and then pursued cross-claims against the general partners under the partnership agreement for indemnification of their payments plus lost tax benefits. The court entered judgment for the bank against the general partners and guarantors for the remaining principal, interest, and fees on the notes, and for the limited partners against the general partners and related entities for the amounts paid plus lost investment tax credits, based on the notes' joint and several liability provisions, the guaranty agreements, and the partnership agreement's explicit indemnification clause covering tax benefits and other losses from the general partners' failures.
This case involved a dispute between Trailways Lines, Inc. and its union over the company's no-beards policy for garage employees with public contact under a national collective bargaining agreement. The union filed two grievances challenging the reasonableness of the policy; the first arbitrator upheld it as reasonable and enforceable, while the second found it unreasonable and issued a nationwide cease-and-desist order. The court granted Trailways' motion for summary judgment to vacate the second award and denied the union's motion to enforce it. The core reasoning was that the first award was final and binding under the contract and thus res judicata, the second arbitrator exceeded his authority by disregarding the prior ruling and dispensing his own brand of industrial justice, and the remedy ordered went beyond the scope of the grievance submission.
The case involved a lawsuit by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company against former employee Timothy Schwertmann for allegedly breaching a covenant not to compete contained in a collective bargaining agreement. The defendant moved to dismiss the federal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act applies only to suits between employers and labor organizations. The court held that the statute also permits suits against individuals for breach of a collective bargaining contract and therefore denied the motion to dismiss.
This case involves a dispute between Cotton Blossom Corp. and its owners and Lexington Insurance Company regarding coverage under a marine insurance policy for a vessel. The plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment on their claim under the wreck removal provision (Section II), while the defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the hull and contents claim (Section I), arguing breach of a watchman's warranty. The court determined that both federal admiralty law and Missouri law require strict compliance with express warranties in marine insurance policies, so the breach suspended coverage under Section I, granting summary judgment to the defendant on that claim. However, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion on Section II, finding genuine issues of material fact remained regarding the wreck removal claim.