John Keating Regan

In Brown v. J.C. Penney Casualty Company, the plaintiff sought to recover insurance proceeds under a homeowners policy for damage to a residence and its contents caused by a fire. The court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover for the building because he lacked an insurable interest at the time of the loss, as the property had been sold at a tax foreclosure sale prior to the fire, extinguishing his ownership and redemption rights. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the contents due to evidence indicating he had set the fire himself. The decision was based on Missouri law requiring an insurable interest at both the time of contracting and the loss, and on circumstantial evidence establishing the incendiary origin of the fire by a preponderance of the evidence.

propertybusiness & regulatorytaxes

This case involved a dispute between Manufacturers Railway Company and Riverway Harbor Service St. Louis, Inc., where the plaintiff sought damages for the destruction of wooden piling clusters at its Mississippi River dock facility allegedly caused by the defendant's towboat during barge positioning on April 27, 1985. The court decided in favor of the defendant, dismissing the action with prejudice after finding no liability. The core reasoning was that the incident occurred during routine docking maneuvers that a properly constructed piling cluster should withstand, the presumption of fault for collisions with stationary objects did not apply, and the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's negligence caused the damage.

propertytorts & liability

This case involved a bank suing a Missouri limited partnership and its general and limited partners, along with guarantors, to recover balances due on two promissory notes after default on a vessel purchase loan secured by a ship mortgage. The limited partners settled with the bank and then pursued cross-claims against the general partners under the partnership agreement for indemnification of their payments plus lost tax benefits. The court entered judgment for the bank against the general partners and guarantors for the remaining principal, interest, and fees on the notes, and for the limited partners against the general partners and related entities for the amounts paid plus lost investment tax credits, based on the notes' joint and several liability provisions, the guaranty agreements, and the partnership agreement's explicit indemnification clause covering tax benefits and other losses from the general partners' failures.

business & regulatorytaxesprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Trailways Lines, Inc. and its union over the company's no-beards policy for garage employees with public contact under a national collective bargaining agreement. The union filed two grievances challenging the reasonableness of the policy; the first arbitrator upheld it as reasonable and enforceable, while the second found it unreasonable and issued a nationwide cease-and-desist order. The court granted Trailways' motion for summary judgment to vacate the second award and denied the union's motion to enforce it. The core reasoning was that the first award was final and binding under the contract and thus res judicata, the second arbitrator exceeded his authority by disregarding the prior ruling and dispensing his own brand of industrial justice, and the remedy ordered went beyond the scope of the grievance submission.

labor & employment

The case involved a lawsuit by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company against former employee Timothy Schwertmann for allegedly breaching a covenant not to compete contained in a collective bargaining agreement. The defendant moved to dismiss the federal claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act applies only to suits between employers and labor organizations. The court held that the statute also permits suits against individuals for breach of a collective bargaining contract and therefore denied the motion to dismiss.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a dispute between Cotton Blossom Corp. and its owners and Lexington Insurance Company regarding coverage under a marine insurance policy for a vessel. The plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment on their claim under the wreck removal provision (Section II), while the defendant moved for partial summary judgment on the hull and contents claim (Section I), arguing breach of a watchman's warranty. The court determined that both federal admiralty law and Missouri law require strict compliance with express warranties in marine insurance policies, so the breach suspended coverage under Section I, granting summary judgment to the defendant on that claim. However, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion on Section II, finding genuine issues of material fact remained regarding the wreck removal claim.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a Missouri plaintiff suing a New York-based auto wholesaler in federal court in Missouri over a business dispute, prompting the defendant to move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court applied Missouri's long-arm statute and due process standards, requiring minimum contacts with the forum state such that jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Although the defendant may have transacted some business in Missouri, it maintained no office, property, advertising, or other presence there, and its contacts were not purposeful or sufficiently related to the claims. The court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the defendant could not reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Missouri.

procedure

The case involved a company's challenge to an arbitrator's award that reinstated an employee terminated for violating the three-day unreported absence rule in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union. The company sought declaratory relief to vacate the award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded authority under the CBA by reducing the discharge to a suspension with back pay. The court held that judicial review is narrow and limited to determining whether the award draws its essence from the CBA, which here required termination for the violation as a separate and independent ground. Because the arbitrator lacked power to modify the contractually mandated penalty, the court vacated the award as not drawing its essence from the agreement and granted judgment on the pleadings to the company.

labor & employment

The case involved Earl Brissette's challenge to the termination of his Social Security disability benefits, which had been awarded after a 1972 accident but ended in 1981 after the agency found him able to return to work; after the district court initially upheld the termination, the Eighth Circuit remanded for further proceedings, leading to a favorable ALJ decision restoring benefits. Brissette then sought attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act for the judicial appeal and separately under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) for court representation. The court denied EAJA fees, finding the government's position substantially justified because it had prevailed in the initial district court ruling, and awarded $2,775 under § 406(b) based on a reasonable hourly rate of $60 for 46.25 hours of judicial-phase work only, excluding administrative-level services and limiting the award below the contingency agreement maximum.

healthcareprocedurefederal power

This case involved Falcon Products, Inc., a U.S. company, and its Mexican subsidiary Falcon de Juarez, which sought coverage under a Difference in Conditions property insurance policy for losses from table bases manufactured using scrap metal contaminated by Cobalt-60 radiation from a ruptured medical device. The contamination occurred before the subsidiary purchased the scrap, and the resulting products were unusable, leading to substantial expenses; the insurer denied the claims citing policy exclusions. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant insurer, holding that the losses were not covered because the property was already contaminated when acquired by the plaintiffs, the contamination exclusion applied regardless of the cause, and the parent company had no direct insurable interest in the subsidiary's property losses. The court also found the faulty materials exclusion applicable and rejected arguments that the nuclear exclusion clause created coverage for this type of contamination.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a claim by Barbara Quartana against John D. Utterback for libel based on statements in a letter sent to her employer, Sealright Co., regarding arrangements for sales to a third party. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, holding that the allegedly false statements attributed to the plaintiff were not defamatory as a matter of law and did not constitute libel per se or per quod. The reasoning centered on the fact that the statements, even if falsely attributed, did not expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, nor impute misconduct in her profession, and no proper innuendo was pleaded to show defamatory meaning.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case was an interpleader action to determine entitlement to proceeds from two term life insurance policies on Ronald A. Martin, who was murdered in 1980. Helen A. Martin, the primary beneficiary on both policies, was convicted of capital murder, leading the court to disqualify her from receiving the proceeds under Missouri public policy that bars a murderer from profiting from the crime. The policies provided that contingent beneficiaries would take only if no primary beneficiaries were living at the insured's death, but since Helen remained alive (though legally disqualified), the court held that the proceeds instead belonged to the administrator of the insured's estate.

criminal lawfamily law

This case involved a motion by the plaintiffs to remand their lawsuit against Burroughs Corporation back to Missouri state court, arguing that the defendant's removal to federal court was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because it occurred more than six months after service of process, well beyond the required thirty-day period. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the motion to remand. The court reasoned that the statutory time limit for removal is not jurisdictional but procedural, and that the plaintiffs had waived any objection to the late removal—as alleged in the verified removal petition—and were estopped from raising it due to their extensive participation in federal proceedings, including filing discovery requests, entering confidentiality agreements, noticing depositions, and proceeding through an aborted jury trial and amended pleadings. The court further noted that Section 1447(c) requires remand only for cases removed without jurisdiction, which did not apply here.

procedure

The case involved plaintiffs suing Burroughs Corporation for fraud based on alleged misrepresentations about the capabilities and performance of a B-80 computer system purchased in 1977 to handle business operations including inventory control. After a mistrial and prior rulings dismissing related warranty and negligent misrepresentation claims, the defendant moved to dismiss the amended fraud complaint. The court granted the motion with prejudice, holding that the complaint failed to plead the circumstances of the fraud with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) and that the five-year statute of limitations barred the claim because the plaintiffs, as sophisticated business operators, knew or should have known of the system's inadequacies well before the limitations period expired. The court noted that attempts to amend and evidence presented at trial did not cure these deficiencies.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a negligence claim by Roselyn Robbins and her husband Jeffrey against the United States after Major Marvin Loper, an Air Force officer on temporary duty, collided with parked vehicles on Interstate 70 during a rainstorm, injuring Roselyn. The court found that Loper was acting within the scope of his employment and that his excessive speed and failure to keep a careful lookout constituted negligence under Missouri law, which requires the highest degree of care for drivers. As a result, the court awarded Roselyn Robbins $1,750,000 in damages for her injuries and Jeffrey Robbins $250,000 for loss of consortium.

torts & liabilityfederal power

Homer Massey filed for judicial review of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' decision terminating his Social Security disability insurance benefits, which had been awarded based on his emphysema, asthma, and bronchitis. The district court considered cross-motions for summary judgment and upheld the administrative determination that Massey's condition had improved sufficiently by October 1981 to allow him to perform sedentary work in a clean environment. The court applied the substantial evidence standard of review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), finding that medical reports, including pulmonary function tests, and vocational expert testimony supported the ALJ's credibility assessments and conclusion that the claimant could engage in substantial gainful activity. Conflicts between treating physicians' opinions regarding the extent of disability were resolved by the Secretary, and the final decision was affirmed.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

This case concerned a company's motion to vacate an arbitrator's award requiring payment of 1983 vacation benefits to roughly 350 employees terminated after the permanent closure of its Plymouth Avenue plant. The collective bargaining agreement conditioned vacation eligibility on active payroll status for at least 120 days before July 22 of the relevant year and presence on the payroll at the start of the vacation period. After the union grieved the company's refusal to pay, the arbitrator sustained the claim, but the court held that the award failed to draw its essence from the contract because the terminated employees did not satisfy the explicit eligibility criteria. The district court therefore granted the company's summary judgment motion and vacated the award.

labor & employment

The United States, through the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), sued Missouri Farmers Associates (MFA) to recover $32,014.90 for crops MFA purchased from borrower Edward Stoops that were subject to an FmHA security interest. The court held MFA liable for the full amount on the conversion claim and found in favor of Stoops on MFA's third-party indemnification claim. The court reasoned that the standardized FmHA security agreement satisfied Uniform Commercial Code requirements for an enforceable interest in the crops despite lacking an explicit granting clause, and that prior "after-the-fact" approvals of other sales did not waive the government's lien as to MFA's purchases. MFA presented no evidence supporting its claim against Stoops.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case arose from a 1979 product liability explosion in Missouri that killed two people and caused extensive damage, leading American Hydrotherm to settle claims for over $766,000 with payments from its insurers. Great Atlantic, as excess insurer, sued Liberty Mutual seeking reimbursement for the $266,475 it paid, arguing that Liberty Mutual's two $500,000 primary policies together provided $1,000,000 in coverage. The court granted Liberty Mutual's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, reforming one policy (the LG policy) to limit its coverage to Canadian operations only due to a mutual mistake in failing to attach an endorsement excluding U.S. operations. The core reasoning rested on evidence of the parties' intent, including vastly different premiums charged for the two policies, the history of the policies as renewals, and Great Atlantic's own excess policy which referenced only $500,000 in primary coverage.

business & regulatory

In Green v. City of Moberly, a former candidate for city council sued the city, mayor, and council members under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging that a policy barring candidates and supporters from speaking at council meetings violated her rights to free speech and to petition the government. The plaintiff had been prevented from orally urging the council at a December 1982 meeting to fire the city manager and was directed to submit her views in writing instead. The court treated the defendants' motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment and granted it, holding that the plaintiff was not deprived of her right to petition because her written letter was received and considered, and that she had no constitutional right to orally address the council during its sessions on matters not on the agenda. The court reasoned that council meetings are not forums for political debate or unrestricted speech, that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions apply, and that the policy did not prevent expression outside the meetings themselves.

free speechcivil rights