The case involved a dispute between American States Insurance and its insured, Crawley Construction, over whether the insurer had a duty to defend or indemnify the company in a state-court action. The underlying claims against Crawley sought monetary damages for lost profits allegedly caused by inadequate construction of a fuel-tank farm. The court held that the policy provided no coverage because the claims involved neither bodily injury nor property damage as defined in the policy (physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property), but instead only economic losses. Because there was no duty to defend or indemnify, the court granted summary judgment to American States and awarded it reimbursement of $90,032.41 for defense costs and indemnity payments made, finding that the insurer had properly reserved its rights in a letter to the insured.
This case involved longshoreman Joseph Celestine suing shipowner Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. for injuries from tripping over a spare coil of wire on the winch deck of the LOUISE LYKES while loading cargo in Oakland. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that Section 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act limits shipowner liability to negligence, and under the Scindia turnover duty the vessel need only turn over the ship in a condition allowing an expert stevedore to work safely with reasonable care; an open and obvious coil that the stevedore could easily have inspected, reported, or corrected did not breach that duty, and no contract or custom expanded the shipowner's obligations. The court noted the stevedore's primary responsibility for on-site hazards and the availability of an alternate ladder.
This case concerned the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a permit allowing the Port of Oakland to fill 180 acres of wetlands adjacent to Oakland Airport for expansion of air cargo and related facilities, with proposed mitigation on other properties. California, through its Attorney General, challenged the permit on grounds that the Corps failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by preparing inadequate Environmental Assessments. The court held that the Corps violated NEPA because its assessments did not sufficiently evaluate impacts on wetlands, wildlife, water quality, noise, cumulative effects, and the mitigation plan, and it could not determine whether those impacts were significant without further analysis. The court vacated the permit, remanded the matter to the Corps for additional review that could include a full Environmental Impact Statement if warranted, and maintained an injunction against further filling to prevent irreparable environmental harm.
This case involves third-party claims by defendant banks against Spectra-Physics officers and directors for contribution and indemnity arising from prior settlements in state and federal actions related to foreign-exchange transactions. The court addressed motions for reconsideration of an order denying a good-faith settlement determination under Cal. C.C.P. § 877.6 and for modification of a discovery referral order. It ruled that the action is governed by California law rather than federal common law, that § 877.6 applies to the prior settlements, but denied the good-faith determination as premature pending limited discovery by the banks; it also granted the requested expansion of the magistrate's discovery authority. The core reasoning was that Congress has not authorized federal common law in this area and the statute permits evaluation of the settlement's good faith even though made before the banks became parties.
This case arose from an involuntary bankruptcy petition filed against George and Alexandra Benny in 1982, after which the debtors moved to dismiss and challenged the authority of Bankruptcy Judge Lloyd King under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. The debtors argued that the terms of all sitting bankruptcy judges had expired on June 27, 1984, that successors could only be appointed pursuant to the Article II Appointments Clause, and that Congress could not retroactively extend those terms. The court rejected these claims, holding that the 1984 Act validly extended the judges' terms and that Judge King had authority to preside. Its reasoning rested on the history of bankruptcy legislation, including prior holdover provisions and transition periods, the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline, and the permissibility of limited retroactive measures to ensure an orderly transition without disrupting ongoing cases.
This case arose from a 1981 plane crash of an Aeronaves de Mexico domestic flight in Chihuahua, Mexico, killing three California residents. The court granted motions to bar jury trial under federal statute and dismissed various defendants, leaving only Aeronaves de Mexico. On motions for partial summary judgment, the court ruled that California law governs compensatory damages with no cap because California's interest in full compensation for its residents' deaths outweighs Mexico's interest in protecting its airline industry, and the Warsaw Convention's liability limits do not apply because the flight was not part of a single international itinerary. However, the court applied Mexican law to bar punitive damages, finding Mexico has the stronger interest in regulating conduct and punishing its own citizens within its borders.