Robert Howard Schnacke

The case involved a dispute between American States Insurance and its insured, Crawley Construction, over whether the insurer had a duty to defend or indemnify the company in a state-court action. The underlying claims against Crawley sought monetary damages for lost profits allegedly caused by inadequate construction of a fuel-tank farm. The court held that the policy provided no coverage because the claims involved neither bodily injury nor property damage as defined in the policy (physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property), but instead only economic losses. Because there was no duty to defend or indemnify, the court granted summary judgment to American States and awarded it reimbursement of $90,032.41 for defense costs and indemnity payments made, finding that the insurer had properly reserved its rights in a letter to the insured.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case involved longshoreman Joseph Celestine suing shipowner Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. for injuries from tripping over a spare coil of wire on the winch deck of the LOUISE LYKES while loading cargo in Oakland. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that Section 5(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act limits shipowner liability to negligence, and under the Scindia turnover duty the vessel need only turn over the ship in a condition allowing an expert stevedore to work safely with reasonable care; an open and obvious coil that the stevedore could easily have inspected, reported, or corrected did not breach that duty, and no contract or custom expanded the shipowner's obligations. The court noted the stevedore's primary responsibility for on-site hazards and the availability of an alternate ladder.

torts & liabilityprocedurelabor & employment

This case concerned the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a permit allowing the Port of Oakland to fill 180 acres of wetlands adjacent to Oakland Airport for expansion of air cargo and related facilities, with proposed mitigation on other properties. California, through its Attorney General, challenged the permit on grounds that the Corps failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by preparing inadequate Environmental Assessments. The court held that the Corps violated NEPA because its assessments did not sufficiently evaluate impacts on wetlands, wildlife, water quality, noise, cumulative effects, and the mitigation plan, and it could not determine whether those impacts were significant without further analysis. The court vacated the permit, remanded the matter to the Corps for additional review that could include a full Environmental Impact Statement if warranted, and maintained an injunction against further filling to prevent irreparable environmental harm.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

This case involves third-party claims by defendant banks against Spectra-Physics officers and directors for contribution and indemnity arising from prior settlements in state and federal actions related to foreign-exchange transactions. The court addressed motions for reconsideration of an order denying a good-faith settlement determination under Cal. C.C.P. § 877.6 and for modification of a discovery referral order. It ruled that the action is governed by California law rather than federal common law, that § 877.6 applies to the prior settlements, but denied the good-faith determination as premature pending limited discovery by the banks; it also granted the requested expansion of the magistrate's discovery authority. The core reasoning was that Congress has not authorized federal common law in this area and the statute permits evaluation of the settlement's good faith even though made before the banks became parties.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case arose from an involuntary bankruptcy petition filed against George and Alexandra Benny in 1982, after which the debtors moved to dismiss and challenged the authority of Bankruptcy Judge Lloyd King under the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. The debtors argued that the terms of all sitting bankruptcy judges had expired on June 27, 1984, that successors could only be appointed pursuant to the Article II Appointments Clause, and that Congress could not retroactively extend those terms. The court rejected these claims, holding that the 1984 Act validly extended the judges' terms and that Judge King had authority to preside. Its reasoning rested on the history of bankruptcy legislation, including prior holdover provisions and transition periods, the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline, and the permissibility of limited retroactive measures to ensure an orderly transition without disrupting ongoing cases.

federal powerprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a 1981 plane crash of an Aeronaves de Mexico domestic flight in Chihuahua, Mexico, killing three California residents. The court granted motions to bar jury trial under federal statute and dismissed various defendants, leaving only Aeronaves de Mexico. On motions for partial summary judgment, the court ruled that California law governs compensatory damages with no cap because California's interest in full compensation for its residents' deaths outweighs Mexico's interest in protecting its airline industry, and the Warsaw Convention's liability limits do not apply because the flight was not part of a single international itinerary. However, the court applied Mexican law to bar punitive damages, finding Mexico has the stronger interest in regulating conduct and punishing its own citizens within its borders.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Iranian nationals who had been admitted to the U.S. as nonimmigrant students, treaty investors, or visitors and who applied for extensions of stay or adjustment to permanent resident status; their applications were denied by the INS District Director under amended regulations during the 1979-1980 Iran hostage crisis. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, claiming abuse of discretion in the timing and basis of the denials, lack of authority for the regulations, and denial of equal protection by their continued application after the crisis. The court treated the motions as cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled for the defendant, finding no material facts in dispute. It held that the INS had statutory discretion to consider foreign relations and policy in immigration decisions, that the regulations were validly promulgated under the Attorney General's authority, and that the selective enforcement against Iranian nationals was neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional given the President's directives.

immigrationfederal powercivil rights

This case involves Transamerica Computer Company alleging that IBM violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by monopolizing or attempting to monopolize trade in peripheral electronic data processing devices compatible with IBM central processing units. The dispute centers on IBM's introduction of its System/370 computers and related peripherals in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which allegedly harmed competitors offering cheaper plug-compatible tape drives, disk drives, and printers. The district court outlined the evolution of computer technology from hard-wired to stored-program systems and examined the competitive dynamics in the peripherals market. It applied antitrust standards requiring plaintiffs to prove damages with reasonable accuracy rather than speculation, scrutinizing assumptions about equipment rental lives and the impact of new IBM products on existing lines.

business & regulatory

This case involves a motion by the plaintiff to remand a diversity jurisdiction lawsuit back to San Mateo County Superior Court after the defendant, a Saudi Arabian citizen, attempted to remove it to federal court. The court denied the motion to remand. The reasoning centered on the timing of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), where the presence of unnamed Doe defendants created ambiguity; the defendant was permitted to wait until those defendants were dismissed before removing, as the plaintiff had created the uncertainty. Additionally, filing a counterclaim in state court did not waive the right to remove because it occurred before the case was clearly removable.

procedure

This case was a class action lawsuit by black and female employees against Owens-Illinois alleging racial and sex discrimination in hiring, pay, promotions, assignments, and terminations at its Oakland, California plant. The court found no discrimination against black employees, determining that hiring, pay, promotions, and job placements followed collective bargaining agreements, job qualifications, and workforce needs without regard to race, as supported by statistics showing black hiring rates equal to or exceeding local civilian workforce percentages and by the absence of any discriminatory policy or pattern. For the class of female employees, the court directed further submissions on appropriate relief, including back pay for plaintiff Alice Brice. The core reasoning was based on workforce data, adherence to union contracts, regression analyses that did not indicate bias, and evidence that employment decisions were merit- and vacancy-based.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involves antitrust claims by Transamerica Computer Company against IBM, alleging monopolization and attempted monopolization of markets for general-purpose computer systems and plug-compatible tape and disk drives under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, based on various IBM design, pricing, and competitive practices. The court denied IBM's motion to strike the jury demand, ruling that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial even in complex cases. It also denied motions for summary judgment on the antitrust claims, relevant market definitions, and damages issues, as well as motions to strike specific allegations, because prior rulings in other cases were not binding on this plaintiff, the issues presented factual questions requiring trial, and the evidence was relevant to showing IBM's intent and impact on competition. The court further denied certification of an appeal, finding it would not advance the litigation's resolution.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved several plaintiffs who had illegally entered the United States and sought a court declaration to prevent their deportation, arguing that it would harm their U.S.-born citizen children and violate various constitutional and legal principles. The court dismissed all complaints, finding that they failed to state valid claims for relief. The reasoning included prior Ninth Circuit precedents rejecting the "de facto deportation" of citizen children as a basis to halt parental deportation, the inapplicability of the Eighth Amendment to civil deportation proceedings, the clear statutory intent to deport illegal aliens despite family separation concerns, the lack of current deportation orders implicating due process, and the fact that proposed legislation does not alter existing law.

immigrationcivil rights

In this case, a seaman aboard a vessel owned by Maritime Overseas Corp. and chartered to the United States fell ill in Japan and was examined at a U.S. Naval Dispensary, where doctors identified a possible chronic condition but issued a 'fit for light duty' report after the seaman refused further tests and threatened not to deliver an unfit report; he later collapsed and died at sea from undiagnosed lung and heart disease. Maritime settled a wrongful death suit brought by the seaman's widow for $85,000 and sued the United States for indemnification, alleging the Navy doctors' negligent examination and inaccurate fitness report caused the liability. The court held that the United States must reimburse Maritime for the settlement plus fees and expenses, reasoning that the contract for medical services was a maritime contract imposing a duty of non-negligent performance, that evidence supported a finding of negligence by government agents that exposed Maritime to liability under principles from Hopson v. Texaco, and that Maritime's tender of defense and settlement were reasonable.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved plaintiff Hallinan suing former Attorney General Mitchell for damages due to warrantless wiretapping of conversations in 1969-1970, based on claims under federal wiretap statutes and constitutional amendments. The court granted summary judgment to Mitchell after previously denying a motion to dismiss. It reasoned that the Supreme Court's 1972 ruling requiring warrants for domestic national-security wiretaps should not apply retroactively to the earlier period, that the statutes did not cover such surveillances, and that Mitchell's actions met the standard of reasonableness and good faith given the circumstances and lack of settled contrary law at the time.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Arastra Limited Partnership and the City of Palo Alto. Upon stipulation by the parties and a finding of good cause, the court ordered the withdrawal of all pleadings and the vacating, setting aside, and expunging of its prior decision filed on September 15, 1975. The order requires publication in the Federal Supplement but does not take effect until the parties file a signed dismissal with prejudice.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a claim by Arastra Limited Partnership against the City of Palo Alto for inverse condemnation of its 515-acre undeveloped property in the foothills area. The plaintiff alleged that the city's open space zoning ordinances, following years of approved development plans and studies, effectively confiscated the land without compensation. The court determined that the ordinances appropriated valuable property rights equivalent to a scenic or open space easement, constituting a taking under inverse condemnation law. It ordered the city to pay the fair market value of the fee title as of the ordinance's effective date in exchange for conveyance of full title, reasoning that this provided equitable relief while addressing the direct invasion of the owner's rights, with any remaining factual issues like allowable density left for jury determination.

propertyenvironment

This case involved Montgomery Ward seeking to recover taxes paid on inventory of imported goods stored in its Oakland warehouse. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, holding that the goods remained immune from state and local taxation as imports under the U.S. Constitution. The reasoning was that the original packaging consisted of the sturdy cartons and bales, not the shipping containers, and the goods had not been sold, removed from packaging, or put to their intended use while in the warehouse, with many items even being shipped to out-of-state locations under the importer's control.

taxesfederal power

In United States v. Christman, a department store security chief was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) with unlawfully intercepting wire communications after installing an extension telephone to monitor and record calls made by employees on the store's private internal phone system in response to reports of prostitution, drugs, theft, and misuse of phones. At the close of the government's case, the district court granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal and discharged him. The court reasoned that the federal wiretap statute does not apply to private intercommunication systems that do not use common carrier facilities, that an extension telephone is not an intercepting device under the statute's definitions, that the interceptions occurred in the normal course of employment to protect the employer's property and service, and that employees misusing the private system lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy from interception.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the United States seeking penalties from the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway for allegedly violating the federal Hours of Service Act by having employees work over the allowed hours on a round trip between Richmond and Riverbank, California. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding no violation. The core reasoning was that the five-hour layover at Stockton qualified as an interrupting period at a "designated terminal" under the Act, as Stockton was a recognized terminal with suitable facilities, thus keeping the total continuous service under the limit.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case is a defamation lawsuit brought by the Church of Scientology of California and an individual against the publisher and author of the book Scientology: The Now-Religion, which describes Scientology as a pseudoreligion created for commercial gain. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the publication was protected by the First Amendment privilege from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and later cases for statements on matters of public interest. The court denied the motion, ruling that the privilege extends to books but that triable issues of fact remained as to whether the defendants acted with actual malice, including the adequacy of their pre-publication investigation and their decision to issue a paperback edition after receiving claims that the statements were false.

free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure