The case involved a U.S. Army enlisted member petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain discharge based on the denial of conscientious objector status. The petitioner argued that the Army violated its own regulations on processing timelines, denied her procedural due process, and lacked any basis in fact for rejecting her application. After reviewing the full administrative record—including interviews by a chaplain and psychiatrist, an investigating officer's hearing, recommendations from the chain of command, and the final decision by the Army Conscientious Objector Review Board—the court found that the petitioner had not demonstrated sincerity or met the required criteria of opposition to war based on religious belief. The court concluded there was a basis in fact, and even substantial evidence, supporting the Army's denial. The petition was therefore denied.
This case involves a surety bond for a school construction contract in Maryland, with the plaintiff Board of Education suing the defendant surety in state court. The defendant removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds, but the plaintiff petitioned for remand, arguing that the removal petition did not sufficiently allege the parties' citizenship. The court denied the remand petition after allowing the defendant to amend its removal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 to cure the jurisdictional allegations, finding that the original pleadings incorporated by reference established the necessary diversity between the Maryland plaintiff and the out-of-state defendant.
This case was a diversity action in which J. Aron & Company sued Service Transportation for damage to a large shipment of coffee destroyed by fire while stored at the defendant's Baltimore terminal, alleging breach of duty as warehouseman and bailee; the defendant counterclaimed for storage charges and impleaded its insurer. The court found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case by proving delivery of the goods in good condition, a bailment for hire, and failure to return the property undamaged. Under Maryland bailment law, the burden then shifted to the defendant to present evidence of due care or a legally sufficient excuse for the loss, such as security measures against theft and the unknown origin of the fire, though the court observed that the defendant's evidence was likely insufficient to meet this burden.
This case was a class action lawsuit brought by an inmate on behalf of all those held in Maryland state prisons, challenging Division of Correction regulations that require inmates to turn over personal funds for deposit into non-interest-bearing reserve accounts managed by the institution until release. After dismissing the plaintiff's separate claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining constitutional and fiduciary claims regarding the handling of inmate money. The core reasoning centered on whether the state's practice of holding funds without interest or allowing outside accounts amounted to a deprivation of property without due process, a taking without compensation, or an equal protection violation, drawing on affidavits, admissions, and precedents involving similar prison account policies.
The case involved a contract dispute over the importation and distribution of MZ motorcycles manufactured in East Germany, where the plaintiff distributor claimed that 988 units lacked required certificates of compliance with federal motor vehicle safety standards under 15 U.S.C. § 1397, rendering them unsellable. The plaintiff sued the importer, its president, and the customs broker under various contract and tort theories seeking damages, while the defendants raised counterclaims. After a bench trial, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the warranty in the distributorship agreement, the importer's compliance efforts, the broker's role in customs filings, and liability under the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
business & regulatoryfederal powertorts & liability
This case involved a dispute over the termination of a gasoline station franchise and lease after the death of the franchisee, Elgie D. Lanham. His personal representative sued Amoco Oil Company under the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act seeking to continue the franchise relationship, while Amoco sought to end it and regain possession of the premises. The court granted summary judgment to Amoco, holding that the franchise and lease agreements expressly terminated upon the franchisee's death and thus did not pass to the estate under Maryland law. The court further reasoned that the PMPA permits termination upon the franchisee's death because it qualifies as an event making termination reasonable under the statute's provisions for relevant events, including severe disability.
