
Cywinski v. Binney
District Court, D. Maryland · 1980-03-11 · cited 1×
The case involved a U.S. Army enlisted member petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain discharge based on the denial of conscientious objector status. The petitioner argued that the Army violated its own regulations on processing timelines, denied her procedural due process, and lacked any basis in fact for rejecting her application. After reviewing the full administrative record—including interviews by a chaplain and psychiatrist, an investigating officer's hearing, recommendations from the chain of command, and the final decision by the Army Conscientious Objector Review Board—the court found that the petitioner had not demonstrated sincerity or met the required criteria of opposition to war based on religious belief. The court concluded there was a basis in fact, and even substantial evidence, supporting the Army's denial. The petition was therefore denied.
criminal lawprocedurereligious liberty
Board of Education v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1980-03-05 · cited 3×
This case involves a surety bond for a school construction contract in Maryland, with the plaintiff Board of Education suing the defendant surety in state court. The defendant removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds, but the plaintiff petitioned for remand, arguing that the removal petition did not sufficiently allege the parties' citizenship. The court denied the remand petition after allowing the defendant to amend its removal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 to cure the jurisdictional allegations, finding that the original pleadings incorporated by reference established the necessary diversity between the Maryland plaintiff and the out-of-state defendant.
procedure
J. Aron & Co. v. Service Transportation Co.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1980-02-04 · cited 9×
This case was a diversity action in which J. Aron & Company sued Service Transportation for damage to a large shipment of coffee destroyed by fire while stored at the defendant's Baltimore terminal, alleging breach of duty as warehouseman and bailee; the defendant counterclaimed for storage charges and impleaded its insurer. The court found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case by proving delivery of the goods in good condition, a bailment for hire, and failure to return the property undamaged. Under Maryland bailment law, the burden then shifted to the defendant to present evidence of due care or a legally sufficient excuse for the loss, such as security measures against theft and the unknown origin of the fire, though the court observed that the defendant's evidence was likely insufficient to meet this burden.
business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability
Gray v. Lee
District Court, D. Maryland · 1980-01-28 · cited 7×
This case was a class action lawsuit brought by an inmate on behalf of all those held in Maryland state prisons, challenging Division of Correction regulations that require inmates to turn over personal funds for deposit into non-interest-bearing reserve accounts managed by the institution until release. After dismissing the plaintiff's separate claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining constitutional and fiduciary claims regarding the handling of inmate money. The core reasoning centered on whether the state's practice of holding funds without interest or allowing outside accounts amounted to a deprivation of property without due process, a taking without compensation, or an equal protection violation, drawing on affidavits, admissions, and precedents involving similar prison account policies.
criminal lawcivil rights
Geo. Byers Sons, Inc. v. East Europe Import Export, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1980-01-04 · cited 15×
The case involved a contract dispute over the importation and distribution of MZ motorcycles manufactured in East Germany, where the plaintiff distributor claimed that 988 units lacked required certificates of compliance with federal motor vehicle safety standards under 15 U.S.C. § 1397, rendering them unsellable. The plaintiff sued the importer, its president, and the customs broker under various contract and tort theories seeking damages, while the defendants raised counterclaims. After a bench trial, the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing the warranty in the distributorship agreement, the importer's compliance efforts, the broker's role in customs filings, and liability under the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
business & regulatoryfederal powertorts & liability
Lanham v. Amoco Oil Co.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-11-26 · cited 11×
This case involved a dispute over the termination of a gasoline station franchise and lease after the death of the franchisee, Elgie D. Lanham. His personal representative sued Amoco Oil Company under the federal Petroleum Marketing Practices Act seeking to continue the franchise relationship, while Amoco sought to end it and regain possession of the premises. The court granted summary judgment to Amoco, holding that the franchise and lease agreements expressly terminated upon the franchisee's death and thus did not pass to the estate under Maryland law. The court further reasoned that the PMPA permits termination upon the franchisee's death because it qualifies as an event making termination reasonable under the statute's provisions for relevant events, including severe disability.
business & regulatoryfederal powerproperty
Whalen v. Ford Motor Credit Co.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-08-15
This case involves a breach of contract dispute arising from a loan commitment by Ford Motor Credit Company to finance the construction of a condominium project in Towson, Maryland, where the plaintiffs (the project owners and general contractor) claimed Ford Credit wrongfully refused to fund after the building was allegedly completed. Ford Credit moved for summary judgment on grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing due to an assignment of the commitment to the construction lender Equibank and that the condition precedent of full completion had not been met. The court denied Ford Credit's motion, holding that the plaintiffs retained standing because the assignment was for security purposes and construing the related financing documents together, and that substantial completion (rather than 100% completion) sufficed under the commitment terms absent explicit language requiring otherwise. It also denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on liability, finding disputed factual issues regarding the building's completion and related certificates that required trial resolution.
business & regulatoryprocedure
In Re Swearingen Aviation Corp.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-07-30 · cited 15×
This case involved a motion by Fairchild Industries, Inc. and its subsidiary Swearingen Aviation Corporation to vacate sealed ex parte orders that imposed secrecy obligations on financial institutions subpoenaed as witnesses before a grand jury in Maryland. The movants argued that the orders violated Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that no obligation of secrecy may be imposed on witnesses except as provided in the rule. The court denied the motion, concluding that it retained supervisory power over the grand jury and could issue the orders under the All Writs Act when necessary to protect the grand jury's investigative functions and the integrity of the judicial process, based on facts presented in a sealed affidavit. The orders were limited in scope and duration, prohibiting disclosure only of the subpoenas' service, the documents sought, and compliance details, while allowing other contact with witnesses.
criminal lawprocedure
Butta v. Anne Arundel County
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-06-06 · cited 6×
In Butta v. Anne Arundel County, a white plaintiff sued the county under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming he was denied a qualified position as executive secretary of the county's Human Relations Commission because of his race when the county executive instead selected a black candidate whom the commission had ranked second. The district court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for Title VII claims, found that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of discrimination and that the defendant had failed to articulate any legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring decision, and concluded that racial discrimination had occurred. The court awarded the plaintiff back pay of $8,467.90 for the period of lost earnings through 1976, plus attorneys' fees, while denying back pay beyond that date because the plaintiff's subsequent earnings exceeded the position's salary. The ruling rested on the absence of any evidence that race was a bona fide job qualification and on the county executive's unexplained rejection of the commission's preferred candidate.
civil rightslabor & employment
Steinberg v. Elkins
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-04-30 · cited 5×
Plaintiffs Steinberg and Weigant, former English professors at the University of Maryland, sued alleging denial of procedural due process after their employment was terminated without hearings. They claimed a protected property interest based on tenure allegedly acquired through department practices that followed AAUP guidelines by crediting prior full-time teaching experience elsewhere, leading to renewal of their three-year contracts. The university maintained that the employment contracts explicitly provided no tenure after the initial terms and that any expectation of continued employment was not legitimate under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court considered the defendant's motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for summary judgment on the absence of a property interest, alongside the plaintiffs' motion to compel document production. It granted the motion to compel while addressing the underlying contract and due process issues.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Ames-Ennis, Inc. v. Midlothian Ltd. Partnership
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-04-23 · cited 14×
This case involves a building contractor, Ames-Ennis, suing the owner-developer Midlothian and the Secretary of HUD for unpaid construction funds and retainage related to a federally insured low-income housing project under Section 236. The court dismissed the claims against HUD for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the tort claim in Count I failed to comply with the Federal Tort Claims Act's administrative exhaustion requirement and that the contract claim in Count II exceeding $10,000 falls exclusively under the Court of Claims' jurisdiction. The court further held that 12 U.S.C. § 1702's "sue and be sued" provision does not confer independent federal jurisdiction but merely waives sovereign immunity. Consequently, the pendent state claims against Midlothian were also dismissed as there was no basis for federal jurisdiction over the federal defendant.
federal powerprocedure
Bonomo v. National Duckpin Bowling Congress, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-03-23 · cited 10×
In this case, a woman sued the National Duckpin Bowling Congress (NDBC), a nonprofit that regulates duckpin bowling tournaments, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming sex discrimination after it declined to appoint her as a tournament director. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing it had only five employees and thus was not an "employer" subject to Title VII. The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiff failed to show the NDBC qualified as an employer by aggregating employees with tournament sponsors under joint employer or integrated enterprise theories, and that the NDBC did not function as an "employment agency" under the statute. The decision rested on the jurisdictional requirement of fifteen or more employees and the plaintiff's inability to meet her burden of proof on the facts presented.
civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure
Beck v. COMMUNICATIONS WKRS. OF AMERICA (CWA)
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-03-16 · cited 17×
This case involves twenty individuals who pay agency fees to the Communications Workers of America and its Maryland locals, alleging that the union collected amounts exceeding those allocable to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The court held that the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the fees because filing suit sufficiently notified the union of their objections, consistent with Supreme Court precedents like Street and Allen, and that exhaustion of internal union rebate procedures was not required. It denied the union's motions to dismiss for lack of standing, for reconsideration, and for certification of an interlocutory appeal. The court entered a declaratory judgment finding that the collections violated the plaintiffs' rights and ordering refunds of excess amounts since 1976, along with procedures for determining the proper allocation if the parties could not agree.
labor & employmentfree speechcivil rights
Shacter v. Shacter
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-03-16 · cited 17×
This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order finding that debts owed by Bernard Shacter to his former wife Francine under a 1961 separation agreement were nondischargeable. The parties divorced in 1964, and after Bernard's 1977 bankruptcy filing, Francine sought a determination that the unpaid support obligations—reduced to two state court judgments—were excepted from discharge under § 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act. The district court affirmed, holding that the monthly payments were in the nature of maintenance and support for the wife, as shown by the agreement's language, their periodic character, and surrounding circumstances, even though they did not qualify as technical alimony under Maryland law. The court reasoned that dischargeability turns on the substance of the obligation rather than state-law labels or the presence of other property-settlement provisions.
family law
Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Service Transportation Co.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-03-13 · cited 6×
This case was a declaratory judgment action by Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company against its insured, Service Transportation Co., a trucking company, to determine whether the insurer had to cover damage to a shipment of Nicaraguan coffee that burned at the company’s Baltimore terminal. The parties stipulated the facts, including that the coffee was held under FDA order after inspection while in bond and had not yet reached its consignee. Applying New Jersey law, the court granted summary judgment to the insurer, holding that the policy’s coverage for goods “in the ordinary course of transit” did not apply because the shipment had reached its destination at the terminal. The court relied on precedent defining transit as movement toward a destination and rejected arguments that the FDA detention constituted a temporary stop still within coverage, finding the policy language unambiguous.
business & regulatory
Beck v. Communications Workers of America
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-01-12 · cited 6×
In Beck v. Communications Workers of America, non-union employees subject to an agency shop arrangement under collective bargaining agreements sued the union, alleging that their required fees were being used for political lobbying and campaigns they opposed, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The union had adopted an internal rebate procedure for objecting fee payors and moved to dismiss or stay the litigation pending exhaustion of that remedy. The court declined to require exhaustion as a prerequisite to suit, reasoning that Supreme Court precedents like Allen and Abood permit judicial consideration where the union's internal process lacks independent review and that plaintiffs may proceed directly to litigate the adequacy of the procedure and the fee allocations. The decision allowed the case to move forward without mandating use of the union's Administrative Committee and appeals process.
labor & employmentfree speechcivil rights
Geo. Byers Sons, Inc. v. East Europe Import Export, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1979-01-05 · cited 15×
The case involved plaintiff Geo. Byers Sons, Inc., a motorcycle purchaser, suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and four customs officials under state negligence law for allowing imported motorcycles lacking required federal safety compliance certificates to enter U.S. commerce, allegedly causing the plaintiff commercial losses. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motions, holding that the FTCA imposes liability on the United States only where a private individual would be liable under equivalent state law circumstances, and no such comparable common-law duty was shown here. The claims against the officials similarly failed because the alleged duties derived solely from federal statutes and regulations under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, without a corresponding state common-law duty, and the plaintiff was outside the class of persons the statute was intended to protect.
business & regulatoryfederal powertorts & liability
Sharp v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
District Court, D. Maryland · 1978-12-26 · cited 3×
Plaintiff James Sharp, injured while working in Maryland, received permanent partial disability benefits from the Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Commission but sought additional sums from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company under an excess compensation policy issued to his employer. The policy was required by a collective bargaining agreement to provide benefits at the same rate as the District of Columbia’s Workmen’s Compensation Act for injuries outside D.C. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability and denied the defendant’s cross-motion, holding that the Maryland Commission’s finding of industrial loss was equivalent to a loss of wage-earning capacity under the D.C. Act. This conclusion followed from the statutory language, prior precedent in Cox v. American Store Corp., and the parties’ intent to incorporate the D.C. rate structure to supplement lower state awards.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory
Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1978-12-22 · cited 21×
This case involved twelve plaintiffs who alleged securities fraud, including misrepresentations and excessive trading in their accounts, along with related common law claims against investment adviser Edith Alter, her husband David Alter, Merrill Lynch, and broker James Goff. The plaintiffs asserted violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities Act of 1933, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and various exchange rules, as well as claims for control person liability, breach of fiduciary duty, and common law fraud. The court denied David Alter's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact on aider and abettor or conspiracy liability. It granted Merrill Lynch and Goff's motions for summary judgment on claims based on section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, NASD rules, NYSE rules, CBOE rules, and section 15(a) of the 1934 Act, but denied their motions on the remaining securities fraud and common law claims. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Lenox v. S. A. Healy Co.
District Court, D. Maryland · 1978-11-16 · cited 4×
In Lenox v. S. A. Healy Co., plaintiff Johnny Lenox sued his employer in Maryland state court to recover supplemental disability benefits under a collective bargaining agreement, seeking the difference between Maryland workers' compensation payments and higher District of Columbia rates for a past period of temporary total disability, plus an order for any future benefits that might become due. The defendant removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, arguing that the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000 when future payments were included. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that the amount in controversy was limited to the $5,799.11 in accrued benefits because the plaintiff's right to any future payments was conditional on ongoing determinations of his disability by the Maryland Workmen's Compensation Commission and thus could not be aggregated for jurisdictional purposes under precedents like Beaman v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
procedurelabor & employment