In Shenker v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc., plaintiff Joel Shenker sued his former employer for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and related common law tort and contract claims after his termination in a company-wide reduction in force at age 48. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all counts. The court reasoned that Shenker failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or rebut the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination, that the release of claims was enforceable, and that the common law claims lacked evidence of detrimental reliance or were barred by workers' compensation statutes.
This case involved investors Lindner Dividend Fund and Whitehill Capital suing auditor Ernst & Young for alleged violations of Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, along with state-law claims of gross negligence and violations of the Missouri Uniform Securities Act, based on the plaintiffs' purchases of securities in reliance on misleading 1988 financial reports for the Bank of New England Corporation. The defendant moved to dismiss on grounds including failure to plead fraud with particularity under Rule 9(b), lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and statutes of limitations. The court dismissed the federal Section 18(a) claim with prejudice, reasoning that the amended complaint did not sufficiently particularize the alleged fraud despite prior notice and opportunity to amend, and it dismissed the state claims without prejudice after finding no diversity jurisdiction due to the defendant's partners being citizens of multiple states including those of the plaintiffs, and declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction once the sole federal claim was eliminated early in the case.
The case involved trustees of an ERISA-governed employee benefit fund suing a delinquent subcontractor and the surety on a state-mandated construction bond to recover unpaid employer contributions for work on a Massport project. The court held that ERISA preempts the Massachusetts statute (Mass. Gen. L. c. 149, § 29) that creates a cause of action against the surety bond for such contributions. The reasoning was that the state law both relates to ERISA plans by singling them out for special treatment and provides an additional enforcement mechanism that conflicts with ERISA’s exclusive civil remedies; it also does not qualify for the ERISA saving clause as a law regulating insurance.
This case involved a dispute over whether a Massachusetts law requiring continued health insurance coverage for a divorced spouse without additional premiums applied to a self-funded employee medical benefits plan governed by ERISA. The court addressed cross motions for summary judgment after the case was removed from state court. It decided that the state law is preempted by ERISA as applied to self-funded plans. The core reasoning was that while the state law regulates insurance and would generally be saved from preemption, the ERISA deemer clause prevents self-funded plans from being treated as insurance companies subject to state regulation.
This case involves a plaintiff suing under the federal RICO statute and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) based on allegations of repeated job-related sexual harassment by a defendant who controlled two corporations, claiming the conduct amounted to extortion of her civil rights, contractual job rights, and partnership interests. The court treated the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a motion for failure to state a claim and denied it as to the RICO count, finding that the complaint could support a Hobbs Act violation with intangible property and that the alleged acts over five to six months might establish the required pattern and continuity of racketeering activity. The court granted the motion as to the § 1985(3) count because the allegations involved only one individual and thus could not establish a conspiracy. The rulings are based on taking the complaint's allegations as true and assessing whether the plaintiff could prove any viable theory.
The plaintiffs, owners of copyrighted musical compositions represented by ASCAP, sued the defendants who own and operate the Club Cafe for six counts of copyright infringement arising from unauthorized public performances of their songs on October 4, 1991. The defendants had previously held an ASCAP license that was terminated in 1989 for nonpayment of fees amid a dispute over the club's entertainment policy, and they continued to host performances without authorization despite multiple warnings. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding the defendants had conceded the essential elements of infringement, holding the partnership, corporation, and individual officer jointly and severally liable based on the officer's control and financial interest, and awarding $15,000 in statutory damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and a permanent injunction against further unauthorized performances. The core reasoning relied on undisputed facts of ownership, public performance without license, and vicarious liability standards under the Copyright Act.
